Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

146. Electronic Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Keel)¹

Washington, October 29, 1986, 12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NSDD on Reykjavik Follow-up.

I read the first draft on the way out here to Evansville.² I think it is a very good start on documenting the President’s thinking. It almost sounds like he wrote it. The following areas need some more work.

We need a way of addressing a constant “risk level” over the time period being considered. If we don’t hold that constant we will be comparing apples and oranges. On the other hand we believe that the elimination of ballistic missiles will be an inherently more stable deterrence because of the longer flight times. That may very well mean some arms control restrictions on sub launched SLCM’s. Now we may want to reduce the risk level lower but that should be calculated as a delta for reduced risk.

On SDI we need to point out the new environment that we are talking about results in reduced capabilities for system to be deployed. But since we cannot be certain that we will get an agreement and because we need the leverage produced by the possibility of being able to develop a fully capable system, we need a research and development program that has the potential of producing a fully capable system. In terms of the analysis of what the world would be like in 1996, the chiefs should be able to assume we could deploy ERIS type systems. I believe we know how to do that today. The uncertainties of the more difficult fully capable system should not produce uncertainties as to whether we could defend against third countries or concealed weapons. The uncertainties of the fully blown system should only enter into the leverage that SDI produces and the parallel path of unilateral deployment.

The conclusion needs to be beefed up to make the strong point that the President wants to know how to do it rather than whether he can do it.

Lastly, a paragraph that gives them lead on what constitutes deterrence would be helpful.

Thanks.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–094, NSDD 250. Secret. Copies were sent to Linhard, McDaniel, Cockell, and Thompson.
2. Not found. Poindexter accompanied Reagan to Evansville, Indiana, where the President was campaigning ahead of the November 4 midterm elections. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book II, pp. 1468–1472)