367. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Benedick) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Whitehead)1

SUBJECT

  • Domestic Policy Council Meeting on Protocol to Control Ozone-Depleting Chemicals—11:00 a.m., Thursday, June 11

I. YOUR OBJECTIVE

The first DPC Meeting on this subject (May 20—Allen Wallis attending)2 failed to resolve deep agency divisions over the U.S. negotiating position. Following this, the Secretary wrote Ed Meese, outlining his concern and concisely summarizing the Department’s position and rationale (see Tab B).3 Your objective is to obtain DPC agreement that we continue to negotiate for a strong international accord to control ozone-depleting chemicals or, failing agreement, to put the matter to the President without further delay. The talking points emphasize the risks of loss of international credibility, domestic political backlash, and undesirable unilateral regulation if we fail to continue the heretofore successful U.S. leadership role in these negotiations. I am scheduled [Page 1046] to brief you at 9:30 a.m. on June 114 and, as the head U.S. negotiator, I have been asked orally to frame the negotiating issues for the Council.

II. BACKGROUND

The Issue

Through three tough, and well-publicized, negotiating rounds under United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) auspices since last December, participating countries have moved toward consensus on a schedule for reducing emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. The issues are complex and interrelated (see May 18 DPC Memorandum at Tab E),5 but the central point of division is the extent of reductions which the U.S. should support, and whether the reductions should be scheduled as “semi-automatic” (i.e., reversible by vote of parties) or only implemented upon a future reaffirmation by parties—in both cases preceded by a scientific, economic, and technological assessment.

The debate centers on whether the U.S. should support the “Chairman’s draft” protocol text, which was developed at the April international negotiation,6 and which provides for:

• a freeze on production/consumption of the chemicals within two years after entry into force (EIF);

• a 20% reduction four years after EIF; and

• a further 30% reduction six years after EIF, subject to reaffirmation; or eight years after EIF, “semi-automatic.”

The UNEP Executive Director has asked for government comments on this draft by June 19. Informal but crucial negotiations in the “Chairman’s Group” of selected delegation heads (I will represent the U.S.) will occur June 28–30 in Brussels. A Conference of Plenipotentiaries to approve the protocol is formally scheduled for September 14–16 in Montreal, following a full negotiating round September 8–11.

Other relevant factors include:

• a Senate resolution on ozone protection passed last Friday by 80-2, calling for the U.S. to negotiate “a prompt automatic reduction of not less than 50% . . . . and the virtual elimination of such chemicals” (see Tab C);7

• pending legislation in both Senate and House call for unilateral U.S. reductions of up to 95 percent;8

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• a pending court case could force EPA to regulate unilaterally if the international negotiations fail to come up with a strong protocol;9

• several countries have recently expressed concern over whether the U.S. is changing its strong position, including the FRG and Japan, who noted that previous high-level U.S. representations have influenced them to rethink their own positions.

Agency Views

Lee Thomas (EPA) will open the DPC meeting by presenting information requested on May 20 on health and climatic effects of ozone depletion and on the legal/legislative situation; Beryl Sprinkel will follow with a cost-benefit analysis.

Thomas strongly believes the international agreement should include substantial, firmly scheduled reductions, subject to reversal only following new information, in order to provide a powerful market incentive for development of safer substitutes.

Most agencies (and most nations participating in the negotiations) agree on a freeze and a “semi-automatic” 20% reduction (all protocol provisions are subject to change by 2/3 vote). OSTP and Interior want the 20% reduction to depend on a majority positive vote of parties following a scheduled 1990 scientific assessment; they strongly oppose any further cuts.

While several agencies at staff level have questioned scheduling a “semi-automatic” 30% cut (OMB, Commerce, Energy and possibly the Council of Economic Advisors) the intensity of their feeling is uncertain. USTR, NSC, the Vice-President’s Office, Justice and possibly Defense appear leaning toward the State-EPA original negotiating position.

As part of their effort to prevent agreement on this treaty, some agencies (Interior, OSTP) have raised other issues, such as mandatory requirements for “verification” of compliance, weighted voting, and adherence by most or all potential CFC producers (i.e., developing countries). While these are all desirable (and part of our negotiating position), the overall benefits of an international accord are sufficiently significant that we should not make these points absolute conditions for U.S. adherence.

State Position

State should firmly support the text which has emerged from the negotiations (freeze + 20% + 30%) and EPA’s position favoring “semi-automatic” reductions. Ideal and flexible guidance to the U.S. negotiators would be the points in the enclosure to the Secretary’s June 1 letter [Page 1048] to Ed Meese (Tab A),10 which is fully consistent with the original Circular 175 negotiating authority (Tab D).11 If this cannot be agreed, State should insist that the issue go to the President in accord with the Secretary’s letter.

III. TALKING POINTS

—International agreement is within reach, largely on U.S. terms.

Lee Thomas is charged, by the President and by legislative mandate, with environmental protection. He has concluded that the existing U.S. position is a prudent approach to risk management in the face of current scientific knowledge.

—To modify our negotiating position now would pose substantial risks of:

• a loss of international credibility, in view of the leadership role we have played;

• domestic political backlash on an issue which has brought great credit to the Administration; and

• unilateral controls—the worst possible outcome for U.S. industry and consumers—forced by the Clean Air Act, court order or new legislation.

—In order not to further jeopardize the progress we have made in this major international negotiation, Secretary Shultz and I propose that we instruct the U.S. representative to continue to negotiate in conformance with the existing Circular 175.

—Our objective is to conclude a strong and effective agreement by September, containing provisions summarized as follows: (see next page, which is the enclosure to the Secretary’s letter).

—If any agency has compelling objections to this, we should take the matter to the President without further delay.

  1. Source: Department of State, Environmental Issues, 1979–1993, Lot 93D395, Ozone. Confidential. Drafted by Butcher and Benedick.
  2. See Document 363.
  3. Attached and printed as Tab A to Document 364.
  4. No record of this meeting has been found.
  5. Attached but not printed.
  6. See Document 362.
  7. Dated June 5, attached but not printed.
  8. Probable reference to H.R. 2036, introduced on April 9.
  9. At Tab D is an excerpt from Circular 175. See Document 355.
  10. At Tab A is the evening reading to the President printed in Document 366.
  11. See footnote 9, above.