Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

8659.

Rabat, August 29, 1986, 2305Z

White House for NSC. Subject: King Hassan’s Decision to Break Union With Libya. Refs: (A) Kirby-Zweifel August 29 Telecon² (B) Rabat 8658.³

1. (Confidential—Entire text)

2. As reported ref A, Hassan announced in a televised address tonight, August 29, that he has broken Oujda Accord because Qadhafi, in his August 27 communique with Syria’s Assad, had accused Hassan of “treason” in meeting Shimon Peres last month.

3. While Morocco-Libya relations had deteriorated badly since the Hassan-Peres meeting, as recently as Tuesday night⁴ Hassan had been determined to do nothing to provoke Qadhafi so as to leave the onus on the latter for any rupture that might occur (ref B). The Qadhafi-Assad communiqué thus seems clearly to have pushed Hassan over the edge,⁵ and he doubtless wanted to get in his licks before the always unpredictable Qadhafi had a further opportunity to snipe at Hassan in his expected September 1 address.

4. While it is speculation on the Embassy’s part at this stage, we think another factor weighing in Hassan’s decision to break was probably his desire to further improve relations with Washington in advance of a U.S. visit which he still presumably hopes to make at some early stage to discuss, inter alia, Morocco’s need for economic and military assistance. Regardless of what Washington’s current intentions may be, many senior palace and GOM officials believe there is a better than even chance that the U.S. will take another hard crack at Qadhafi in the days or weeks just ahead. Hassan may well have calculated that if Oujda was about to be scrapped by one side or the other anyway, and if Washington and Libya were about to clash, Morocco could gain more points with Washington by breaking Oujda before rather than after the clash.⁶ Hassan may also have reasoned that even in terms of his relations with the Arab world, it would be easier for him to abandon Qadhafi before rather than after such an American strike.

Kirby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860661–0613. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to DOD, the White House, Algiers, Tunis, Paris, Madrid, Damascus, Riyadh, Amman, and Cairo.
2. Not found.
3. In telegram 8658 from Rabat, August 29, the Embassy reported that Hassan would be giving a national television address that evening. “Several informed Moroccans,” the Embassy noted, “think that the speech will somehow touch on Libya,” including an announcement that Morocco would withdraw from the Oudja Accords. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860660–0905)
4. August 26. Hassan and Peres met on July 21. See Document 259.
5. In telegram 5179 from Damascus, August 29, the Embassy reported: “Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s unexpected visit to Libya August 24 and 25 has been played here as an unqualified success. Asad was able to demonstrate solidarity with Qadhafi at a moment of apparent ‘threat,’ thus making up for what the Libyans had considered lukewarm support at the time of the April bombing and keeping a promise reportedly made to Qadhafi at that time. Asad was able to elicit from the Libyans a forceful condemnation of the Hassan-Peres meeting.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860659–0741)
6. Reagan wrote Hassan on September 3 to thank him for breaking the Oudja Accords. See Document 260.