Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

147. Electronic Message From William Cockell of the National Security Council Staff to Robert Pearson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, October 29, 1986, 2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• S-W-P Breakfast 29 Oct: Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting

Cap asked whether Shultz had an agenda for the upcoming Vienna meeting. Shultz replied “more or less;” yesterday agreement was reached on a two meeting approach—Wednesday² afternoon and early morning on Thursday³ (Shevardnadze has to leave late in the morning). They could work between meetings, of course, as in Reykjavik. The Soviets will want to discuss “laboratories,” he believes. Shultz is willing to hear them on that; but his principal objective, he said, will be to nail down the areas on which there was agreement at Reykjavik, get confirmation in areas where there is specific language, and get language in areas where there is none. Cap replied it was important that in the process of setting out positions we did not slop over into substantive negotiations without proper preparation. “We should establish what both tabled and let that be the case, and then we can go on from there.” In addition, we need to get things separated out. “The Soviets will not be willing to do that,” he believed, “except in the INF area, where there is no question they will—they want the missiles out of Europe.” Shultz observed that we want to end the debate over what was or was not agreed at Reykjavik—“get the positions out there.” Cap asked whether we had anything in our proposal about “laboratories.” JMP replied that we used the language contained in the President’s July 25 letter—R&D which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Cap mentioned that he had just received a letter from Abe⁴ which describes the testing he has to do, and notes that, in some cases, it won’t be clear what he has to do until portions of the program are farther along, and the results of initial testing are in hand. He will send a copy over for JMP. Shultz continued that there are a few items which are implicit in our positions which we need to bring out explicitly. The first relates to the “reservations” which were talked about at Monday’s NSPG⁵ (i.e., supreme national interest clause, and the contingency of an ABM Treaty violation). The second is the point that we can’t go forward if the British, French and Chinese are not in the agreement. The third is the necessity to deal with CW and BW. And the fourth is the importance of focussing on conventional deterrence as we reduce strategic forces. In addition, we need to go through the Reykjavik record and pick out those areas where Gorbachev talked strongly about the importance of verification, lift them out, and develop a separate statement on the importance of the kind of verification that would go with massive force reductions. The Soviets, of course, won’t buy that, but we need to start them getting used to it. In short, he concluded, our efforts at Vienna should be concentrated on consolidating the ground travelled at Reykjavik. Weinberger asked if this, in effect, meant a full-blown resumption of negotiations. Shultz reiterated that he would characterize it simply as a consolidation. “We want to grab Soviet agreement with our position on START, for example, and solidify it.” Cap returned to the issue of British, French and Chinese systems and observed that we can’t raise allies’ systems—“that’s up to them.” Shultz replied that the Soviets won’t completely eliminate their ballistic missile force “while the British and French stand there with a thousand warheads.” We need to fill out the record, he continued, so the President won’t be open to attack on the grounds that he hasn’t thought through all the implications of what was talked about at Reykjavik. Cap responded that he thought there had been agreement with the Soviets that they would not raise the British and French issue. Shultz replied that was in the context of INF, “but it’s inconceivable they wouldn’t raise it” in connection with the proposal to go to zero ballistic missiles. Cap noted that, in any event, we should not be the party to raise the issue. He then went on to reiterate that he was concerned about Shultz’s “opening the negotiations in full form.” That could easily slip over into a statement of new positions. JMP noted that one of the first things we need to get consolidated is the work program outside of the arms control issues—human rights, regional issues, etc. The substance was agreed upon in the working group chaired by Roz Ridgway, but the meeting ended before the heads of state could get to it.

Shultz commented that there is lots we need to get on the public record and nailed down. JMP observed that if we can get separation on INF, START, and nuclear testing—and leave ABM/SDI to be treated independently—that would be the desirable outcome. Cap commented that with all that Gorbachev has said since Reykjavik about linkage—and the recalling of Karpov to “reeducate” him re linkage, “I don’t think we’re going to get anything.” JMP commented that it would be good if Shultz brought up Cap’s invitation to the Soviet Defense Minister. Shultz observed that it would be better to invite Akhromeyev—“he’s pretty good.” JMP noted that was his ultimate motive—to get Akhromeyev over here.

Shultz concluded by observing that there are three other things pertinent to the agenda for Vienna. The first is Gorbachev’s proposal to allow Russian language broadcasts by us if we reciprocate by permitting English language broadcasts by the Soviets. JMP asked if Shultz had seen the intelligence report⁶ which said because of Chernobyl, and the shutting down of similar reactors in the USSR, the Russians have an electrical shortage. Their motive in avoiding jamming of VOA might be to save electricity. Shultz went on to note the final issue related to visits of labor leaders. An arrangement had been worked out with Lane Kirkland to support an exchange of visits. Finally, there were some economic issues the Soviets wanted to discuss. Shultz noted that what he had outlined was “more of an agenda that we can cover,” and that the arms control issues should head the list. Cap observed that if we reach agreement with the Soviets on the issue of broadcasts, we should insist that Arbatov be the Soviet broadcaster—“he’s so repulsive.”

1. Source: National Archives, PROFS system, Reagan Administration, ID 44122. Secret. Also sent to McDaniel, Rodman, Matlock, Brooks, Kraemer, Keel, and Poindexter. No minutes of the breakfast meeting were found. A repeat of an electronic message from Cockell to Linhard, October 29 at 12:47 p.m.
2. November 5. For the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 6.
3. November 6. For the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 7.
4. Not found.
5. October 27. For the minutes of the NSPG meeting, at which participants discussed the negotiating instructions for the Defense and Space talks in Geneva, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 3.
6. Not further identified.