158. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT
- Your meeting in the Oval Office, Friday, 21 November2
(S) Topic: Our Strategy for the Missile Threat.
I believe it’s important at this time that the President be made to feel comfortable and confident again of his policy on SDI and the Soviet missile threat. The loss of the Senate, the Thatcher criticism, the Soviet refusal to follow-up on Reykjavik, and the atmospheric spill-over from the Iran issue could create openings for those who wish to talk the President into revising his SDI position. You should take this opportunity to remind the President that his long-term policy “to make missiles impotent and obsolete” must not be abandoned and that in the next two years we can build on the progress made since 1983, firmly to establish the President’s missile policy in the defense community, in Congress and in the country.
(S) Some Talking Points.
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- The more we in the Pentagon look at the 1990s and beyond, the more important the goal to overcome the Soviet missile threat.
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- In the long term, our democracies cannot build a defense effort on a strategy that relies on suicidal threats. MAD is not a viable way to maintain our Alliances.
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- The SDI research program has been going well, has had many unexpected successes in technology developments, and the Allies now very much want to be part of it.
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- We can’t tell whether the Soviet concessions in Reykjavik on INF and START were genuine. But it’s clear from private and public Soviet statements that none of our strategic programs—not the MX, not stealth—provides as much an incentive for them to move on arms control as does SDI.
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- The Allied anxieties about getting pushed into sudden missile reductions are passing. NATO never likes change at first. They didn’t want to deploy INF, now they don’t want to trade INF for a 90% reduction in Soviet SS–20s. But they realize now that the Soviets are stalling and that we will maintain adequate nuclear deterrence, with or without missile reductions. And they begin to realize the danger of being confronted by Soviet missile forces. In fact, there is good support now in NATO for working on defenses against the shorter range Soviet missiles (Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile systems).
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- We must stay on track with SDI and our arms control position. The underlying trends are in favor of success if we remain steady.
The Issue of Phased Deployment and The Correct Treaty Interpretation.
(1) I believe there is a good case for an evolutionary deployment of strategic defenses. The more the Soviets see us move toward a deployed SDI, the greater will be their interest in actually completing and implementing a reduction agreement (instead of just pretending they would agree to reduce). We have studied ways to move to a phased deployment of SDI. I would like to have you hear a briefing on this as soon as convenient.
(2) The decisions necessary to support a deployed system in the mid-1990’s, especially with regard to the ABM Treaty interpretation, must be taken in 1987 to protect the strategic defense options of a future President. This need for earlier decision results from the success of our research effort.
Our research has advanced technology much faster than political roadblocks have been cleared away. Our SDI research is increasingly constrained by the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It is imperative that we can soon follow the legally correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
- Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Arms Control (President Gorbachev)—1986–1988. Secret.↩
- According to the President’s Daily Diary, Weinberger met with Reagan and Poindexter in the Oval Office from 1:01 until 1:35 p.m. on November 21. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found.↩
- Ikle signed the memorandum “Fred” above his typed signature.↩