Office of the Historian

157. Night Note to President Reagan1

Washington, undated

LAW OF THE SEA

While we have not seen final text of LOS treaty being prepared by Conference President Koh, all indications are that it will fall far short of your six objectives announced January 29, 1982.2 Negotiations are now effectively over and there is little chance of significant improvement. Despite U.S. efforts to use every possible opportunity to negotiate and despite willingness to show flexibility in achieving your objectives the G–77 has effectively refused to negotiate seriously on any of the issues of major concern to the U.S. affecting the deep seabed regime except protection for pioneer miners. Koh will seek to have the treaty adopted by consensus on Friday, April 30. Unless there are significant changes in the situation before April 30, the U.S. delegation will call for a vote at the final session and plans to vote against the adoption of the convention. It is probable that, despite the U.S. position, the Convention will be adopted by an overwhelming majority. The delegation, Under Secretary Buckley and Secretary Haig are seeking support from our allies to vote against the treaty, and failing that, to abstain and make a statement critical of the seabed mining provisions.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Marine Law and Policy Division, Subject and Country Files, Law of the Sea, 1982–1983, Lot 85D105, Law of the Sea—5. Secret. Drafted by Blumberg on April 29 and cleared by Horner and Salmon. There is no indication Reagan saw this report.↩
  2. Document 140.↩
  3. In an April 30 memorandum to Reagan, Haig wrote: “Despite strong appeals to our allies to vote against the treaty, 130 countries voted in favor, 4 countries voted against (United States, Israel, Turkey, Venezuela), and 17 countries abstained (the entire Eastern bloc, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Thailand). The United States delegation made a statement which outlined our good faith efforts to reach an acceptable treaty, described the shortcomings of the final text, and explained the deep convictions that supported a negative vote.” (Department of State, Secretariat Memorandums—Secretary Alexander Haig Correspondence, 1981–1982, Lot 83D288, Evening Reading—April 1982) Malone’s April 30 statement was transmitted in telegram 132685; see footnote 3, Document 156. ↩