228. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to the White House Chief of Staff (Baker) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- The Congress and SDI Negotiations
The decision that we speak with one voice on this issue and that the voice should be your joint voice is a good one. I will move out of the picture except to the extent that you invite me or where you feel I can be of assistance.
Since returning from Geneva a week ago, I have met with a number of Members of Congress, including a lunch today with Tom Foley, the new head of the House Observer Group. Let me summarize my impressions and recommendations.
We must, of course, talk to, and deal with, the leadership. The Arms Control Observer Groups in both Houses could be a good instrument for these exchanges. It will be more difficult to work out an arrangement with the House than with the Senate. Jim Wright is not an easy person to work with and is increasingly partisan. He is also responsive to the growing “leftist” strength among the House Democrats. He can, however, be reached by arguments outlining the clear national security implications of a given course of action and when he can overcome his suspicions that the White House is seeking partisan advantage. Tom Foley reports that the House leadership, including the whip organization, is currently negative about the “deal” idea, particularly after Sam Nunn’s speech. They have ABM and SDI amendments in the works, and believe they have the votes. Many are raring to go. However, Foley believes the current negativism can be overcome with a vigorous effort. The Republican leadership, knowing the realities of the voting balance, would welcome a peaceful resolution of the issue, even if it is only in the form of a temporary truce.
The Senate Democrats are also not enthusiastic about a “deal,” but are pragmatic and want very much to support the Geneva negotiating process. Bob Byrd and Sam Nunn are sour because of the TTBT ratification difficulties, which they see as a credibility problem for the [Page 838] Administration. On the other hand, Alan Cranston, who has influence with the liberals, would like to support and strengthen the prospects for the Geneva negotiations.
On the Senate Republican side, the leadership would like to know what the White House wants. Malcolm Wallop, Pete Wilson and their associates are hostile and suspicious that SDI may be on the block. They have not had an explanation of the “deal,” nor has the case for the “deal” been presented to them.
It is my opinion that a truce through the end of the year or March 31, 1988 at the outside, is feasible. Those who want to attack the Administration on ABM and SDI might be willing to forego that effort for a short period, but not for too long. Those who want to push for the “broad” interpretation can also wait, if it is not for too long.
The funding levels talked about in the papers prepared for the President are, in my opinion, not realistic. We should be clear on this point, even though it may reduce the attraction of the “deal” for us. It will not be difficult to achieve the same level of appropriation for next year as for the current fiscal year, with a small increase to reflect inflation. The Senate might be willing to stretch that sum to four billion dollars, plus DOE funding, but it will be difficult to get that figure in the House. We must, however, keep pushing to get the number up. We can make the argument that we want an increase in appropriations in order to strengthen our negotiating posture with the Soviets, but that will not carry us as high as the figures mentioned in our White House working papers.
In view of the fact that the appropriations cycle has begun, I do not see any virtue in postponing the beginning of a serious exploration with the leadership. On the other hand, Howard, you are the expert in that field.
I believe, finally, that our first step—even without arriving at a final deal—should be to reach a truce until after the Secretary of State’s visit to Moscow on April 13–16.
The Senate Observers have asked me to meet with them on Monday at 4:00 p.m.2