Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

106. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 30, 1988

SUBJECT

• The Moscow Human Rights Conference

The Soviets want a human rights conference in Moscow. Under the right conditions, this would be in our interest. Dick Schifter and Warren Zimmermann agree. I have also talked to Roz. This is the time for us to explore such an outcome, particularly since there may be a sourness developing as a result of a Soviet perception that we are not helping them get out of Afghanistan in a dignified manner.

Sakharov indicated two requirements:² the release of political prisoners and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. I believe we will need three additional criteria met before we can agree to a Moscow conference.

1. Afghanistan has not been introduced as a criteria in the Vienna context. I suggest that for now we proceed on the assumption that the withdrawal is taking place.³

2. The release of all political and religious prisoners, including the 15 or so “hard cases.” We estimate about 300, the Soviets say under 100.

3. We will need a resolution of our bilateral cases, under 100.

4. A “significant” rise in emigration. It is now running at the rate of 9,000–10,000 a year. Our present thinking is to ask for an immediate rise in the monthly numbers so as to give a 1988 end-of-year total of 15,000.⁴

5. We need significant movement on the denials of exit visas on spurious security grounds. They should be asked as a test of their bona fides to move promptly on all cases in which the applicant has not done any secret work for ten years or more.

We have also told the Soviets we need such institutional reforms as freedom of religion, reform of the criminal code, and removal of abuses barring emigration. Rather than insisting on immediate performance, we could tell them that we remain committed to these criteria, and—if they are not met by the time of a Moscow conference—we would have to discuss them at the conference.

We also need to know that a Moscow Conference would take place in the conditions of openness and access which have characterized previous CSCE meetings. The Soviets have provided general assurances; Warren would have to tie them down to specifics with his counterpart in Vienna.⁵

The Madrid forum established a pattern under which a human rights experts meeting and a separate meeting on human contacts (family reunification, etc.) would take place between the end of Madrid and the beginning of the Vienna meeting three years later. We can agree to have a third such meeting. The French would like to have a human rights meeting in 1989; the Danes would like to host a human contact session, and that could also take place in 1989. Each of these would probably last four to six weeks. We could then have a Moscow conference in 1990 designed to review implementation and take inventory as to where the Helsinki Final Act stands with respect to these two broad issues. The fact that it is an additional meeting to follow the other two means there is a standard of how to hold meetings to which the Soviets will be asked to conform. The next big follow-up meeting will then take place in Helsinki in 1991, three years after Vienna.

Holding a Moscow meeting, once our conditions are met, should, as Sakharov suggested, assist Soviet human rights activists. I’m not suggesting that we “reward” the Soviets by holding the conference. It is in our interests if we are able to use it as a lever for better human rights performance. Many human rights groups in the U.S. now support the idea. On the other hand, Mrs. Thatcher is now opposed, although her representatives have suggested that the fulfillment of our conditions may turn her around. In any event, you will see that I am proposing that we explore this question with the Soviets and not make any commitments until after we obtain Alliance consensus.

CONCLUSION

I would like to propose, subject to your agreement, that I be authorized to sit down with Vorontsov either in Geneva before our April Moscow trip, or at the beginning of the Moscow talks, to have a free-wheeling ad referendum discussion and exploration of U.S.–Soviet relations in which the above agenda would be a major item. This is a good follow-up to your talk with Shevardnadze. Vorontsov does have a supervisory role over the Soviet delegation in Vienna. He and I could then use the occasion to chat about some other issues between us as well, including arms. If this does make sense to you, we could send a message from you to Shevardnadze suggesting such a meeting.

I will be seeing you on Thursday. We can briefly talk about it then.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Correspondence of Deputy Secretary John Whitehead, 1982–1989, Lot 89D139, Memos To/From Bureaus—1988. Secret. A stamped notation, on the memorandum indicates that Whitehead saw it on March 31. In the upper-right hand margin, Whitehead wrote: “Max: As I think about this some more, I think I’m in favor of it, though cautiously so, at least for the meeting you suggest with Vorontsov. JW.”
2. Telegram 4019 from Shultz’s delegation in Moscow, February 22, summarized a February 21 conversation between Shultz and Sakharov, during which they discussed the conditions for a Moscow Human Rights Summit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880148–0163)
3. In the left-hand margin, Whitehead wrote: “I’d continue to include this as a condition. If they’re leaving, it’s no problem for them. If not, it’s a problem for us.”
4. In the left-hand margin, Whitehead wrote, “Should we indicate we’re only interested in Jewish emigration?”
5. In the left-hand margin, Whitehead wrote, “The specifics here are important. It’s easier to tell this to right wingers if they can see the Soviets will really have to open up for the meetings.”
6. March 31. No record of this meeting has been found.