Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

3. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, October 27, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• Arms Control Follow-up to Reykjavik (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President

• State

  • Secretary George Shultz

• Treasury

  • Secretary James Baker

• Defense

  • Secretary Caspar Weinberger
  • Mr. Richard Perle

• Energy

  • Secretary John Herrington

• OMB

  • Mr. James Miller

• ACDA

  • Mr. Kenneth Adelman

• CIA

  • Mr. Douglas George

• JCS

  • Admiral William J. Crowe
  • General Larry D. Welch
  • LTG John Moellering

• White House

  • Chief of Staff Regan
  • VADM John M. Poindexter
  • Dr. Alton J. Keel
  • Mr. William Cockell
  • Colonel Robert Linhard

• Special Advisors

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny

The meeting opened at 11:00 a.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at Tab A.² (U)

VADM Poindexter opened the meeting using his prepared talking points. He then asked Secretary Shultz to comment on the results of his consultations following the President’s meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. (C)

Secretary Shultz: I met with my NATO counterparts in Brussels, Ambassador Rowny travelled in Asia, Ken Adelman has been to Australia, Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Kohl has been in Washington and UK Prime Minister Thatcher is coming, and Secretary Weinberger discussed the subject at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting in Scotland.³ Our openess was appreciated by all. In addition, our efforts with the press have turned the story around. By and large our Allies like the results in INF, like the idea of something in nuclear testing to get the issue off their backs, and like the breakthrough in START. (C)

The idea of eliminating all ballistic missiles was in our July position. Now we need to look at what our hole cards are. I highlighted what has to go with such a step in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional forces and British, French and Chinese ballistic missiles. On the whole, the reaction was good. As people think about the world in this context, they have a great deal to do to understand its consequences. (S)

VADM Poindexter then asked Secretary Weinberger to debrief the reaction of the Allies at the recent NPG. (U)

Weinberger: Our public posture is fine. We issued the strongest communique ever.⁴ The Allies continue to criticize INF linkage by the Soviets. Their unity is high. In private, however, there are people who are worried about the sufficiency of deterrence. Will we be able to bring up our conventional forces when our nuclear forces are decreased? All reductions proposals must be made in the context of deterrence equations that work. In bringing up conventional forces the Allies are worried about verification. They also all agree that conventional assurances from the United States hinge on Congressional funding while the Soviets have no similar problem. Finally they are concerned with Soviet refire capability and the lack of adequate INF verification. In the end, all were convinced and signed the communique as a sign of unity. They recognized that without ballistic missiles we will have a different type of deterrence, and that to maintain deterrence will require the support of Congress, etc. They are all worried about sufficiency. Admiral Crowe will discuss sufficiency later. (S)

VADM Poindexter then turned to the subject of instructions to negotiators, using his prepared talking points but modifying them to note (a) that Soviet Emissary Viktor Karpov had been travelling and had been taking a different position than the Soviets were taking in Geneva and (b) that START and INF instructions had been completed and sent so that only Defense and Space issues needed to be discussed. He suggested beginning with the issue of whether to discuss with the Soviets what is and is not permitted by the ABM Treaty, and called on Secretary Shultz to open the discussion. (S)

Shultz: If we are to reach the outcome we seek we will need to resolve this issue. It is well to start laying the ground now so that the sides can have a sense of the issue and why there has been no progress. Our negotiators should (1) express patiently and forcefully our broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty restrictions on testing, (2) do some creative listening, that is, listen to see when the Soviets describe laboratories what they mean. Shevardnadze used his hands to indicate the laboratories were like a box, while Dubinin suggested laboratories could be outdoor test ranges. We should let them talk and find out what they mean. (3) We should not now engage in active negotiations on this subject. Now is not the time for such negotiations. (S)

The President: I could not agree more. We should not begin negotiations that will lead to concessions. We know what we meant in regard to the ABM Treaty. When we go back to them we are talking about a treaty now where we will share the benefits of SDI research. They did not believe that we would share those benefits when we talked in Reykjavik. (S)

Shultz: He [Gorbachev] didn’t say that he wouldn’t share the benefits if he had such a system. (S)

The President: They never talk about cheating. There is a Russian proverb “Doboryai no probia” which means trust, but verify. (S)

Weinberger: I agree, we should not negotiate on this subject. We should not let them talk about what they can’t negotiate. All the things we wish to do under the treaty are not obstacles to agreement. The obstacle is that the Soviets don’t want us to work on this at all. The obstacle is they want us not to work in the same areas where they are already working. I am against discussing this subject. I disagree with George [Shultz] that ultimately we will need to resolve it. Any outcome other than the broad interpretation is less than what we need. The current instructions that we reject further limitations is all we need. A middle ground is bad. If we limit defenses in the context of a ten-year development program, we won’t get there. (S)

The President: If the treaty bears this out, and we have not used the clause that it is a problem, can we simply lay the text on the table? (S)

Weinberger: You have already said the broad interpretation is correct. Conversation on this subject can only cut us back from where we are. We should stress the broad interpretation. (S)

