373. Telegram From the Consulate in Canada to the Department of State1
2997. Subject: Ozone Protocol Negotiations (Montreal)—Status Report.
1. (C—Entire text).
2. Following provides status as of 5 p.m. Thursday2 of fast-paced negotiations which have involved night sessions since Monday.3 While significant progress is being made, complex issues remain. Schedule calls for availability of complete text (with bracketed language) by Friday afternoon.4 However, this may not be achievable, and there are rumors now of weekend sessions. Because of unanticipated deadlocks Thursday, UNEP Executive Director Tolba cancelled trip to address wildlife conference in Colorado, which would have kept him away from conference Thursday night to Saturday night. USDel will cable full text immediately as it becomes available. Given trade-offs on linkages among various articles, it does not seem useful to send text piecemeal. Much of what follows represents tentative, informal views and decisions, since everyone is waiting to see how pieces (developed in numerous working groups) fit together, and what trade-offs can be made.
3. Atmospherics—Negotiations attended by 31 countries, plus European Community. In contrast to previous rounds, developing country participation is much more active and better coordinated through attendance of China, Peru, Indonesia, Kuwait, Yemen, Philippines and Tunisia in addition to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, and Venezuela. Discussions characterized by determined optimism that effective protocol can and must be achieved by end of diplomatic conference next Wednesday.5 Individual EC member states much more open and engaged than in past when they deferred to Commission: and U.S.–EC relationship also closer and more cooperative. A major breakthrough is Japan, which is passively, if not openly, supporting nearly all U.S. positions, representing critical change in prior Japanese position on halons and 50 percent reduction. Japanese Reps are nearly certain that Japan will sign protocol next week, barring technical delay in final instruction from Tokyo.
[Page 1073]4. Status and Principal Issues (by article).
(A) Article 1 (Definitions and Scope)—Definitions being adjusted, in particular to find non-quantitative means of defining bulk substances (i.e., as a replacement for quote 20 percent by weight or volume unquote expression). No major problems, although U.K. has proposed definition of controlled substances that excludes CFC 502, which contains 50 percent of CFC 115. U.S. is opposing this proposal and has offered alternative definition.
(B) Article 2 Control Measures)—
(I) Base Year—Soviets arguing for 1990 base year because their 1986–1990 national plan calls for new CFC production capacity to meet internal consumption. U.S., EC, Nordics, Canada, New Zealand, objecting, while trying to explore options which might encourage accession by Soviets as well as other medium/low-consuming countries. Thursday a.m. Soviets insisted on leeway to reach 0.5 kg. per capita to establish their base for future reductions, which would imply addition to global production of approximately 70–80,000 kilotons above existing Soviet production. They argue that because of their low existing per capita consumption and low historic contribution to the ozone depletion problems, they should be given flexibility to increase domestic consumption before embarking on phase-down schedule. Soviets are adamant, but isolated. They also seem to be concerned about not signing protocol, and seem generally confused by the fast and complex pace of negotiations on the control article in Tolba’s quote informal unquote working groups, which are held only in English.
(II) Regulatory Measures—Scenario of CFC freeze—20 percent reduction—additional 30 percent reduction appears to have been accepted by all. Issue remains over timing, with consensus building for 10-year period (rather than 8 years) with firm anchor date of January 1, 1999 for reaching second reduction step (i.e., 50 percent total reduction). EC (pressed by U.K. and France) suggests first cut of 20 percent to take effect January 1, 1994, rather than in 4 years after entry into force (EIF), as in previous texts. Freeze is now agreed at one year after EIF (see Article 15, below).
(III) Halons—After move by EC Commission, plus U.K. and France, to eliminate halons from protocol and cover them merely with conference resolution calling for quote future decision by parties unquote, EC now apparently willing to accept halons within protocol, with a freeze on consumption after three years of EIF, as in earlier text. This would be in exchange for agreement to stretch out 50 percent reduction from 8 to 10 years (see preceeding paragraph).
(IV) Decision-making—After initial U.S. effort to make decisions on possible reversal of controls and other adjustments to protocol (e.g., addition/subtraction of chemicals; further reduction steps) to require [Page 1074] quote two-thirds majority representing at least 90 percent of global consumption unquote was universally rejected, U.S. is currently pushing for 67 percent. Debate on this not sufficiently advanced to judge likely outcome, with many countries clearly favoring no weighting factor at all.
(V) Control quote Formula unquote—Formula for controlling production/consumption remains a central issue, although progress has been made in resolving split over adjusted production (C equals P plus I minus E) as favored by U.S., Canada, New Zealand and Nordics and E.C. straight production approach. Bilaterals on Sunday6 and Tolba group discussions Monday made clear that the EC arrived just as committed to production controls as U.S., Canada and New Zealand were to consumption controls. Nordics and Japanese favored consumption controls, but made clear they were willing to accept the combined controls in the seventh revised draft text as a quote compromise unquote. USDel believes that proposal (described below) represents sound concept compatible with U.S. objectives and interests. Approach is to provide for gap between consumption and production targets for individual countries (at each stage of freeze/reduction scenario) which would allow the excess production capacity to meet the needs of developing countries and also provide for quote rationalization unquote of production among producing countries by enabling, e.g. U.S. to increase production to meet Canadian needs if latter closes plant which becomes inefficient after reduction controls take effect. Because production increases in some countries would be offset by decreases in other countries, the net effect on global consumption would be neutral (except for the additional consumption margin allowed to low-consuming developing countries (see Article 5 below).
