Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

230. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)¹

Washington, March 31, 1987

SUBJECT

• JCS RESPONSE TO NSDD–250

In November, after the President returned from Reykjavik, we issued NSDD–250. The NSDD was issued against a background of criticism of the President’s proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles within ten years, and of charges that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been adequately consulted in preparing that proposal. The NSDD set forth the rationale behind the assertion that the United States would be safer were ballistic missiles eliminated, and tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a plan on how (not whether) to move to a ballistic missile free world by 1996. The NSDD further directed that the plan not increase the risk of the United States during the transition and not require significant increases above the existing DOD fiscal guidance.

We have now received the JCS response. It concludes that we can reach a ballistic missile free world by 1996 without increased risk or without increased cost, but cannot do both. The JCS note there is no indication the Soviets are willing to eliminate ballistic missiles. For this reason, and because of the prohibitive cost ($388 billion above the current program) of such an elimination without increasing risk, the JCS believe the goal of the total elimination of ballistic missiles should be deferred and the United States should pursue more affordable intermediate goals, such as the current U.S. 50 percent strategic arms reductions proposal.

The substance of the JCS recommendations is contained in an eight page Executive Summary (Tab B).² Almost certainly this is the only portion of the report the Chiefs themselves have actually read; the extensive supporting analysis (100 plus pages) was probably briefed to them but not reviewed in detail. We do not believe it warrants your personal review and have not forwarded it.

Both the JCS response and an earlier response from the DCI suggest (correctly in our view) that there is little likelihood of the Soviets agreeing to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles. Both, however, then go on to suggest that the Soviets might gain significant advantages from such an elimination without some massive U.S. spending program. For all the reasons set forth in NSDD–250, we continue to find this second conclusion difficult to accept. Since, however, it is clear that the first conclusion—the total lack of Soviet interest in eliminating ballistic missiles—is correct, and since the President has already agreed with Mrs. Thatcher to give first priority to the 50 percent reduction proposal, the JCS recommendations clearly support current policy and no useful purpose will be served by debating the rationale.

Secretary Weinberger’s forwarding memorandum (Tab A)³ points out a number of the complexities and limitations of the JCS analysis. Although not explicitly stated, this is intended to refute the conclusion (which some in the Department of State may have drawn) that just as the cost to eliminate ballistic missiles through negotiations is too high, so too is the cost to eliminate ballistic missiles through development and deployment of defenses. With regard to the specific Reykjavik proposal, Secretary Weinberger notes the “enormous and really quite unachievable costs” of responding to “proposals such as came out of the Iceland summit”. In addition, he stresses that eliminating ballistic missiles would require deploying improved air defenses, and increasing the number of Stealth bombers. Compressing these adjustments, as well as other force adjustments, into ten years is what leads to the high costs. In addition, the Secretary explicitly notes that Reykjavik is flawed since SDI would be needed before the elimination of ballistic missiles, while Reykjavik provided for deployment after such elimination. While no useful purpose will be served by raising this point with the President, it does seem to us that if this were a football game Secretary Weinberger’s repudiation of a proposal which grew out of his concept of eliminating ballistic missiles, and which was tabled in Iceland with the encouragement and support of his senior arms control representative, would lead to a 15-yard penalty for piling on.

We believe the best course of action is to quietly close the door on any further military analysis of the elimination of ballistic missiles, at least until there is some evidence of Soviet willingness to discuss this question seriously. We therefore recommend you send the Executive Summary of the report, along with Secretary Weinberger’s comments, to the President, using the memorandum at Tab I⁴ for that purpose. We do not believe a written response to the JCS would be useful. Such a response has a high possibility of gaining further, uncontrolled, distribution and turning into a “President Backs Off Eliminating Ballistic Missiles at JCS Insistence” headline. Instead, we recommend that, once the President has reviewed Tab I, and pending other direction from him, you quietly inform the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense that the President has read the Chiefs’ report, and agrees that no further action is necessary for now.

Prior to accepting this recommendation, you should recall that during a February 25 meeting with the JCS, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Shultz, and yourself, the Secretary of State displayed some interest in pursuing the possibility of moving forward with the elimination of ballistic missiles. Shultz expressed the view that the economy could certainly sustain the additional costs involved. You, in turn, suggested that once the JCS analysis was formally transmitted, it might be appropriate to have a meeting or for the Secretary of State to articulate his views in writing. (Bill Cockell’s Memorandum for the Record on the subject is at Tab II.)⁵ Unless you feel you have made a commitment to Secretary Shultz we would strongly discourage a meeting. There is no realistic chance that the Soviets are going to accept the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, and, despite the Secretary of State’s optimism, no realistic chance that if the Soviets did accept such an elimination we could increase the budget by a third of a trillion dollars above the currently programmed levels (which are, probably, optimistic already). Thus there is no useful purpose to be served by keeping this drill going, and we recommend that it be brought to a quick and quiet end.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the Executive Summary of the report to the President.⁶

That, once the President has reviewed the report, you inform the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense that the President has reviewed the JCS report and is in agreement that we need take no further action on NSDD 250 for now.⁷

Bill Cockell, Fritz Ermarth and Mike Donley concur.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 94, NSDD 250. Top Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Signed.”
2. Printed as Tab B, Document 231.
3. Printed as Tab A, Document 231.
4. Printed as Document 231.
5. Printed as Document 219.
6. Carlucci approved the recommendation.
7. Carlucci approved the recommendation.