124. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Malone) to Secretary of State Haig 1

SUBJECT

  • Law of the Sea Consultations in Bonn and Moscow, the LOS Review, and Future Steps

This report summarizes my recent consultations on the Law of the Sea Conference with representatives from the FRG, U.K., France, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. As a result of these discussions, I believe these nations will support U.S. efforts to avoid finalization of the treaty text at the Conference in August and to use that session for consultations. It also summarizes the status of the LOS review and steps contemplated for the future.

Coordinating Group Consultations (June 18–19, Bonn)

The Coordinating Group (U.S., FRG, U.K., France, Japan) supported the need to keep open all U.S. options, and endorsed the U.S. view that no dramatic moves should be made in Geneva.2 The consultations evidenced reduced anxiety concerning the U.S. position and its possible effect on the Conference. Agreement regarding strategy was achieved notwithstanding differing preferences regarding the ultimate outcome. Japan and the U.K. continue to favor adoption of the Draft Convention with minor modifications. France prefers a convention, but only a “good” one and reserves the right to seek any amendments necessary to improve the result for French and allied national interests. The FRG seeks fundamental renegotiation of the seabed mining regime but made it clear that they preferred renegotiation to withdrawal even if renegotiation becomes a very lengthy process.

Group of Five (June 22–25, Moscow)

At the Group of Five (U.S., U.K., France, Japan, U.S.S.R.) preceded by bilaterals with the Soviet Union, the U.K., France, and Japan were, for the most part, silent or supportive of the U.S., reducing the meeting to what was essentially a U.S.–U.S.S.R. bilateral.

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The U.S.S.R. delegation, while protesting the difficulty which the U.S. policy review caused for it in Moscow and risks it perceived at the Conference, was obviously prepared to cooperate closely with the U.S. and others in the Group of Five, avoid making problems, use its influence to calm the Group of 77 and to stay in very close touch.

The U.S.S.R. delegation repeatedly sought specific U.S. proposals to make it easier to take a decision to go along with a U.S. effort to revise the convention and hoped that the U.S. list of changes would be short. The U.S.S.R. offered bilaterals with the U.S. for weekend of August 1.3

The U.S.S.R. repeatedly expressed gratitude for the new U.S. willingness to cooperate closely with them in the LOS Conference and agreed that if we and the U.S.S.R. cooperate closely most Conference risks can be managed effectively.

Status of the LOS Review

Our papers on the structure of the review and U.S. interests and objectives have been given to the Congress, the LOS Advisory Committee and our closest allies for reactions.4A working group has since drafted analyses of the Draft Convention in light of our interests and objectives and by July 15 will compile tentative views on essential changes to the Convention.5 From this we will draft delegation instructions for SIG approval and submission to the White House by July 21, to permit us to issue cleared instructions by August 1. (Schedule attached.)6

Substantial changes to the seabed mining text to meet U.S. needs are likely. The situation regarding navigation is less certain, although problems with pertinent provisions of the Draft Convention have been defined. I anticipate, nevertheless, that there will be little difficulty in preparing instructions for the Geneva session.

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Other Future Steps

Other future steps include consultations with Ambassador Tommy Koh (Conference President), on behalf of the Coordinating Group of Five, to obtain his agreement to establish a high level leadership group at the Conference with emphasis upon allowing the U.S. to explore its concerns without the need to negotiate. This group would a) serve as the discussion forums for U.S. concerns, b) ensure “crisis management” to avoid a runaway Conference, c) preempt the working time of the main LOS Conference Committees where there would be a risk that desirable Treaty texts would unravel and d) prevent moves toward negotiation of amendments to the texts or efforts to adopt the texts.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P810116–0474. Secret. Drafted by Kronmiller on June 29; sent through Clark. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Haig saw it.
  2. The Tenth Session resumed in Geneva on August 3.
  3. In telegram 194970 to Moscow, July 24, the Department reported that Bessmertnykh presented Stoessel with a paper “on July 21 which he said represented the Soviet response to the U.S. proposals made during recent consultations on LOS.” The paper stressed that the U.S. position threatened to undermine “the prospects of successful completion of the work of the conference and creates a real threat of a break down through the U.S. fault of the process of settlement of the pressing problems of the Law of the Sea on the basis of a single ‘package’ of compromise decisions, which it became possible to work out as a result of joint efforts of the USA, the USSR, and other countries in the course of difficult talks over many years.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810345–1070)
  4. A June 5 memorandum from Kronmiller to the Interagency Group on the Law of the Sea forwarded an undated paper entitled “Law of the Sea: United States Interests.” (Reagan Library, Bandow Files, [LOS: U.S.Interests—6/5])
  5. See Document 125.
  6. Attached but not printed.