Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

53. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, October 2, 1981

SUBJECT

• Human Rights Policy

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Your speech² and Ambassador Stoessel’s testimony³ established a new direction for U.S. human rights policy. To sustain its credibility, there is now an urgent need for more detailed guidance. We recommend the approach developed here and in the Tabs. It is not a total policy, but specifies (a) the basic principles we should follow, and (b) how to deal with urgent near-term decisions forced on us by events and by legislation.

WHY WE NEED FULLER ELABORATION OF POLICY

Congressional belief that we may not have a consistent policy threatens to disrupt important foreign policy initiatives such as aid to El Salvador. So far, human rights has been one of the main directions of domestic attack on this Administration’s foreign policy. There is no reason for us to be on the defensive here. And most important, “Human rights”—a somewhat narrow name for our values—gives us the best opportunity to convey what is ultimately at issue in our contest with the Soviet bloc.

Merely responding to specific legal requirements and criticisms as they arise will not meet our needs. Such a policy is intrinsically defensive: it allows our critics to define the issues. The cases they bring up will be those most embarrassing to the United States. Greater abuses in places such as Cuba and Vietnam will escape notice. Since we do not give foreign assistance to our adversaries, a reactive policy will again wind up victimizing our friends and giving immunity to our enemies.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A STRONG AND REALISTIC POLICY

We cannot return to earlier policy. Our experience shows that miscalculated human rights policy has a potential to press unfairly on our friends, and can even be exploited by anti-democratic opposition movements to undermine friendly governments. It can prevent us from doing what is necessary in tough situations, and is frequently an irritant in bilateral relations.

Earlier human rights policy tended to be negative rather than positive: it was highly interventionist on isolated human rights cases without being able to change the underlying conditions that produced these cases. Our new policy should convey a sense that U.S. foreign policy as a whole is a positive force for freedom and decency in the long run; without creating an inflated rhetoric that would increase demands for unnecessary short-term negative steps. If the positive dimension of our policy is convincing, it will help relieve the disportionate pressure on specific short-term human rights problems that create difficulties for the United States.

We recommend that you adopt a two-track approach, positive as well as negative, to guide our public statements on human rights and our specific policy choices. On one track these are the positive policy requirements to work for individual freedom and decency (a clearer expression than human rights):

—Providing an example of the success of our principles by maintaining our world positions and a strong defense posture.

—Restoring America’s reputation as a reliable partner for our friends, so as to maximize the influence of our quiet diplomacy.

—Promoting economic progress in the developing world to create a more stable environment for freedom and maintain a sense of progress.

—Increasing world understanding of democratic values and institutions.

—Taking the offensive against the Soviet bloc, pointing out their abuses of freedom and decency, to discourage the spread of their system.

—Expounding our beliefs and opposing the USSR through our strong role in UN bodies and CSCE (Tab 1b, c). This is central.

—Reinforcing international moral and legal standards whenever possible. We can help by responding strongly to outrages against our citizens and diplomats, and by undertaking a serious program against terrorism, one of the cruelest violations of human rights.

—These long-term elements of positive policy must be supported by an early package of positive initiatives (details at Tab 1), e.g., designating a reorganized HA as the coordinating point for guidance to ICA on the dissemination of our concept of freedom abroad.

On the other track, short-term policy is also necessary to respond to serious abuses. It should not undercut our positive effort. But the sense that freedom and decency are moving forward in the world depends on there being a reaction to serious abuses.

Among the instruments we use on this track we should stress traditional quiet diplomacy and use it effectively. Only in this way can we avoid using public criticism when it is not necessary. In using policy instruments we should follow criteria outlined in Ambassador Stoessel’s testimony (Tab 2). Just as these criteria should not apply only to our friends, a human rights policy cannot be credible if it has impact only on pro-Soviet countries.

DEALING WITH URGENT NEAR-TERM DEMANDS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA

Policy Management

Designating Judge Clark to head the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance would give out policy credibility. An Assistant Secretary of HA clearly committed to the aspirations of the Administration should be nominated quickly. If HA is reduced or important functions put elsewhere, HA, rather than our new policy, will become the focus of attention; it would also become more difficult for HA to execute a balanced policy (positive as well as negative). Once HA has firm policy guidance, it can resume its role in policy.

Legal Obligations in Foreign Assistance (Summarized at Tab 3)

The Kennedy and Humphrey-Kennedy Amendments⁴ should be repealed. Since repeal of the general legislation would not be worth the cost, the Administration will continue to have obligations to act in certain ways where there is “a consistent pattern of gross violation” of human rights. In most areas of assistance, the law also requires us more generally to “advance” or “promote” human rights. In these areas the Executive is thus legally required, in deciding on aid, to give human rights considerations weight as part of an integrated assessment. If we appeared not to do so, we would build Congressional pressure to designate governments as gross and consistent violators and to pass country-specific legislation prohibiting aid to them.