(C) Article 3—Calculation of Control Levels—Only issue includes concern of several countries about accuracy of ozone depletion potentials and suggestion that they be dropped as a factor in calculating emissions. USDel believes this will be turned aside, as we and others have argued for the need to include depleting potential.
Article 4—(Control of Trade)—Issues seem well on way to resolution along lines of U.S. preference/guidance. However, fully-agreed text not possible at this time, due primarily to Brazilian attempts to exempt trade restrictions on LDC non-parties. With respect to paragraph 2,7 list of products containing controlled substances would be drawn up by parties at later time, with controls applying to non-[Page 1075]parties, within 4 years of EIF. Agreement was reached on paragraph 7 exemption,8 with U.S. proposed language of quote compliance as determined by the parties unquote accepted.
(E) Article 5—(Low-Consuming Countries)—USDel managed to get title (and concept) amended to restrict this exemption/grace period to developing countries (i.e., which would eliminate USSR from possible qualification). Developing countries, led by Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, Venezuela and China are now pressing for CFC consumption level to be set at 0.3 kg/capita (rather than 0.1 or 0.2 as in previous text.) USDel insisting on lower number, but prepared to accept 0.3 figure in interest of attracting China and other LDCs. This is consistent with interagency discussions in Washington last week and U.S. industry views expressed privately during these negotiations. Consensus has been reached that grace period will extend for 10 years. During that time LDCs that reach agreed-upon consumption level as consumption grows would then be frozen at that level.
Developing countries would then follow the reduction schedule to 80 percent and then 50 percent, delayed by ten years from the years when other countries must comply. Developing countries now above the agreed level (0.2 or 0.3) would be required to reduce to that level but not to make further reductions during the initial 10 year grace period.
(F) Article 6—(Review and Assessment)—USDel introduced language to ensure that scientific/technical/economic review, and assessments by parties, are kept to main decision points of regulatory control schedule. We further proposed establishment of experts panel on technological/economic aspects in addition to previously agreed-upon scientific group.
(G) Articles 7–17, Data-Technical Assistance Meeting of Parties, etc. With exception of Article 15, below, no major issues remain. U.K. raised data confidentiality issue early in week but have not pressed any language changes: and Japan questioning financial mechanism.
(H) Article 15 (Entry Into Force)—As envisioned, this remains major stumbling block. UNEP Ex Dir Tolba characterized EIF this a.m. as quote the major problem, given trio of firmly held positions unquote. He described these as quote famous and well-known U.S. 90 percent production approach: which he observed had no support; (2) those countries which favor no weighting at all; and (3) his own compromise of 60 percent. (Actually, USSR supported 90 percent. EC and Japan appear to have no problem with 60 percent.) Problem of EIF requirement was exacerbated when EC Commission Representative Brinkhorst [Page 1076] admitted that EC assession would not carry with it the ability to bring in and commit all member nations. Rather, member states enjoy sovereignty of joining or not joining, so that each would probably join separately, adding their votes and individual consumption percentages serially. Thus, the impression of U.S. and all others up until now that when EC joins it would represent over 40 percent of global production was erroneous. At this point any support U.S. hoped to get for something close to 90 percent requirement evaporated. Brinkhorst stated that the 9 EC members in attendance will all sign and ratify. (Non-attendees are Ireland, Greece and Portugal.) He also proposed adding quote dates certain unquote to entry into force and the control schedule which would call for e.g., EIF to occur by January 1, 1989 with the freeze twelve months later and reduction steps as described above. (EIF would still be subject to number of ratification and percentage of global consumption required.) While largely symbolic, the EIF date would help the Commission and more progressive EC members to generate pressure on other EC members to ratify (according to Brinkhorst and Reps of FRG, Belgium and Denmark). Negotiations continuing on this issue, with U.S. holding firm to its 90 percent position. This will undoubtedly be one of several issues carried over into diplomatic conference. It is clear that most countries willing to accept 11 country ratifications, rather than 9, to bring protocol, into effect.
(I) REIO Issue: The EC remains insistent that the protocol include provisions which permit REIO-member states to fulfill their obligations under Article 2 (control measures) jointly. Their new proposal limits joint treatment only to member states of such organizations that are parties to the protocol and requires that such states’ joint production/consumption not exceed levels set in Article 2. Significantly, the new proposal does not provide for group compliance for Article 4 (control of trade with non-parties). Protocol will most likely be quote mixed unquote agreement for the EC, that is, both the organization and member states will become parties. EC Commission Representatives have indicated that they expect all or virtually all EC-member states to join the protocol, and have stressed the strong enforcement role the Commission intends to play vis-a-vis its member states regarding implementation of the protocol. U.S. and other delegations are studying the new EC proposal in conjunction with other developments.
- Source: Department of State, Environmental Issues, 1979–1993, Lot 93D395, Ozone. Confidential; Immediate.↩
- September 10.↩
- September 7.↩
- September 11.↩
- September 16.↩
- September 6.↩
- Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Montreal Protocol discusses the banning of exported controlled substances from non-member countries.↩
- Article 4, paragraph 7, of the Montreal Protocol discusses exemptions to the ban on exports of controlled substances.↩