Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

91. Defense Intelligence Appraisal Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

DIAAPPR 23–88

Washington, June 23, 1988

NORTH AFRICA: MAGHREB DIPLOMACY (U)

Summary

(C) North African leaders from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania held their first summit ever on 10 June and pledged to form a committee charged with building a greater Arab Maghreb.² The committee will convene on 13 July in Algiers. The announcement caps a yearlong effort by Algeria to bring Libya into the regional mainstream first by improving its own relations with Libyan leader Qadhafi and then by effecting a Libyan-Tunisian rapprochement. The reestablishment of relations between Morocco and Algeria on 16 May and the continued warming trend in Libyan-Tunisian relations were instrumental in reviving previously frustrated efforts toward a Maghreb alliance.³ For the first time in more than 12 years, a climate has been created that is conducive to regional economic and political stability. All states will try to promote the concept of a greater Arab Maghreb to encourage economic integration and to bolster regional security. Reconciliation, however, will most likely be inhibited by traditional rivalries and animosities. Regional states are motivated by independent and sometimes conflicting agendas, and they harbor as many differences as they do similarities.

Discussion

Saudi Intervention

(C) On 16 May Morocco and Algeria announced the restoration of bilateral relations, thereby removing a major obstacle to the creation of a greater Arab Maghreb. The decision to restore diplomatic ties following a 12-year hiatus caps efforts initiated a year ago when Saudi Arabia engineered a tripartite summit between the Moroccan, Algerian, and Saudi heads of state. Riyadh has over the years used its good offices to try to mediate a settlement to the Western Sahara conflict. With no resolution of this contentious issue apparent, Riyadh reportedly sought a normalization of relations as the best avenue for pursuing a political deal and for increasing stability in the Arab west. Saudi efforts would not have been possible, however, had Morocco and Algeria not been motivated by self interest and priorities at home to end the impasse.

Self-Motivating Factors

(S) Several converging factors most likely encouraged Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to drop his longstanding demand that the Western Sahara dispute be resolved before he restored relations with Rabat. Under Bendjedid, Algeria has placed great emphasis on maintaining a bridge between Arab nations so that it can negotiate conflicts—for example, between Iran-Iraq and Libya-Tunisia—mediate differences among Palestinian factions, and use its contacts with all parties to negotiate an end to terrorist actions peacefully. Algiers responded emotionally to the uprising in the Occupied Territories, placing much of its prestige on hosting an Arab summit to address the issue. A successful summit, however, requires high-level attendance and, by restoring relations with Rabat, Algiers was able to obtain support from Morocco’s King Hassan and his wealthy Arab allies.

(S) The willingness of Algeria to compromise probably also demonstrated its interest in securing closer economic and political ties in North Africa. Although Algiers’ relations with both Tunis and Tripoli were much improved, some leaders in the region were reluctant to engage in a relationship that isolated Morocco. Also, Algiers probably concluded that the Western Sahara conflict was yet one more dispute that did not serve Arab interests and that efforts to resolve it could aid in burnishing Algeria’s Arab credentials. Moreover, Algeria’s priorities have changed. The country is now committed to social and economic reform, and regional disputes only divert resources from these objectives.

(C) Morocco, for its part, had little to lose from the move. It has not yet compromised its position on the Western Sahara but has gained potential leverage over its regional rival by demonstrating that the benefits of economic and political cooperation outweigh those of a protracted guerrilla campaign. The resumption of Algerian-Moroccan relations puts Rabat back into the mainstream of North African affairs and reduces the threat of hostilities with its militarily superior neighbor. Moreover, Morocco has gained an economic partner with whom it can pursue potentially lucrative trade and development projects. Contacts between Moroccan and Algerian firms are already under way. Rabat hopes to market car parts, tires, fruits, and vegetables in Algeria, and Algeria has already begun exporting tractors, bicycles, and televisions to Morocco.

The Desert War

(C) The Western Sahara dispute remains a potentially divisive issue, although Saudi mediators are optimistic that a breakthrough is near. Rabat and Algiers reportedly reject the idea of sovereignty for the territory but have not yet agreed on a form of autonomy for the Saharan people. Also, King Hassan will apparently not accept diplomatic representation for the Polisario at international organizations or Polisario demands that he withdraw his military and administrative apparatus before a referendum. Both Saudi and Moroccan officials concede a settlement could take a year. An end to the conflict is not, however, inevitable. Morocco and Algeria must overcome years of suspicion and mistrust and competing claims for regional dominance in order to secure a lasting peace. Lack of progress on this issue could well lead to a setback in bilateral relations.