Human Rights Considerations in Specific Areas

Military Assistance (including IMET) is an area in which there should be, consistent with the legislation, a presumption in favor of arms transfers to friends when they are needed and practicable with Congress. Reason: here a miscalculated human rights policy runs the greatest risk of harming US security—and thus, in the long run, human rights.

We have not yet built up enough credibility with Congress to pursue the optimum course here. It would be counter-productive to propose military assistance in a few problem cases, such as Guatemala.⁵ The overall policy sketched here will eventually give us greater freedom in military assistance by making it clear that we are consistent and humane.

Crime Control Equipment (Tab 4), on the other hand, should not be licensed in questionable cases. In a number of cases we will need, as an exception, to license non-lethal crowd control equipment to a country if it is vital to our security (e.g., Iran 1978) and faces serious attack in the streets by forces antagonistic to us. Reason: Most crime control equipment is inexpensive and relatively easily obtained on the world market or manufactured locally. Thus, we do not weaken our friends substantially by failing to license crime control equipment. On the other hand, while licensing decisions have little positive value to human rights policy, no other action we take in the human rights field is potentially such a powerful—and misleading—negative symbol.

In Bilateral Economic Assistance (and ESF) decisions we must pay attention to human rights, especially where urgent security interests are not involved and aid does not directly serve basic human needs. But there are so many diverse kinds of economic assistance, and purposes it serves, that the role of human rights considerations will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Multilateral Assistance: Votes on MDB Loans

Our primary criterion in voting should be to motivate further improvement by voting yes where there has been substantial progress in respect for freedom and decency. This implies that we should abstain or vote no if there is a serious and sustained retrogression. Credibility of our policy also requires that we abstain or vote against friendly countries on human rights grounds if their conduct merits it.

Reasoning: Votes on MDB Loans are essentially symbolic, but for the near term they are an important symbol of policy. If we vote for every friendly country, regardless of their various human rights records, our policy will be misrepresented as a hypocritical cover for an anti-Soviet policy. Such a series of votes would contradict our earlier statements that we changed votes on Argentine, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay because of improving conditions.⁶ Moreover, we are likely to vote against countries such as Cuba. To avoid politicization of international organizations such as the MDBs, we must attribute such votes to financial/economic considerations or to human rights considerations. If we use the latter, we will have to show how our votes are compatible with votes in favor of friendly countries that are accused of equally bad practices.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices should not be abridged or taken away from the State Department, where we can assure a realistic appreciation of how an inept presentation can harm our bilateral relationships. This Administration does need to change the Country Reports (Tab 5), including consideration, where relevant, of the human rights orientation of guerrilla and terrorist groups opposing governments—so that we do not lightly allow governments to be displaced by an opposition worse for freedom. Reasoning: the Country Reports are required by a law difficult to repeal: it seems better to turn the legal requirement to a positive use. The Country Reports can help the Administration define the terms of domestic debate over human rights policy.

Nine International Human Rights Agreements before Congress (Tab 6) mostly need careful restudy. We have already recommended approval of the Hostage Convention. We should prepare to give an early and vigorous push toward ratification of the Genocide Convention. Ambassador Kampelman judges this would yield major dividends.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the human rights policy summarized here, with implementing action to be monitored by the Deputy Secretary and approved by Action Memo to him.⁷

If you approve, that we be tasked to prepare a memorandum for the President on this policy.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P910037–2282. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Fairbanks on September 25 and cleared in S/AL, S/CSCE, S/P, H, PM, PA, HA, AF, ARA, EA, EUR, NEA, EB, IO, and AID. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Bremer saw it. In the upper-right hand margin, a stamped notation reads, “Expedite.”
2. In telegram 102450 to all diplomatic and consular posts, April 22, the Department transmitted the text of Haig’s March 31 speech on human rights and foreign policy. (Department of State, Subject Files, Human Rights Files, 1981, Lot 82D273, SHUM Policies 1981)
3. An unknown hand wrote: “September 6.”
4. The Kennedy amendment and the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment banned the export of arms to Chile and Argentina, respectively.
5. Reference is to the conflict between left-wing insurgents and the government of Fernando Lucas García.
6. For text of Bushnell’s March 10 statement before the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, see Department of State Bulletin, April 1981, pp. 44–46.
7. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.
8. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a December 22 memorandum to Haig, Clark stated: “The real stimulus to the deliberations that led up to the appointment of Elliott Abrams as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights was a memo from Wolfowitz and Eagleburger outlining the need for and the content of a new, clearer and more positive Reagan Administration policy on Human Rights.” (Department of State, Files of the Deputy Secretary of State—William P. Clark, 1981–1982, Lot 82D127, Memos to S, P, T, E, M, C, S/S—1981)