Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

14143.

Washington, January 16, 1988, 0630Z

For Ambassador Wisner from INR/NESA-GSHarris. Subject: Maghreb: Belling the Libyan Cat . . . They Hope.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Algiers, Tunis, and Nouakchott will sell Qadhafi admission to their regional pact, but only as long as he meets their price. Rabat, not a pact member, does not see the benefit in objecting. US reservations will not make the Maghreb states seriously reconsider, but the disparate natures of the parties will doom the Maghreb pact sooner or later.

Networking

3. Last month, Algerian Prime Minister Ibrahimi went to Libya;² Algerian, Tunisian, and Mauritanian Foreign Ministers considered admitting Libya to the Tripartite Pact;³ and Tunis renewed ties to Qadhafi.⁴ Algerian President Bendjedid then visited Tunis and Tripoli to quash remaining obstacles to his conception of a greater Maghreb. Qadhafi was set to visit Tunis this week, but cancelled when Tunis received the Sixth Fleet Commander January 11–13.

Algeria: Dealing

4. Algeria has made numerous economic deals with Libya, but its chief goals are diplomatic and political. It thinks it can manipulate Qadhafi, and wants to play a role in Libya after he goes. It thinks Libyan membership in the Tripartite Pact would give Rabat a stark choice—join an Algeria-designed regional network or face isolation—which would press Hassan to settle on the Western Sahara. And in Algerian politics, economic gains would mollify technocrats who seek regional trade/cooperation (though most think Morocco—not Libya—offers a more complementary economy).

Tunisia

5. An arm well-twisted: Aware of potential rewards and Algiers’ Maghreb designs, Tunis is haggling with Libya over an admission price to the Tripartite Pact. For renewal of diplomatic ties, Libya agreed to pay ousted Tunisian workers and stop giving refuge to Tunisian dissidents. Algeria has given Tunisia a de facto security guarantee, but President Ben Ali is bolstering his southern military command, and is using the Sixth Fleet Commander’s visit as a signal of his preference for close US ties.

Morocco

6. Collecting alimony: King Hassan ended “union” with Qadhafi in 1986 in response to US pressure and Libyan criticism of Moroccan-Israeli ties. But trade, financial, and political links remain strong, and may be improving. Despite rumors of new Libyan aid to Polisario, Qadhafi publicly backs Hassan’s view of the Western Sahara. And Rabat and Tripoli retain intelligence links.

Indecisive—or Cunning

7. If coaxed Rabat says it fears regional isolation, but has not lobbied its case in Maghreb capitals.⁵ Seeing the Tripartite Pact as Algeria-inspired, it will not seek to join. Its only leverage on Algeria is the Western Sahara, but Hassan is reluctant to use this sensitive issue as a bargaining chip. Rabat thinks Qadhafi suspects Algerian motives, and sees Maghreb politics as a calculated political game. Its current strategy is to hunker down, perhaps suffer a bad year or so, but keep playing its own Libya card, and wait for the newly unified Maghreb to self-destruct.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880041–0790. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Whitaker; cleared by Janean Mann (INR/NESA), Judy Bird (INR/NESA), Donald Mulligan (INR/AA), Charles Jefferson (INR/PMA), Gary Dietrich (INR/NESA), and George Harris (INR/NESA); approved by Harris.
2. In telegram 116 from Algiers, January 9, the Embassy reported Ibrahimi’s “characterized aim” of his December 18–20 talks in Tripoli “as improving economic cooperation, while Ibrahimi referred to political dimension strictly within a Maghreb context: ‘we consider (that) the work we have been doing with the Jamahirya over the past year and a half is a positive step toward the building of the Arab Maghreb.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880021–0149)
3. In telegram 5529 from Nouakchott, December 28, 1987, the Embassy reported: “According to the Tunisian DCM in Nouakchott, the December 20 summit in Algiers of the Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia focused chiefly on the Western Sahara war, Maghreban economic integration, and Libya’s request to join the Tripartite Treaty of Fraternity and Concord. The Tunisian diplomat stated that Algeria’s pressure on Tunisia to let Libya join the Treaty had abated.” The Embassy continued: “No final decision had yet been made to allow Libya into the treaty. But given the improvement in Tunisian-Libyan relations, Libya’s accession to the treaty was likely: Libya might join as early as March or April 1988, when the treaty members will hold a summit in Nouakchott to mark the fourth anniversary of the compact.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871056–0857)
4. In telegram 14462 from Tunis, December 29, the Embassy reported: “The Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released December 28 a joint Tunisian-Libyan communiqué announcing the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations because of the ‘positive signs that have occurred in their relations.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D871060–0081) In telegram 245 from Tunis, January 8, the Embassy reported that the two nations had “re-established diplomatic relations albeit at less than Ambassadorial level.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880596–0830, D880019–0046)
5. In telegram 1246 from Tunis, February 3, however, the Embassy reported that in a February 2 interview “Baccouche declared that ‘talk of Morocco’s isolation presents a pseudo-problem, there will be no Maghreb without Morocco.’ Citing the Western Sahara as a major obstacle, Baccouche asked ‘How can one envision the creation of a greater Maghreb without a solution to this problem?’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880093–0179)