Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

1448.

Rabat, February 11, 1988, 1556Z

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Reaction to Quadhafi Meetings With Ben Ali, Bendjedid and Abdelaziz.

Ref:

• (A) Rabat 1300,²
• (B) Tunis 1370,³
• (C) Algiers 798.⁴

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

2. Summary: The Moroccans are annoyed but officially remain silent regarding Qadhafi’s recent fishing expedition with his Maghreb neighbors. Most galling to the GOM was the GOA-arranged meeting between Qadhafi and Polisario Chief Abdelaziz. The press is highlighting a post-Annaba statement by Qadhafi that he wanted union with all the Maghreb states and had no intention of resuming military aid to the Polisario. End summary.

3. We have been treated to the usual press fulminations attributing the usual motives to the usual suspects (i.e., the Algerians and their purported effort to gang up on Morocco) following the meetings with Qadhafi in Sakiet and Annaba. The GOM, nevertheless, is maintaining public silence while trying to assess the damage, if any. Looking at matters from a Rabat tilt, the local press of February 10–11 has been quick to note that Qadhafi appears to be playing Rabat’s game, not Algeria’s, in two respects. First, according to Qadhafi’s February 9 AFP interview, the Libyan leader referred to the existence of a union agreement with Algeria, presumably indicating he remained uninterested in joining the Tripartite Treaty. The AFP quoted Qadhafi as saying “there will soon be further contacts and the proposals (for union) will be submitted to Morocco.” Qadhafi then reportedly added “If Morocco does not want to participate in this union, we are in no hurry to settle the (Sahara) conflict and we will not insist.”

4. On another point important to the GOM, Qadhafi reportedly stated that Libya had not resumed military aid to the Polisario: “We decided a number of years ago not to take part militarily in that conflict. We are only furnishing humanitarian assistance.” Thus, it appears initially to the Moroccans that no great damage to its interests has emerged from any of Qadhafi’s meetings in Algeria or Tunisia over the past week.

5. Officially but not in public, the Moroccan position remains that expressed by Foreign Minister Filali to DCM February 5, i.e., that Algeria is making a mistake in trying to isolate or pressure Morocco and that even if the GOA succeeds in bringing the other Maghreb states into a treaty framework without Morocco, it will not achieve the desired result (ref A). MFA Counselor for Arab/Islamic Affairs Adib Taieb indicated to PolOff February 5 that the GOM continued to be reasonably relaxed about the faint prospects of Libyan adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Taieb told us that the GOM thought Tunisia would continue to oppose such a move, while an Iraqi diplomat said his government had learned from the Tunisians that the GOT had virtually promised as much to visiting Moroccan PM Laraki during his visit to Tunis a week ago.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880120–0439. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Casablanca, Nouakchott, Paris, and Tunis.
2. In telegram 1300 from Rabat, February 8, the Embassy reported on Filali’s February 5 conversation with the DCM: “Lamenting lack of Algerian movement on bilateral relationship and continuing efforts with other regional states, Filali asserted that it would not be in Algeria’s interest to construct a Maghreb without Morocco, even if it were able to do so. The further Algeria was able to go in that direction, the more Morocco would have to turn its economic, political and security options with Europe and the U.S.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880109–0102)
3. In telegram 1370 from Tunis, February 5, the Embassy reported: “Libyan leader Qadhafi arrived in Tunis Feb. 4 proclaiming his intent to discuss unification of the Arab nation.” The Embassy continued: “Libya is lukewarm about joining the Tri-partite agreement, and Tunisia will not encourage it. Given Qadhafi’s style, Embassy believes Qadhafi’s visit is at least as likely to exacerbate Tunisian-Libyan relations as it is to improve them.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880101–0475)
4. In telegram 798 from Algiers, February 10, the Embassy reported: “At first glance, Qadhafi’s visit yielded little of substance.” The Embassy commented: “Latest round of visits apparently advanced the cause of Maghreb unity in only a symbolic sense.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880116–0792)