The President: Can’t we simply state that we are following the broad interpretation and that we will make no concessions? (S)

Weinberger: I am worried about any discussion of this. (C)

Poindexter: We will have to get into this with Congress. Can we turn now to the subject of non-withdrawal? (C)

Weinberger: It is difficult for a nation to say we will not withdraw from an agreement that is being violated by the Soviets. I have argued against the phrase “non-withdrawal”. We could say not deploy or not test, but we should not say non-withdrawal. (S)

The President: My going ahead with this approach assumes that we can’t get a system within ten years. (S)

Weinberger: In all likelihood that is correct. But this is different from saying that we will not withdraw from the treaty, especially if the Soviets continue to violate it. We should not accept non-withdrawal under any circumstances. Our goal is not to preserve the ABM Treaty. You should state to our negotiators that what we need is a new treaty. That treaty can provide that we won’t deploy for ten years, but we can’t accept an unlimited non-withdrawal commitment. Non-withdrawal is geared to preserving the ABM Treaty, and that is not our goal. Our negotiators should make it clear that what we are after is a new treaty. (S)

Shultz: I agree that a non-withdrawal pledge must not waive our ability to withdraw from the treaty for reasons of extreme national interests. I don’t disagree with Cap. (S)

The President: We are doing the same thing they are. We believe that we are preserving the Treaty. We can’t look that far ahead, so we don’t want to waive all our rights. We will adhere to the six-months notice requirement. Could we not say that six months is all it calls for and they have violated the treaty? (S)

Crowe: I think it is important that you hear the JCS views. We have tried to keep a low profile, but we have done a lot of analyses on the military balance and our ability to deter. We are supportive of arms control, including reductions in strategic ballistic missiles. The time frames discussed at Reykjavik we had not considered before. Fifty percent reductions in five years and zero ballistic missiles in ten years have not been analyzed. We don’t have a computer model to help us envision the world in 1996. We need to make a lot of assumptions. (S)

The JCS conclusions are as follows. On INF we concur with the INF approach. With regard to a fifty percent strategic offensive reduction in five years, the risks are a bit higher than today. If, however, we have a discreet proposal, and if we modernize along with the reductions, and if the conventional situation gets a little better, then we can support a fifty percent reduction. We did not address verification. (S)

Going to zero ballistic missiles in ten years is a real challenge. It will take some time until all our analysis is complete. There would a whole new climate of deterrence in such a world. We have identified several issues:

—First, the triad would have to change to either a monad or a dyad with bombers and SLCMs.

—Second, we would need to reappraise our use of weapons in counterforce and flexible response. We would have to come up with new policies. We don’t exactly know how NATO extended deterrence would work in this kind of world. We need guidance.

—Third, if SSBNs are eliminated then the entire Soviet approach to ASW will change. The Soviets will be able to shift much more of their forces to the open ocean.

—Fourth, we need to ensure we have adequate deterrence each day from today to the time we reach zero ballistic missiles. That means we have to look at when we shift from SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] to SSGNs [cruise missile carrying submarines] and how we make that shift.

—Fifth, we know we will require more bombers, more tankers, improved air defense beyond what we have now, converting SSBNs to SSGNs, improved ASW to counter Soviet cruise missile-carrying submarines, and improved conventional forces.

—Sixth, we will need to persuade Congress and the public to increase dollars as our strategic forces go down. (S)

The military issues are much more complex than the other issues. The Chiefs support zero ballistic missiles and we are ready to run reasonable risks, but stability is the name of the game and it will require conventional improvements and other steps. Some steps can’t be taken in ten years (more bombers and air defense for example). Thus we will face gaps. We may be at a disadvantage at some point during this phase down. The transition to zero ballistic missiles would involve high risks. We can’t advise moving to such a situation in ten years. We have no doubt this will have to extend beyond 1996 but we don’t know how far beyond. We need to get a better understanding of costs; this will not be a cost free exercise. We also need strong Allied support. We need an interagency effort to determine the policy that we will follow ten years in the future if we are to move to a zero ballistic missile world. (S)

Weinberger: The Soviets have an immensely strong air defense. We need to recognize that we face a great risk here. So our time table has never been reviewed and needs to be. We need a time table and if an effective defense takes longer then we will have to go longer. (S)

Crowe: We have the technology for defense, but we need the funding. (C)

Shultz: I welcome this thoughtful discussion. We need to find our way to zero ballistic missiles and zero nuclear weapons. If Reykjavik does nothing but shake up people that’s fine. Adequate deterrence in a non-nuclear world means more money for conventional armaments. What we are buying for that money is getting away from being 30 minutes away from the end of civilization. We need to challenge the idea that we can’t do this. We have a five trillion dollar economy. Now we are spending $280 billion for defense; we need to look in the range of $400 billion a year in order to get something very important. Much larger resources are available than we are using. (S)

