Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

157. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, November 19, 1986, 10:27 a.m.

SUBJECT

• S-W-P Breakfast 11–19: Arms Control

Cap opened the discussion by saying he was going to return to an “old wound.” Specifically, he wondered what we thought we would accomplish in the December 3–5 arms control discussions with the Soviets which Max had arranged. Do we need a whole new set of instructions? George Shultz said he thought none were required. What, then, is the point of the discussions, Cap asked. George replied that “in the battle of imagery” we want to be seen as the people who are willing to engage in discussions. “In the battle of substance,” following a long gestation period, at Reykjavik the Soviets essentially agreed to our positions on INF and START . . . there will still be some arguing—details remain to be worked out, but in essence the Soviets accepted our positions, and we made progress in things like counting rules. Then at Vienna, Shevardnadze “kind of stiff armed us”; but that (Soviet) posture is already breaking up by virtue of the planned December meeting, “so we should scratch around” and see what’s possible.

Cap asked who had requested the December meeting. George indicated that at Vienna Shevardnadze wanted a special group to meet in order to discuss what is permitted under the ABM Treaty. We had said no to that proposal, but indicated that we would be amenable to inter-round discussions, “sort of like last summer,”² and this is the result. George said he had complete confidence in the capability of our negotiators to manage the discussions sensibly.

Cap replied that he had a somewhat different view of the situation. At Reykjavik, he said, the Soviets pursued two paths. They tried to tempt us with some attractive agreements, “then slammed the door on SDI.” If we had agreed with the Soviets they would have achieved their goal of killing SDI. If we did not agree, then the Soviets could portray SDI as the obstacle, and try to mobilize public opinion against it. This is reminiscent of the approach the Soviets used in the ’70s—to portray us as the source of the problem; then, in our eagerness to get agreement, we would “eliminate the problem”, as the Soviets had defined it. But, in this case, their attempts to mobilize US opinion against SDI failed; the polls showed increased support after Reykjavik, though in England, Germany and Italy (but not France) they may have made some headway, supported by a general increase in anti-American feeling. “So that’s why I worry about continued meetings in which the Soviets could advance their (propaganda) aim further . . . I don’t think the Soviets were serious about their offer on the first day at Reykjavik.” George replied that, of course, we can never be sure how serious the Soviets were in their positions at Reykjavik; though it’s obvious they would like to cripple SDI. Their positions are always a mixture of propaganda and serious intent. But if we refuse to talk to them, that just adds fuel to their propaganda campaign. At Reykjavik the President did well. He pocketed the Soviet concessions. We wanted zero-zero INF. It’s there now, and the Soviets won’t be able to get it off the table. In his Eureka College speech,³ the President talked about 5000 RVs. “The Reykjavik number is below that, probably.” We made headway on counting rules—that’s on the table. The Soviets want Pershing out of Europe, he continued, “so I think they’ll de-link INF. That’s an important objective for them.” START is more questionable. There is a stronger defensive connection there. Cap again said he felt it was important for us to be cautious about “any backdoor measures” the Soviets use to try to kill SDI. Cap then went on to observe that “Mrs. Thatcher’s press statement” was a good one. George corrected him, noting that it was not “her” statement, but the product of negotiations. Her great worry, Cap said, was that we would give up our strategic modernization program “and wipe out everything at the ten year point.” Cap had told her that there was no intention to give up an effective deterrent. What she wanted most was a statement regarding TRIDENT D–5 and support for the British program.

George commented that we need a heavily coordinated approach to the Europeans as we go into the December series of NATO meetings. He noted that he had given a speech in Chicago Monday⁴ on arms control “which was heavily cleared,” so he assumes it represents a coordinated USG position. Al Keel observed that there are two incorrect interpretations of the President’s position which are receiving play in the media currently, including an erroneous twist on the speech the President gave last night.⁵ “The President just reiterated our existing priorities” for the Thatcher statement, he said; there was no change. And the Shultz reference to the possible retention of some ballistic missiles after 10 years is not a change in Administration position either. He was speaking hypothetically. (Shultz noted that he had discussed that part of the speech personally with the President). Al went on, noting that the press is trying to create the impression that the President is backing away from Reykjavik. That is not the case.

The media are engaged in a frenzied effort to conjure up an image of disarray in the administration. We must be particularly careful today to ensure that the three press spokesmen emphasize that the President has no intent of backing away from the proposals tabled at Reykjavik. Fred Ikle commented that he had talked to Paul Nitze about the concept of retaining a few ballistic missiles. Fred is not convinced that such missiles would be useful in the context of a hedge against Soviet violations (i.e., the fact that both sides were allowed to retain some missiles could actually make it easier for the Soviets to cheat.) George suggested that we should work up some fairly extensive talking points for all to use to be sure we’re presenting a coordinated and correct position publicly. Cap noted that “we should do more in the way of joint preparations” for the upcoming NATO meetings than we typically do. He expects the meetings to be “extremely unpleasant.” George said he didn’t think so. He’s been to two meetings with the Allies since Reykjavik, and they weren’t so bad. It’s rather interesting, he noted, that some of the Allied governments now love SDI—because they see it getting in the way of arms control! Cap agreed it’s remarkable to see how many Europeans love nukes now.

1. Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 49822. Secret. Copies were sent to Rodman, McDaniel, Thompson, Pearson, Brooks, Mahley, Matlock, Sommer, and Keel. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found.
2. Reference is to August 11–12 meetings in Moscow; memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Documents 142, 143 and 144.
3. Reference is to Reagan’s commencement address at Eureka College on May 9, 1982, in which he outlined U.S. objectives in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks set to begin the following month. The speech is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 99.
4. November 17. Reference is to Shultz’s speech on “Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Future of Deterrence,” before the International House of Chicago and the Chicago Sun-Times Forum at the University of Chicago. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1987, pp. 31–35)
5. Reference is to Reagan’s remarks at the Ethics and Public Policy Center Anniversary dinner at the Washington Hilton on November 18. For the text, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book II, pp. 1563–1567.