Tunisian-Libyan Relations

(C) The Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement has given impetus to improved Tunisian-Libyan relations. Libyan leader Qadhafi and Tunisian President Ben Ali have now met on four occasions, including their 22 May meeting on the Tunisian island of Djerba.⁴ While on Djerba, the two sides reportedly agreed in principle to allow each country’s national goods free passage across the borders; to cooperate in the field of energy; to extend and interlink telephone networks; and to construct a highway between Sfax, Tunisia, and the Libyan border. A common national identity card will also be created and will carry the same information and design but in different colors for each country. In addition, Tunis and Tripoli reportedly agreed in principle to joint exploitation of the Continental Shelf, according to the International Court of Justice ruling, although differences persist over the division of resources.

(S) Economic considerations and security concerns were undoubtedly instrumental in Ben Ali’s decision to pursue closer ties to Libya. Negotiations on Libyan monies owed to Tunisia, since the 1985 break in relations should net Tunis some $45 million, although this amount is only half of Tunisia’s initial demand. Roughly 20,000 Tunisians have traveled to Libya in search of work since diplomatic ties were resumed in December, but the number who remain in Libya is probably far fewer. More than 200,000 Libyan tourists have visited Tunisia, providing hard currency for the economically depressed southern region. Tunis will also benefit from joint ventures currently under discussion and from Libya’s complementary economy, which will provide a market for Tunisian labor, goods, and services.

(C) Ben Ali also apparently calculated that more was to be gained by trying to cooperate with, rather than confront, his volatile neighbor. Relations between Tunis and Tripoli have been strained since their abortive 1974 unity agreement,⁵ forcing Tunisia to remain alert to a Libyan conventional military attack or Libyan-sponsored subversion. Tunis most likely believes that by bringing Qadhafi into the North African fold, it can alleviate its security concerns and reduce the threat from the east.

[portion marking not declassified] Qadhafi, for his part, is seeking respectability and a means of ensuring a Libyan role in regional affairs. Economic cooperation with the promise of greater availability of goods, as well as agreements already reached easing travel restrictions, should also bolster his domestic position. He is apt to use relations with his neighbors to try to drive a wedge between them and the US, but North African foreign policy will not be based on the colonel’s whims.

Outlook

[portion marking not declassified] The current level of cooperation in North Africa bodes well for near-term regional stability. A stable North Africa also benefits the US by creating a more economically and politically stable environment in which to conduct foreign relations. In addition, it reduces the potential for Soviet intervention and a superpower tug-of-war. The current calm and accommodation will, however, be difficult to preserve. Born of independent tactical considerations, this unlikely alliance joins Hassan, the conservative Monarch; Bendjedid, the pragmatic centrist; Ben Ali, the moderate activist; and Qadhafi, the radical revolutionary. Differing ideological predilections, varying agendas, and ingrained suspicion and mistrust will most likely inhibit any permanent reconciliation.

[portion marking not declassified] Qadhafi’s entry into the alliance will increase the Libyan leader’s respectability but probably not at the expense of US relations with alliance members, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. Hassan, Bendjedid, and Ben Ali perceive the necessity of trying to rein in Qadhafi as a means of enhancing regional security and perhaps reaping economic rewards, but they remain distrustful of the colonel’s intentions. Moreover, they are unlikely to sacrifice US support for Qadhafi.

(C) The Western Sahara dispute continues to be a potentially divisive issue, but all sides appear to be tiring of this protracted conflict. In addition, renewed ties between Morocco and Algeria provide a more conducive framework for reaching a political settlement. Both sides will have to compromise, with Hassan offering enough autonomy to the Saharan people to satisfy Algeria’s need for a face-saving way out. Realizing that the King’s political fortunes are closely tied to the Western Sahara and to ensure that the peace process continues, Algiers will most likely have to relent on its demand that Morocco withdraw its military and administrative apparatus from the territory before a referendum. Failure to reach an agreement would most likely lead to the breakdown of regional reconciliation. For now, all sides can benefit from the current respite to focus on troublesome domestic issues, including their flagging economies, and to bask in the lull in regional tensions.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Papers (SecDef), Subject: North Africa. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. See Document 90.
3. See Document 88.
4. See Document 89.
5. See footnote 4, Document 288.