142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan1
45435. Subject: Reciprocating States.
1. (Confidential—Entire text)
2. The following letter was delivered today to Under Secretary Buckley by UK Embassy officials.
Begin text.
The UK is anxious that there should be as many signatures as possible to the multilateral agreement and we would wish, if it is at all possible, that France should be an initial signatory.
If there is a prospect of France being a signatory there would be advantage in deferring signature until after the forthcoming session of UNLOSC (ie until early May).
We understand that the closing of the “window” for PEE applications (which is the significant element) can, under US law, be deferred until mid-May, but that the United States administration apprehend political difficulties in deferment. The assessment of those political difficulties is naturally a matter for judgment on the part of the United States authorities. We would, however, urge upon them the advantages of a delay which might bring in not only France but also one or more of the other like-minded states (Italy and Belgium).
We are aware of the argument that the conclusion of the reciprocating states agreement will give weight to the negotiating position of the industrialised countries in the forthcoming session of UNLOSC, particularly over PIP. However, the strength of this argument depends on the number of industrialised countries participating. If there is a deferment of signature, unity on PIP will be the greater, and therefore potential more impressive, because it may be expected that all the like-minded states will hold together on that issue and there will be no division to be exploited between those who have signed the agreements and those who have shown their unwillingness to do so. The latter would then have no cause to demonstrate that they have desisted because of concern over limitations.
In addition, the G77 appear to expect the agreements to be signed at this time and a deferment of signature would remove what the G77 [Page 428] would consider an affront. This can only assist the United States in its negotiations on part XI.
3. The following letter from ForMin Cheysson was delivered to Haig on February 16, 1982. Begin text.
Dear Al,
As you know, France cannot consider signing reciprocity agreements on international seabed exploration if such agreements lead to a monopoly of beds rich in polymetallic nodules by the industrialized countries and to a breakdown of the Conference on the Law of the Sea.
With this in mind, you stated that consortiums which had already engaged in exploration work would only apply for and obtain permits for limited areas.2 Despite serious doubts, I agreed to take the risk of concluding the planned agreements, provided that France made it known in an Agreed Minute that it cannot consent to the monopoly of the nodule-rich seabeds and had been given the possibility, in the event of a monopoly, of denouncing the agreements without notice or on very short notice. On January 28, 1982, therefore, I wrote you that I concurred in the terms of a text that our negotiators had agreed on ad referendum, and I added that I did not contemplate any major changes therein.3
It became quite evident during the most recent negotiating session on February 134 that some consortiums intend to apply for permits for areas clearly exceeding the 150,000 or even, in certain cases, the 200,000 square kilometers we had considered to be the maxium. The agreed minute has consequently been revised to allow the states to express their differing opinions. More important, a clause has been added at the request of your representative in order to specify that this agreed minute shall in no way affect or prejudice the rights and obligations of the parties pursuant to the agreement, to international law, or to their domestic law.
These changes clearly reveal our divergent views and will thus make it more difficult to defend our common interests at the Conference on the Law of the Sea. Furthermore, these changes lead me to believe that the requests from the consortiums will be of such magnitude that there will be a serious risk of monopoly and a consequent breakdown of the conference.
[Page 429]Under these conditions, I would consider it preferable to postpone the conclusion of our negotiations to a later date when the consortiums will be better able to determine their requests and the governments better able to weigh the chances of success of the conference.
Cordially,
Signed: Clyde Cheysson
4. USG is assessing developments and guidance will follow.
- Source: Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, Reciprocating States/Seabed Mining. Confidential; Immediate. Printed from the copy that was received in the NSC Message Center.↩
- Telegram 344245 to Paris, December 31, 1981, transmitted the text of Haig’s letter to Cheysson. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820002–0284)↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 39250 to Paris, February 13, the Embassy provided a summary of the negotiations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820080–0800)↩