Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

70. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

5833.

Rabat, June 12, 1986, 1624Z

SUBJECT

• June 11 Audience With King Hassan: Dealing With Libya.

Ref:

• State 183331.²

1. (Secret—Entire text)

2. Summary. During a June 11 audience with King Hassan at the Royal Palace in Skhirat, which focused almost entirely on the King’s upcoming trip to the United States, I emphasized to Hassan that Washington saw U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya as the centerpiece of discussions. I observed that talks on that subject would set the tone for all other discussions during the visit. Hassan said he understood the importance the U.S. placed on the issue, commenting that he too had many grievances against the Libyan leader who, he emphasized, could turn on Morocco at almost any time. He noted, however, that such cooperation was so sensitive as to require very restricted discussion, since mere mention of the subject heightened the external security threat against Morocco. I told Hassan the U.S. understood the security concerns and would be ready to discuss ways in which to cooperate to meet the threat during the visit. Other subjects reported septels.³ End summary.

3. I met for an hour with King Hassan at the Royal Palace in Skhirat on June 12. The meeting was at my request, and focused on Hassan’s upcoming trip to Washington. Hassan was accompanied by Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and FonMin Abdellatif Filali.

4. I opened discussion by making points in reftel and noting to Hassan the importance Washington placed on the Libyan issue in the discussions to be held in the course of his visit. Advising Hassan that I would speak with the candor that has characterised our previous discussions, I said that Washington intended for U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya to be the centerpiece of the talks, and that the progress in these exchanges would in large part determine the success of the rest of the visit. I told Hassan that Washington wanted to see an end to the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, and sought to cooperate with Morocco in opposing Libyan support of terrorism around the world and of subversion against its African neighbors.

5. Hassan at first appeared somewhat taken aback by this direct presentation. He observed that, between chiefs of state, any subject was open to discussion. He understood the importance the U.S. places on the Libyan issue. Warming to the subject, he acknowledged that it was in Morocco’s interest as well to discuss the Libyan issue during the visit. He agreed that Libya is a major supporter of international terrorism and seeks to destabilize African neighbors. He added with vigor that Libya had been at the origin of the Sahara problem, as a result of its support for creation of the Polisario guerrilla movement. Noting that the Oujda Accord with Libya had been designed to “neutralize Qadhafi, not just to isolate him,” Hassan observed that Qadhafi is so volatile that he could turn on Morocco at any time. He repeated that he was ready to fully discuss the Libyan issue.

6. Hassan then noted that he had one concern about any discussion of bilateral cooperation against Libya: that the discussions be handled with an absolute maximum of discretion. He said it would be necessary that any meeting which discussed the subject might be restricted to a very small group of advisers on either side. “You have your methods of dealing with Qadhafi,” he remarked, “and I have mine.” He continued that “there are certain subjects of conversation between Chiefs of State that should be discussed ‘off the record’.” He said that, for example, he would have no problem if the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and myself were to participate in this discussion, but emphasized that the group of advisers should be kept small.⁴

7. Hassan explained that Libya, along with Algeria, represented the greatest threat to Morocco. He said that, while he feared no internal threat and was confident that his great-great-grandchildren would continue to occupy the throne in Morocco, he was not confident about external threats, over which he had so little control. It was for that reason that he felt it so important that attendance at any meeting to discuss cooperation against Libya be tightly controlled.

8. I assured Hassan that we would be prepared to consult in advance with him on who would attend the meetings from each side. Reiterating what I have told him in the past, I said that I had made termination of the Moroccan-Libyan relationship a priority goal, but added that Washington understood his concerns over a security threat from Libya should that goal be achieved. I told him that we would be prepared to explore with him in Washington ways to meet an increased Libyan threat resulting from U.S.-Moroccan cooperation against Libya.

9. Comment: Hassan’s response to my presentation on Libya did not appear to have been thought out in advance. It was more of a visceral reaction to an unexpected statement of intent.⁵ He was, however, quick to point out that he would face a real threat of Libyan subversion the day he terminated the tenuous union he now has with Qadhafi. Senior Moroccan security officials have often told us of the active Libyan efforts currently underway to put a network of Libyan activists in place for the day the Oujda Accord collapses, and described the enormity of their task in taking effective countermeasures. Hassan did not discuss during our June 11 meeting what exactly he would expect from the U.S. in exchange for terminating the relationship with Libya, nevertheless I suspect he will move cautiously before he takes any such step, carefully weighing the costs and benefits to Morocco. I am confident also that the June 11 audience has left him with no illusions about the importance we will give the Libyan question during the visit to Washington, and what we expect from him. We will need to give careful consideration to increased security threats to Moroccan and Polisario presence in the Western Sahara, if Libya reverted to past practice following a rupture in the union. Should Hassan raise these issues, we should be ready to respond to his concerns, if we expect forward movement from him. Embassy analysis of the current Moroccan-Libyan relationship follows by septel.

Nassif

1. Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross Subject Files, Morocco 1986. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: “Save—Have Elaine Morton come & read this—thanks.” Below this note, Morton initialed the telegram.
2. In telegram 183331 to Rabat, June 11, the Department transmitted talking points to Nassif in preparation for his impending meeting with Hassan, which read in part: “termination of the Moroccan/Libyan union is one of the primary objectives of my mission.” The Department instructed Nassif to emphasize that “real progress on the Libyan issue during your Washington visit will be critical to the success of your visit and will color the discussions on all other issues.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0285)
3. In telegram 5837 from Rabat, June 12, Nassif reported that he raised the issue of Hassan meeting with Peres. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0329) In telegram 5845 from Rabat, June 12, Nassif reported that Hassan “offered a lengthy aside on animosity between Algeria and Morocco.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0701)
4. Morton drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin bracketing the last sentence in this paragraph.
5. In telegram 6312 from Rabat, June 26, the Embassy reported “King Hassan’s meeting with the President is a major opportunity to advance our objectives of ending Morocco’s union with Libya. In reality the agreement is moribund. Hassan prefers a languishing relationship to a public breach. He fears renewed military assistance to the Polisario, concerted action with Algeria, and potential subversion within Morocco by Qadhafi.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis) Hassan ultimately canceled his visit to the United States, scheduled for July, in favor of a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres. See Document 259.