Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

65. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 2, 1983

SUBJECT

• Stoessel Mission Results, Follow-up and Prospects

Results

Ambassador Stoessel’s July 4–14 mission to European capitals was largely successful in achieving its primary aims, which were to:

—make our friends and Allies aware of the strong concerns of the President and the USG about the deteriorating Soviet human rights situation; and

—achieve agreement in principle on continuing consultations on Soviet human rights matters after Madrid, with a view toward increasing all our efforts to encourage better Soviet human rights performance.

Allied Responses: The Allies have promised at NATO to get back to us with detailed responses to the ideas we presented in our non-paper (Tab A),² and we expect to have soon more general responses from heads of government to the President’s letter.³ (We have already received positive responses from Kohl and Fanfani.)⁴ The Allies have also agreed to coordinate statements on human rights matters at the close of the Madrid meeting, and to increase NATO activities and consultations on Soviet human rights issues following the close of Madrid. These represent modest steps to transfer as much human rights work as possible from the CSCE NATO caucus to NATO itself when CSCE human rights meetings are not in session, and to use NATO more effectively to coordinate Allied positions and actions on human rights issues.

Neutral Responses: The Stoessel mission also found strong interest among the two neutrals visited (Austria and the Vatican) in bilateral consultations on Soviet and Eastern European human rights matters. Bilateral consultations with Austria, the Vatican and others promise to form a useful adjunct to our consultations in NATO, and among other things will serve as a means of communicating agreed NATO positions to others.

Follow-up

In the near term, we are pursuing five major courses of action.

First, we are planning to follow up Ambassador Stoessel’s initial round of consultations with an expanded series of consultations which will include many countries we had to leave off the July 4–14 trip due to time constraints. Assistant Secretary Abrams plans to go to Canada in mid-September,⁵ and we are tentatively considering asking Ambassador Stoessel to undertake another mission to Europe, this time to Switzerland, Greece, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and perhaps a second stop at NATO Headquarters. We will also be following up at a lower level with the Japanese, since they are a party to Western Embassy human rights discussions in Moscow.

Second, we will be working with the Allies to explore the possibilities for both public and private approaches on human rights. Publicly, Max Kampelman is working with the Allies to arrange a joint press conference by the 16 NATO Heads of Delegation at the closing ceremonies in Madrid at which they would emphasize their commitment to continuing to focus on human rights post-Madrid.⁶ Privately, we want to urge the Europeans to raise human rights performance issues when they see the Soviets at Madrid, at the UNGA and in other bilateral meetings. This is a point you can reinforce with the Allied ministers at the September 8 breakfast in Madrid.⁷

Together these efforts would put the Soviets on notice that although Madrid is over, the Allies’ concern about abysmal Soviet human rights performance is not. We will advise you of the results of our consultations with the allies on this point as preparations get underway for your meeting with Gromyko in Madrid.

Third, we will be consulting with Art Hartman in Moscow about the possibilities for upgrading Embassy human rights consultations to the Ambassadorial level, perhaps creating in Moscow an ad hoc committee of Allied Ambassadors which would meet quarterly to review Allied (and perhaps neutral) efforts to monitor Soviet human rights performance.

Fourth, we will be seeking to include CSCE human rights performance as an issue on the December NATO Ministerial agenda. This would be the first step in our efforts to preserve and expand the NATO caucus process. The ideas presented in our non-paper (Tab A) could serve as a basis for further discussions at the Ministerial.

Finally, beginning in early-September we will start holding meetings and human rights workshops with interested U.S. public groups (Jewish groups, scientific groups, American Psychiatric Association, Freedom House, Amnesty International, P.E.N.) to exchange views on the Soviet human rights situation, to facilitate public discussion in the U.S. of Soviet human rights abuses, and to encourage U.S. groups to work with European counterpart groups on Soviet human rights issues.

Prospects

This preliminary game plan gives us a very full plate of follow-up actions to pursue. It should not be expected that all of the proposed actions, particularly those within NATO, will be greeted with universal acclaim. However, the long run objective—to energize Allied and neutral governments and publics on Soviet human rights issues—is worth the effort. A successfully pursued strategy could eventually encourage increasing Western European aggressiveness in presenting human rights issues to the Soviets. This would, in turn, add to the political pressure on the Soviets to moderate their human rights abuses to the extent that they valued European opinion.

1. Source: Department of State, Soviet Union, 1958–1984, Lot 90D438, Stoessel Mission to Europe, 1983. Confidential. Drafted by Schumaker on August 1 and cleared in EUR/SOV, EUR, HA, C, EUR/RPM, and P.
2. Undated, attached but not printed.
3. See the attachment to Document 61.
4. In telegram 213215 to Bonn, July 29, the Department transmitted the text of Kohl’s July 27 letter, which stated that West German leaders had discussed the issue of Jewish immigration with the Soviets. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830436–0560) In telegram 16099 from Rome, July 12, the Embassy transmitted the text of Fanfani’s letter, which expressed support for American human rights policies. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830429–0604) In telegram 193915 to Athens, the Department provided a summary of Stoessel’s meeting with Fanfani. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830397–0348)
5. In telegram 8001 from Ottawa, October 26, the Embassy provided a summary of Abrams’s discussions with the Canadians. (Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, USSR—Human Rights/Stoessel Mission [2]) In an October 11 letter to Trudeau, Reagan wrote: “I have asked Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams to make a special trip to Canada to let you know of my continuing strong concern about the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, and to extend my thanks for the splendid assistance which the Government of Canada has already given in helping us to carry this message of concern to our European friends and allies.” (Ibid.)
6. Not further identified.
7. Telegram 9009 from Shultz’s delegation in Madrid, September 7, transmitted Shultz’s remarks at the September 6 breakfast. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830516–0130)