Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

78. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (George) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) and the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (Abramowitz)¹

Washington, September 20, 1985

SUBJECT

• [less than 2 lines not declassified] Gorbachev’s Reaction to the Moscow Visit of World Jewish Congress Representatives

[WARNING NOTICE: IN THE EVENT THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS BRIEF RECIPIENTS OF THIS MEMORANDUM ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW, OR ON SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS BY SOVIETS AS DESCRIBED HERE, PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THESE DETAILS SHOULD NOT BE CONVEYED.]

1. [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

2. [1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

a. The 9 September meeting in Moscow between Vadim Zagladin and WJC Representatives was subsequently reviewed at the highest levels of the Soviet government, and the results were considered positive.

b. The Soviet side believes it is dealing with “good people” (at the WJC), but the USSR will continue to require positive signals from the world Jewish community for further progress to occur.

c. As a sign of Soviet good will, Jewish emigration over the next three months will be permitted to increase substantially.

3. [less than 2 lines not declassified]

a. CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev specifically instructed Zagladin to have these comments conveying his positive reaction to the Moscow meetings delivered to a senior WJC official during the week of 16 September. [name not declassified] said Zagladin and Gorbachev thoroughly discussed the WJC meetings shortly after their completion.

b. [name not declassified] said many Central Committee members, including Georgiy Arbatov, were opposed to Zagladin’s meeting with the WJC delegation, but Gorbachev personally overrode these objections and authorized the Moscow discussions. He said Gorbachev specified that the Zagladin–WJC meeting occur in the Kremlin to elevate its importance.

c. [name not declassified] said the Soviets will authorize direct emigration flights if positive results, including a decline in the level of French Jewish criticism of the USSR, are forthcoming at the Gorbachev summit meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand.²

d. According to [name not declassified] the Institute for the USA and Canada (IUSAC) serves as a consultant to the CPSU Central Committee but is not in the Soviet policymaking chain. IUSAC Director Georgiy Arbatov was informed of the WJC visit to Moscow only two days before it occurred. Also, IUSAC official Radomir Bogdanov’s attempted message-passing role³ during the WJC visit was unauthorized at government levels above IUSAC, and represented the Institute’s belated attempt to “jump on the bandwagon.”

4. [name not declassified] further indicated that the Soviets do not wish to discuss the Jewish emigration issue officially with the U.S. Government but that they want to eliminate the issue as an impediment to official Soviet-U.S. negotiations on other matters. He stated that the Soviets view the atmospherics surrounding bilateral relations as crucial to the success of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit.⁴ He also remarked that the Soviets hope the summit will be a substantive and serious meeting. [less than 1 line not declassified] the U.S. at this time is to determine the level of U.S. commitment to a productive summit. He claimed the CPSU CC International Department will formulate Gorbachev’s negotiating posture in advance of the November meeting, [less than 2 lines not declassified].

Clair E. George⁵

1. Source: Reagan Library, 1985 SYS 4 INT, 41101–41200. Secret; Noforn; Nocon; [handling restriction not declassified]
2. In telegram 39555 from Paris, October 3, the Embassy reported on the Mitterrand-Gorbachev meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850704–0730)
3. Not further identified.
4. In an October 22 memorandum to multiple recipients, George wrote: “The Soviet Union is not interested in a discussion regarding human rights at this [Geneva] meeting. However, if the United States insists on raising this subject at the Geneva talks, or at any future time in talks concerning bilateral issues, the Soviets have prepared for Gorbachev a comprehensive file on human rights violations in the United States. (Reagan Library, 1985 SYS 4 INT, 41251–41300) For a memorandum of conversation between Reagan and Gorbachev concerning human rights at the Geneva Summit, see Document 80.
5. Printed from a copy that indicates George signed the original.