I am transmitting herewith the proposed action plan for US efforts to
establish an alternative deep seabed mining regime, as decided upon by
the designated Interagency Group (IG). I
agree with the IG’s recommended action
plan except for the recommendation that you personally initiate contacts
with other governments on the action plan.
I believe that you should not become involved at this initial stage
because we want to reserve your intervention and capital for later
stages in the LOS dialogue and for
other major issues. I will urge our allies not to make premature
commitments to sign the LOS Convention
pending the arrival of a special U.S. emissary in early September.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State2
Law of the Sea Policy
Action Plan to Establish an Alternative
Deep Seabed Mining Regime
NSDD 43 directs the Department of
State, in coordination with the interested agencies and the NSC, OMB and OPD staff, to
prepare an action plan to establish an alternative deep seabed
mining arrangement outside the Law of the Sea Convention.3 Following are the recommendations on near-term
actions to establish such an arrangement.
All concerned agencies recommend that we initiate this plan of action
immediately.
Our short-term objectives would be to:
• dissuade our allies from making or announcing a decision to
sign the LOS Convention or
other action that would prejudice our ability to work out an
alternative seabed mining arrangement and, most importantly, not
to make any commitment to ratify the LOS treaty.
• engage in a dialogue with our allies and possibly other
countries on the serious problems in the LOS seabed mining regime and,
thus, the need for and benefit of an alternative regime; at the
same time, elicit their concerns about protection outside of the
LOS Convention of their
other oceans interests.
Our longer-term objective is to convince our allies and other nations
not to ratify the LOS treaty but,
instead, to join us in an alternative regime.
If we are to achieve our objectives, the President must be involved
in this effort. Head of government to head of government contacts
are vital to initiate the action plan and may be necessary again as
we implement it. A presidential communication to London, Bonn,
Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Tokyo should be made as soon
as possible. This message would underscore the serious problems of
the LOS treaty and forecast the
arrival of an emissary.
A presidential envoy would be sent to foreign capitals in early
September. He should be of high rank and be prepared to discuss
these
[Page 498]
matters with foreign
officials of ministerial rank. The envoy would: be prepared with
instructions and supporting materials appropriate to the political
level contacts he will make; seek to obtain a political commitment
from our allies to defer decisions on signing the LOS treaty while we explore means of
satisfying our law of the sea interests outside of the LOS treaty; outline our problems with
the LOS seabed mining regime and
our proposals for an alternative deep seabed mining regime;
emphasize that such a regime, if widely accepted by the seabed
mining states, would create a viable legal and practical
alternative; and sound out their concerns on non-seabeds LOS issues to enable us to focus
clearly our subsequent contacts. After the emissary’s initial
visits, further consultations would include appropriate LOS experts.
The emissary should initially visit the Federal Republic of Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Belgium, Italy and the
Netherlands. A second tier of countries might, subsequently, be
approached by the same or another appropriate emissary.
By August 14 the preparatory work for the presidential communication
and emissary visits will be completed. This would include:
• a draft communication from the President;
• instructions for the emissary with talking points; and
• background material appropriate for the political nature of the
emissary’s contacts. This paper will include an outline of an
alternative regime and background to enable the emissary to
sound out the concerns of the allies on non-seabed
issues.
Within this period, suggestions on the emissary will be forwarded to
the White House.
During the implementation of this action plan we must take advantage
of the Secretary of State’s and other cabinet officers’ contacts
with their foreign counterparts to press our LOS concerns. This effort should be
coordinated carefully to ensure that cabinet officers are prepared
properly and their contacts used to our fullest advantage.
