Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

259. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

6931.

Rabat, July 15, 1986, 1159Z

SUBJECT

• Hassan to Postpone U.S. Trip Meet Peres.

Ref:

• State 218582.²

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Summary. King Hassan told me late July 14 that he would not travel to the U.S. as planned for scheduled working visit. He said he will meet Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres on either 7/21 or 22 in Morocco to try to relaunch the Middle East peace process. I explained that Washington had been interested in discussing a number of issues during the visit in addition to the Middle East. Hassan responded that a meeting with Peres to discuss the Fes Plan was the best way to truly isolate Libyan leader Qadhafi. He said he hoped that President Reagan would understand, and appealed that if his initiative with Peres bore fruit, he would very much need U.S. support later on. He said he nevertheless felt it important for now to keep Washington free from identification with what had to be, at least initially, an Arab-Israeli initiative. End summary.

3. King Hassan called me in late July 14 for a one-hour meeting. Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Foreign Minister Filali attended throughout.

4. Hassan opened by telling me he had “good and bad news”. He said that he would not be able to travel to the U.S. for his scheduled working visit in Washington to begin July 22. The reason, he explained is that he had agreed with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to meet here in Morocco on July 21 or 22.

5. Hassan said the two had agreed to try to re-launch the Middle East peace process, and would meet to that end. They would discuss on the basis of the peace plan drawn up at the 1982 Fes Summit. He reminded me he remains president of the Arab League, and said he was still charged by the league to defend the Fes Plan. “Who better to talk to about it”, he asked rhetorically, “than the most interested party?”

6. Hassan said the meeting would and must take place in complete secrecy. He said he did not want to give the Soviets a chance to say “no”. He noted that secrecy would spare certain Arab countries—he specifically cited Syria and Jordan—embarrassment. Similarly it would eliminate any pressure on European countries to feel the need to support his initiative. He was not clear on where he thought his discussions with Peres would lead, but added that he saw it as the beginning of a long process.

7. Hassan said he regretted having to postpone his meeting with the President, and expressed the hope that it could be re-scheduled in the following months. Specifically mentioning August or September as hopeful future dates for a U.S. visit.³ He noted, however, that he felt it important that his meeting with Peres be seen as a purely Arab-Israeli initiative, not one concocted in Washington. To meet with the President a few days before or after meeting Peres would inevitably be seen by all as a U.S. plot. He said he did not want to be perceived as plotting. He hastened to add, however, that U.S. support for his initiative was extremely important. “The first round may be bilateral and in Morocco,” he said, “but the second, third and fourth may very well need to be in Washington.” He recalled that the President in his end-of-Ramadan message to him,⁴ had praised the Moroccan monarch as a leader of the Arab world. He said he was fulfilling his Arab responsibilities, and felt sure that the President would understand.

8. I told the King that Washington, like I, would be most disappointed by the news of the visit postponement. I conveyed to him the points contained reftel regarding our support for a Hassan-Peres meeting. I noted, however, that Washington had hoped to discuss a broad range of issues of importance to both the U.S. and Morocco. Hassan responded quickly. That he knew Washington wanted to talk about Libya and how best to isolate that country. He said, however, that the best way to isolate Qadhafi was precisely by supporting a Hassan-Peres meeting. “We will be discussing on the basis of the Fes Plan,” he recalled. “Libya was the one state that has never endorsed that plan.” He argued that by meeting Peres. He would serve U.S. interests far better than merely by travelling to Washington. Any discussion on U.S./Moroccan cooperation against Libya could be taken up by visits to Morocco of Weinberger and/or Casey.⁵

9. After my meeting with the King, I called Foreign Minister Filali. We met just before midnight at his home. I explained to him my concern for the bilateral relationship of this postponement. He said he was also completely surprised by the King’s decision. He noted how hard he himself had worked to bring about the visit. He asked me why the Israelis were pressing so hard for a visit at this moment. He said that Peres had told Hassan that a September visit would come too late to be of electoral assistance and needed a visit right away. I expressed our view per Tel Aviv 9047 that a meeting would probably have no effect on the National Unity Government in Israel although it would provide Peres a political benefit.⁶ I suggested that a meeting before or after the Washington visit could be easily arranged given the desire of both sides to meet. The Foreign Minister suggested that he speak with the King the next day about his decision and would get back to me.

10. Comment: Hassan’s decision to postpone the visit may have stemmed from two bases: first, with the U.S. centerpiece being cooperation against Qadhafi and termination of the Oujda Accord, Hassan may have felt he had little to gain and much to lose, especially in light of the Libyan-Algerian dialogue.⁷ Secondly, he may feel that to improve U.S. military and economic assistance during austere times he would have to go to Washington with a very strong hand. A successful face-to-face with Peres would in his view do nicely. Any Washington pique over the postponement could be overcome by a subsequent meeting with Peres in Washington.

Nassif

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A White House Situation Room handling slip affixed to the top of the telegram indicates that McDaniel, Pearson, Rodman, and Morton saw the telegram.
2. In telegram 218582 to Rabat, June 12, the Department transmitted talking points for the Embassy to convey to Hassan in support of a Hassan-Peres meeting. (Ibid.)
3. An unknown hand underlined “August or September” in this sentence.
4. In telegram 175561 to Rabat, June 4, the Department transmitted Reagan’s Ramadan message. The message reads in part: “I know that through your leadership Morocco will remain a bastion of civilized values, setting an example in the Middle East and around the world.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860432–0097)
5. An unknown hand drew an arrow in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
6. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. The telegram was not found.
7. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.