Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

87. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

2888.

Rabat, March 21, 1988, 1734Z

NEA for Murphy. Subject: Rabat Mini-COM, March 17–18, 1988.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Begin summary: Ambassadors Johnstone, Nassif, Pelletreau and Pugh, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Ussery, met in Rabat March 17–18 for an informal review of Mahgreb issues, including prospects in the Western Sahara, the developments between Mahgreb states, Libya, the role of the Soviets, U.S. commercial interests and other topics. This message reports highlights of the discussion and conclusions. End summary.

3. Western Sahara
While U.S. interests would be served by a resolution of the conflict, it seems clear that outside efforts to promote settlement (UNSYG, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia) have little prospect of success until Algeria and Morocco decide they want to move to a solution, which is not yet apparent. There may, in fact, be some risk that the United Nations will allow an interest in the technical aspects of peacekeeping and a referendum to get ahead of political preparations. We concluded that it would be useful to consult more fully with the Tunisians (the Mestiri visit), the Saudis, and the UNSYG, so as to have a better base of information on how others assess the situation and what they are doing. In talking with the Tunisians and Saudis, we would want to find out what they believe to be agreed elements between the parties. Is there, for example, agreement on Moroccan sovereignty, with some form of local autonomy? Is there agreement that there would be no independent Sahara foreign or defense policy or membership in international organizations? What is the attitude of the parties towards a “Quebec” formula? While much discussion centered on means of resolving dispute, including specific formulas such as “Quebec”,² and possible U.S. roles, we do not believe that U.S. interests would be served by identifying the U.S. with any particular formula for resolution of the conflict or by a more visible U.S. role. At the same time, we agreed that the range of solutions potentially acceptable to the parties is quite narrow, probably focusing on detailed arrangements for some form of local autonomy, under recognized Moroccan sovereignty and control.

The Greater Mahgreb

Overall, we believe that an improvement of relations between the countries of the Mahgreb, particularly between Algeria and Morocco, would be in U.S. interests, by enhancing long term regional stability and lessening the opportunity for Soviet involvement. We must recognize that the continuing attraction of the greater Mahgreb idea, and the competitive dynamics of the Mahgreb states, may well lead to the inclusion of Libya in broader groupings despite our arguments in favor of isolating Qadhafi, however limited the effect of such arrangements and groupings may be.

We may, thus, be confronted with the necessity of reevaluating the effectiveness of our Libya political policy in the region, and searching for additional and/or other means of constraining Qadhafi in the Mahgreb. On the economic side, we are concerned that U.S. policies targeted at Qadhafi are having some counterproductive effects, resulting in additional profits to Qadhafi and an expansion of third country oil and other economic activity in Libya. This, too, requires continued evaluation.

Trade and Commerce

— It is clearly in our interests to expand Maghreb-U.S.-commercial relations; fundamental differences between the commercial situations of the regional countries mean that we must approach each situation differently:

— For relatively cash-rich Algeria, we are preparing to intensify our sales promotion efforts, and look particularly at major projects.

— Our approach in cash-poor Morocco and Tunisia should be oriented more toward U.S. direct investment, with the goal of penetration of the EC Market for low-labor-cost manufactured goods.

— In this context, we believe USDOC could profitably prepare a study for U.S. businessmen on the advantages of European penetration through Maghreb investment; we note for instance that each Embassy recently submitted a new investment climate statement, which statements would be useful in such a regional document.

— Current experiences in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia with aircraft sales efforts indicate to us that we must make an effort to be more closely identified with the marketing efforts of U.S. companies.

— Host governments must understand that the USG is firmly behind American companies, even if there are several U.S. competitors for a contract, in order to counterbalance very effective representation by European Embassies on behalf of their national companies.

— We should also begin sharing more information on such regional sales efforts and consider how we can better coordinate our support to these efforts.

Military and Strategic Cooperation

— Our military cooperation programs in each of the countries are an important and useful element of the bilateral relationship.

— This is not a zero sum game; we can and should improve our military cooperation with rivals Morocco and Algeria at the same time, without unduly threatening either. Exercises in Morocco and Tunisia, the “spare parts” program in Algeria, and the African coastal security program in Mauritania are all examples of successful military programs.

— The Moroccan base line program, if enacted, will be a thorn in the Moroccan-Algerian relationship, but not cataclysmic.

The Soviets

— The Soviet Union’s strategic agenda in the region has been largely frustrated to date; the East-West balance in the Mahgreb remains strongly in our favor.

— The Soviets are marginalized in Morocco and Tunisia, although they may make minor inroads with activities such as the Mjara Dam project in Morocco. Their record on fishing has not endeared them to the Mauritanians. And Algeria has moved to a more neutral political position and an increasingly Western orientation in trade and commerce.

— However remote, the risk of future Soviet bases in Libya remains the number one US concern vis-a-vis the Soviets in the area given Qadhafi’s unpredictability and uncertainty about the post Qadhafi era.

Regimes and Bilateral Relations

— Each Ambassador reviewed the state of our bilateral relations and the condition of the host regimes. Both are in good shape in each host country, despite specific problems facing each government, but declining assistance levels are a problem in Tunisia.

Locust Invasion

— More coordination between host countries, as well as our respective aid missions economic sections is needed to meet the immediate emergency. Because of political sensitivities, we may have to lean more heavily on international organizations than we would otherwise prefer. At a minimum, we must do everything possible to foster an effective time-sensitive sharing of information throughout the region.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880243–0287. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, Tunis, and USUN.
2. Reference is to the special protections of the French language and French-Canadian culture in the province of Quebec within Canada’s federal parliamentary democracy.