I want to say something about Reykjavik. We need to try to make it clear that when you said you were in favor of eliminating all nuclear weapons, and people were scandalized, that you were not making a specific proposal. We should simply say that our positions are what we formally tabled. We are very public on being ready to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles. (S)

Poindexter: The President’s 1983 speech sought to eliminate ballistic missiles, with the ultimate aim of making all nuclear weapons obsolete.⁵ In January 1986 we agreed that the ultimate objective was to eliminate all nuclear weapons. But this requires a balance of conventional forces, shifting the competition to peaceful means, etc. The President’s position has been clearly placed on the record here. (S)

The President: I want to assure you I understand the calls for a shift to conventional forces is the basis of deterrence. We know our NATO Allies are only scratching the surface. They have the GNP and the people that the Soviets can’t match. The Soviets need to realize that their economy can’t go much further. They are up against an economic block in conventional forces. If the Soviets have to face an arms race with the rest, they can’t win. This is what we are counting on, all the way down to rifles in the hands of our Allies. Then there will be no first strike advantage. We will pay through the nose, but we will not permit them superiority. (S)

At the tail end of the discussions in Reykjavik, they wanted to confine SDI to laboratory testing. Gorbachev assailed our language on ballistic missiles. He offered all nuclear weapons-rather than all ballistic missiles. We said, well, let’s get back to our discussion on laboratory testing. We just said we understand what you are offering. We did not agree. Then we went back to discussing laboratory testing. (S)

I was campaigning last week on campuses. The biggest political rally was at the University of Oklahoma. There were signs saying to keep SDI, and also some signs saying get rid of SDI. I pointed out that people were misinterpreting SDI. It is a totally defensive system and we have offered to share its benefits. I got a standing ovation and there were no signs raised. Uniforms were once despised on campus, now they are accepted. The kids were on their feet when I spoke of their military in uniform. This is a different generation. (S)

Weinberger: You changed their views. Gorbachev does want an agreement. We have leverage because of this. (S)

Regan: Let me ask a question. Where does partial deployment fit? (C)

Weinberger: We are authorized to deploy in one area only. (U)

Regan: Let’s let this be part of the JCS study—complete deployment, partial deployment or what. The budget of the last three years has been six to seven percent of the GNP. In 1988 we could have 320 billion, with 360 billion in 1990. We will have extra money in the budget. What do we do about shaping these budgets? I don’t think we will get much more than six to seven percent of GNP. (C)

Weinberger: We don’t have extra money in the budget. Fifty percent of our budget is personnel. It costs quite a bit to maintain the kind of forces we have. We are doing the best planning we can do. (C)

Regan: If we are going to shift to a new kind of world we need to know it now. If a budget increase is needed to get to zero ballistic missiles, we will have to redefine our priorities. (C)

Weinberger: We need more money, not redefined priorities. (C)

Baker: If we are going to add money in order to go a different type of deterrence we need that knowledge early. (S)

Crowe: Deterrence will be different in this new world. (S)

Weinberger: And we will have to worry because they have such strong air defenses. (S)

Poindexter: But Stealth will help to overcome that advantage. (S)

Crowe: Stealth is a long way in the future. (S)

The President: If we were able to get an agreement and to show the Soviets they are faced with a conventional arms race, that Congress will see what they are doing, that we were going to conventional deterrence without nukes. The Soviets could not keep up with such a race. (S)

Adelman: Before we change deterrence we must first ask (a) is it good for us and (b) is it good for the Europeans. (S)

Poindexter: The question is not whether we are going to go to a zero ballistic missile world, but how best to do it. (S)

Adelman: Then what is the likelihood of any arms control agreement? How practical are such sweeping steps? I think we should concentrate on fifty percent reductions in START. On zero ballistic missiles, I just don’t see it as happening. (S)

Miller: We can’t get the money without cutting the domestic budget or a tax increase. (C)

The President: We ought to be able to find 40 programs no one wants. Again, with us going ahead with SDI the Soviets have another incentive. We will share the benefits with them if we eliminate ballistic missiles. If we don’t eliminate ballistic missiles we will deploy SDI, treaty or no. What will the Soviets do if we have a shield and offensive ballistics? They could think that we have a first strike capability. If they move on fifty percent reductions, we should be able to move further. (S)

Adelman: Does massive arms control then mean massive spending? (S)

The President: Maybe it does. (U)

Poindexter: We will be working with the departments and agencies to structure an answer to the question of what we have to do now in order to be able to go to zero ballistic missiles in ten years. (S)

Admiral Poindexter then drew the meeting to a close. (U)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0139 10/27/1986 [Arms Control] (1). Secret. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Prepared by Linton Brooks.
2. Attached but not printed are an undated memorandum from Poindexter to Reagan outlining the issues to be discussed at the NSPG meeting and talking points for Poindexter.
3. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group met in Gleneagles, Scotland, October 21–22.
4. The communiqué is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 1986, pp. 65–66.
5. Reference is to Reagan’s March 23, 1983, televised address from the Oval Office in which he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. The address is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book I, pp. 437–443, and is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.