219. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Third World Hunger Study (Keating) to the Steering Group of the Third World Hunger Study1
Three months ago, President Reagan asked that we examine the problems of hunger and starvation in the Third World, and the U.S. response to them.2 The President was particularly concerned about starvation in poor countries suffering from drought or other natural disasters, although he asked that we review non-emergency food problems as well. This is the first time that we have looked at Third World food problems from this perspective.
This memorandum reports on the first part of our work, acute food crisis situations where emergency food aid can prevent starvation. We have analyzed our emergency food aid processes from beginning to end, reviewing the adequacy of USG operations and mechanisms, the extent of distribution constraints, the quality of food supply and demand data, and the degree to which we have received international cooperation in our relief efforts.
Our findings reveal that starvation continues to be a real threat to rural populations in the poorest countries of the Third World. It is especially acute in sub-Saharan Africa where millions live in absolute poverty. The United States response to Third World hunger has always been generous—unrivaled in the world. For example, the Reagan Administration doubled emergency food aid over fiscal years 1982 to 1984 to $343 million. This year we are providing 663,000 metric tons of emergency food aid, amounting to 45 percent of all donor financing. Almost 60 percent of our emergency food aid is going to 24 sub-Saharan African countries hard hit by a drought that this time affects not only the vast Sahelian area in the north, but also the usually fertile savannah and livestock plains as far as the southern African veldt.
Generally, Congressional support for regular appropriations for PL 480 programs (supplemental funds to meet extraordinary emergency needs) is excellent. This is a reflection of our humanitarian concerns, and the existence of U.S. farm surpluses and the many interests served by the PL 480 program. However, the time required to obtain approval of additional funds to meet emergency needs is regarded as unaccept[Page 597]ably long in view of the human suffering associated with delays in food shipments.
The most demanding task of emergency food relief programs begins at the port of entry in the Third World. There the effort to distribute foodstuffs inland to remote areas can be very difficult, and sometimes impossible in countries where military violence either disrupts or prevents access to hungry people. In combination with badly rutted or non-existent roads, and beaten-up trucks, the job of food delivery is indeed expensive, time-consuming, and dangerous. The field workers of the private voluntary organizations and other international programs who have long been in the vanguard in carrying out this responsibility are to be commended for their valiant efforts.
Unfortunately, poor countries suffering from food shortage emergencies have been increasingly unable to share the burden of the internal distribution costs of free food. They were once able to meet the extra expense (both local currency and foreign exchange), but their worsening balance of payments positions increasingly compel them to turn to donors and international organizations to pay these costs. As a consequence, the financing of the complete emergency food aid delivery system, from farmer to port of entry to hungry people, is likely to fall on donors if more lives are to be saved.
The timely provision and accuracy of food supply and demand data are other areas of concern. Various studies suggest that the margin of safety for coping with sudden drops in local food production is shrinking in many Third World countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.3 They are prone to acute food crises because of irrational government policies which have caused a structural deterioration of their agricultural sectors and a severe decline in food production. While we expect an increase in emergency food requests over the next five years, we are not entirely comfortable with the analytical models now used to estimate demand.
In carrying out emergency food aid programs, cooperation from other donor countries and international organizations can increase the effectiveness of our bilateral assistance and lead to a greater total food aid effort. The United States contributes 25 percent of the resources for the FAO and WFP, but with regard to the FAO we are dissatisfied with its leadership and management. Moreover, FAO interpretations of emergency food requirements often do not square with those of major donors. Our own expectations with regard to other donor governments and international food organizations have not been entirely [Page 598] clear; an uncertainty that constrains us in seeking improvements in international emergency food aid cooperation and coordination.
A final area where improvement is needed concerns cooperation between the public and private sectors on Third World hunger problems. In spite of the United States’ tremendous food aid efforts over the past three decades, the general public is still largely unaware of what we have done and are doing. The media have tended to focus, perhaps disproportionately, on the severity of the hunger problem rather than on the many positive actions the Administration has taken to meet the challenge. In addition, the potential of the business community to provide government decisionmakers with unique regional perspectives and expertise for Third World hunger problems has gone mostly untapped.
Our findings suggest that if we are to reduce loss of life caused by acute food crises, we must 1) respond more rapidly; 2) deliver food more effectively; 3) improve food data analysis; 4) cooperate more closely with the private sectors, and 5) seek improvements in international cooperation and coordination. We have made ten specific recommendations to reach these objectives.
We have also considered the budgetary implications of our recommendations (attached),4 proposing small budget increases only in cases where, in our judgement, additional funding (provided in a timely and flexible way) could break critical bottlenecks and help maintain the integrity of our emergency food aid programs. Amended legislation would be necessary for three of our recommendations.
We are continuing to work on the second part of our report, the non-emergency food problems, and will shortly submit recommendations to the Steering Group.
I look forward to your participation at the Steering Group meeting on May 15.5
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC NSSD File, 1–84 [US Third World Hunger Relief] (2 of 3). Secret.↩
- See Document 217.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- The undated analyses of the individual recommendations are numbered one through eight and are attached but not printed.↩
- No record of this meeting has been found.↩
- Secret.↩
- Under a May 30 action memorandum to McFarlane, Levine forwarded Keating’s May 9 memorandum. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, “Terrific work.” (Reagan Library, Rosenberg Files, Food for Progress-Keating Group [Famine] 5/23/1984–06/06/1984)↩