Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

137. Briefing Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Malone) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, January 20, 1982

SUBJECT

• January 21, 1982 National Security Council Meeting on Law of the Sea

A meeting of the National Security Council will be convened January 21, 1982 to consider future U.S. participation in the Law of the Sea Conference. The following results should be sought at that meeting:

1. A decision to continue to negotiate at the Law of the Sea Conference.

2. Avoidance of any decision to require us to put forward in public an intransigent hardline position. (This would be construed by the developing countries as identical to a decision to withdraw from the Conference and would be treated as such.)

3. Avoidance of a decision which impairs our ability to engage in ad referendum consultations with other countries between now and the time final detailed instructions are prepared and cleared within the government.

4. Avoidance of any decision which would have as its underlying premise the assumption that the U.S. can (without first trying to repair the LOS treaty) successfully transform any reciprocating states agreement into a permanent alternative regime for seabed mining which would fully protect our long range interest in access to deepsea minerals.

Agency Views

The Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, Labor, State, Transportation, and Treasury, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Science Foundation recommend continued participation in the negotiations to fulfill these objectives. They recognize that, while there is an opportunity to obtain substantial improvements, it will be extremely difficult to satisfy all of the objectives. Fulfillment of these objectives would be considered mandatory by the US delegation in negotiations.

The Department of the Interior supports returning to the negotiation but wishes to instruct the delegation to deliver our “bottom-line” position to the Conference in the form of an ultimatum.² (see contingency talking points, Attachment A)³

Jim Watt, Marty Anderson, Dick Darman and Ed Meese may all believe that we can withdraw now from the Conference and construct an alternative regime that would be adequate if the law of the sea treaty fails. Attachment B, LOS Conference Strategies, is a response to their concerns.⁴ I believe it is important that you read that paper in preparation for this meeting.

The following issues may arise at the meeting:⁵

—Should the U.S. withdraw from the Law of the Sea Conference immediately, or continue to negotiate reserving until later its decision whether the results of further negotiations are satisfactory?

—If the U.S. continues to negotiate, should U.S. negotiators put forward a maximum set of demands and indicate no flexibility—a tactic which produces a climate at the Conference which would ultimately encourage us to withdraw?

—If the U.S. continues to negotiate, how should the delegation handle urgent consultations during the balance of January and February while instructions are being developed and cleared in the interagency process?⁶

Strategy for the Meeting

The attached talking points provide you with a comprehensive opening statement designed to meet the contentious issues likely to be raised and set forth the Department’s perspective. I recommend that you cover all of those points at the outset and seek to achieve a decision on the basis outlined in those points. Additional contingency talking points are provided for use if more detailed discussions ensue.

As we have agreed, there is no justification for pursuing Option I at this time. Withdrawal from the Conference can be accomplished after the U.S. makes one last effort to improve the treaty to meet its needs. Accordingly, if the NSC seems to be moving toward an Option I decision, every effort available should be made to avoid a final decision pending further informal discussions with the President and senior White House staff.

If the group presses on precisely how we could change the treaty, under Option II, to protect our interests, you might refer them to our paper on the subject (at Tab D).⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880121–0781. Secret; Sensitive. Cleared in IO, NEA, PM, INR, AF/I, ARA, S/P, L, EA/RA, EB, EUR/RPE, P, T, and E. “MAM” initialed for all parties clearing the memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Haig saw it.
2. Haig wrote “No way!” in the right-hand margin.
3. Attached but not printed. See footnote 5 below.
4. Attached printed in an attachment to Document 136.
5. Talking points for each of these issues are contained at Attachment A. The talking points for the first issue are labelled “Opening Statement.” [Footnote is in the original.]
6. Haig wrote “ad ref” to the right of this paragraph.
7. Not attached. An undated paper entitled “Implementation of Option II” was sent to Nance under a December 17 covering memorandum from Bremer. (Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, 12/18/81 [1])