Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State and Multiple Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

4850.

Rabat, May 17, 1988, 1121Z

SUBJECT

• Restoration of Algerian-Moroccan Relations.

Ref:

• Rabat 4848.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: The decision of King Hassan and President Bendjedid to restore diplomatic relations is a major step forward, for which the Saudis and we can take some credit. While Interior Minister Basri told Ambassador not to read more into the communiqué language than is evident, King Hassan clearly implied to SecDef Carlucci a month ago³ he expects some movement on the Sahara. Basri said he estimated it would take a year to resolve the 13-year-old conflict, and that the de facto ceasefire in the territory is still holding. Meanwhile, the door is now open for Hassan to attend the Algiers summit. The U.S. should make every effort to stimulate concrete measures by the two sides to improve bilateral trade and economic cooperation, as we have been doing. End summary.

3. The decision to restore diplomatic relations on the terms stated in the communique did not come easily. While Algeria appears to have come the greatest distance in agreeing to normalize without explicit progress on the Sahara conflict, Morocco has committed itself to a solution based on a “free referendum of self-determination . . .without any constraint.”

4. During May 16 dinner at Basri’s home, the Interior Minister told Ambassador that the agreement was no more and no less than what the language stated and cautioned against reading more than that into the communique wording. He stated, for example, that Morocco had not committed itself to recognize the 1972 border agreement, which he said first had to be ratified by Parliament. He did say, however, that the two sides have reaffirmed the validity of other agreements. (Comment: These would appear to include the 1969 Ifrane Treaty of Solidarity and Cooperation,⁴ which was to be valid for an initial 20 years, plus some ten bilateral accords concluded at Tlemcen in 1969 in the fields of economic, commerical and judicial cooperation.)

5. With regard to the Sahara dispute, the Moroccans so far remain tight-lipped about the substance of any discussions with the Algerians on resolving this central issue of contention between them. It is likely that discussions are moving forward on some referendum modalities. In response to Ambassador’s question as to whether the Sahara dispute would be resolved soon, Basri responded that it should take about one year to resolve. He added that there is a de facto ceasefire in the desert which appears to be holding. It should also be noted that King Hassan made an optimistic statement about improved relations with Algeria a month ago to SecDef⁵ looking ahead to a return of Moroccan troops from the Sahara—a clear implication that he expects some movement on the issue.

6. The communiqué language indicates that Arab solidarity—in advance of the Algiers Summit—was a major consideration and perhaps determined the timing of the announcement. This suggests a good will gesture by Hassan to Bendjedid, as well as a possible Saudi role in brokering the reconciliation. Whether this means Hassan will change his mind and attend the June 7 summit in Algiers is not known; Basri told Ambassador that Hassan’s attendance was not a sure thing, but agreed that the door was open. When the Ambassador offered that it would be contrary to the spirit of the reestablishment of relations for Hassan not to attend, Basri agreed.

7. Whether or not progress is imminent on the Sahara or whether Hassan goes to Algiers, we can take some credit for promoting the reconciliation. Since the Ramadan summit of last year when King Fahd brought Hassan and Bendjedid together on the border, we have been urging the Moroccans and Algerian representative in Rabat to take a different tack. We had suggested that rather than attempt to resolve the Western Sahara problem as a first step, they should begin by reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations. Moving to resolve the Western Sahara problem would then be easier since the climate would have warmed and economic incentives would prevail over purely political goals.⁶ The U.S. should continue to encourage and support this process.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0613. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Immediate to Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott. Also sent to Cairo, Riyadh, Paris, London, Casablanca, USUN, and USCINCEUR.
2. Telegram 4848 from Rabat, May 17, transmitted the text of the Moroccan-Algerian communiqué announcing the reestablishment of relations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0255)
3. A record of the Carlucci-Hassan meeting is in Document 275.
4. Reference is to the Treaty of Ifrane, signed by Hassan and Boumédiène on June 15, 1969, which settled a long-standing border dispute between Morocco and Algeria.
5. See footnote 3, above.
6. See footnotes 4 and 5, Document 456.