Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

177. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 6, 1982

SUBJECT

• Don Rumsfeld’s Law of the Sea Mission

I welcome the nomination of Don Rumsfeld as your personal emissary to our major Allies to discuss the Law of the Sea Convention.

Don’s immediate and primary objective will be to persuade our Allies not to make a decision to sign the Law of the Sea Convention until we have an opportunity to develop and discuss with them an alternative regime. His trip will be an occasion for opening a dialogue with them on the need for an alternative regime; he will present outlines of possible alternatives; and he will lay the groundwork for convincing our Allies that their navigation and other non-seabeds interests can be protected outside the UN LOS Convention.

This is a major undertaking, one of the highest importance—and of great difficulty, given the drift of our Allies toward signature of the LOS Convention. In my judgment, Don’s task will be made easier if he is able to talk about other subjects—this will increase the receptivity of his interlocutors to his message on Law of the Sea. Furthermore, Don’s trip gives us a positive opportunity we should not lose to add some emphasis to policy views we have already expressed. Don is, after all, well known from his days at DOD and as our NATO Representative.² He will also be the first American political figure associated with the Administration to call on the new German Chancellor.

There are four themes that are appropriate to raise in all of the countries Don will visit:

GATT Ministerial. This is one of the key opportunities for the free world collectively to do something positive in the next few months. The Japanese seem prepared to cooperate in constructing a new work program; the Europeans tend to be defeatist, thinking it is impossible at this juncture to make progress on trade liberalization. Don could reinforce the efforts Bill Brock³ is making to persuade our trading partners that the economic difficulties we are all experiencing make it more, not less, important to have a positive result at the GATT Ministerial, and to get going thereafter on a program aiming at freer and fairer trade not only in goods, but in services and investment.

IMF Borrowing Facility. This is another positive initiative. All countries are concerned about the increasing strains in the international financial system brought about by excessive past borrowing and the increasing pressure which debt service is imposing on several large debtors. The United States has floated a proposal in the IMF for a special borrowing arrangement which could mobilize a pool of usable currencies more quickly and at less total cost than would be involved in an unjustifiably large IMF quota increase. Stressing your determination to move this proposal to rapid fruition as a means of reestablishing confidence in our ability to meet this problem constructively would add a useful financial dimension to Don’s presentation and help show that we are moving to address each of their major concerns.

Non-Proliferation. I have expressed, in a letter sent to Foreign Ministers,⁴ our strong belief that suppliers should not engage in any significant new nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states that do not agree to accept full scope safeguards, particularly where there is evidence that a non-nuclear-weapon-state is seeking to develop nuclear explosives. We are acting on this principle by not permitting US companies to assist the Chasma⁵ project unless Pakistan accepts IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities. Don could reinforce our hope that our Allies will join us in requiring full scope safeguards before selling anything to Pakistan for the Chasma project.

Defense Budgets. All of our Allies could stand some additional friendly persuasion to devote more of their resources to defense, and Don, with his background at the Pentagon and NATO, has the credentials to talk authoritatively on this point. His prime targets should be Paris (the French for the first time in years are cutting back their defense spending); Bonn (where the new government may be more responsive than the old); and Tokyo (where the government could use some bolstering to continue at least at the pace of last year’s progress).⁶

None of these are subjects on which we expect Don to “negotiate.” These are, rather, issues where he can help simply by showing that the Administration’s, and especially your interest is deep on these issues. I do not see his discussion of these matters as constituting a major part of his mission—Law of the Sea is and must be the primary subject. But I think adding these subjects will add credibility to Don’s position as your personal representative, and increase the chances of his success in his primary mission.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, 10/06/1982. Secret. There is no indication Reagan saw the memorandum.
2. Rumsfeld served as Ambassador to NATO, from 1973 until 1974, and as Secretary of Defense, from 1975 until 1977.
3. U.S. Trade Representative William Brock.
4. Not found.
5. The Chashma Nuclear Power Complex in Pakistan.
6. In telegram 23118 from Tokyo, December 28, 1981, the Embassy reported on the Japanese defense budget for the 1982 fiscal year. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810615–0929)