Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

510.

Algiers, January 30, 1986, 1508Z

SUBJECT

• Qadhafi Message to U.S.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: I met for an hour with President Bendjedid Jan. 30 at his request to discuss a variety of regional issues, most significant of which was his Jan. 28 meeting with Qadhafi.² After expressing condolences on Challenger explosion,³ Bendjedid described commitments made by Qadhafi on regional issues. He also passed on message from Qadhafi dealing with latter’s reputed desire for decreased tensions and willingness to deal with Soviet presence in Libya and terrorism. End summary.

3. Bendjedid traced history of difficult relations Algeria has had with Qadhafi but noted that Algeria had as a geopolitical imperative to maintain friendly relations with the Libyan people. As a result, he said, Algeria took a nuanced position on Libya—standing up to Libyan transgressions such as in Tunisia while maintaining friendly “official” relations to prevent the mobilization of Libyan public opinion against Algeria. In this context, Bendjedid said, he had met with Qadhafi after having stalled the meeting for over three months and having rebuffed dozens of pointed requests.

4. Bendjedid found Qadhafi agitated and troubled by current events—he expressed a strong desire to rebuild the bilateral relationship with Algeria. Bendjedid said he had told Qadhafi that there were a number of preconditions to an improved relationship, all of which Qadhafi said he would agree to. Qadhafi had even offered to sign a protocol listing the preconditions in detail, an offer which Bendjedid had rejected, saying that Libyan promises were meaningless—only actions counted. I asked Bendjedid about those preconditions. He said they related to Tunisian security and Libyan conduct. I asked if Qadhafi’s support for Ben Bella had not been discussed. Bendjedid said he had raised it and that Qadhafi has promised that this support was a thing of the past and would not be continued.

5. On Tunisia, Bendjedid said Qadhafi had expressed shock that Algeria had sided with Tunisia against Libya. Bendjedid had said that the merits of the case left no choice. Libya was the aggressor party, Tunisia the victim. He warned Qadhafi that Algeria would stand by Tunisia in every possible way should it be confronted by Libya. Qadhafi expressed hope for normalized relations with Tunisia. (In response to my query, Bendjedid said contacts between Tunisia and Libya had already begun through the two countries’ Ambassadors in Paris and would likely increase soon.) Algeria was undertaking to provide a list to Qadhafi of the assets of Tunisians which had been left behind by expelled workers. Qadhafi had promised to review such a list to arrange satisfactory settlement.

6. I asked if Bendjedid had pressed Qadhafi on terrorism. He said he had and was told by Qadhafi that although he strongly supported the Palestinian cause he had not been involved in any way in the recent events in Rome and Vienna.⁴ Bendjedid said he had gone over with Qadhafi the terrible damage done to the Palestinian cause by such incidents.

7. Discussion of terrorism provided Bendjedid with opportunity to get to the point of our meeting. Bendjedid said Qadhafi was preoccupied by the deterioration of his relations with the U.S. Despite his opposition to U.S. policies in the Middle East, Qadhafi did not want his relationship with the U.S. to deteriorate to the point that he would have to subordinate himself to the Soviets in order to buy a measure of protection. Qadhafi had said that Soviets had been after him for a long time to grant basing rights and that he had always resisted this “infringement” on Libyan sovereignty. Qadhafi said that U.S. fleet actions and menacing acts could leave him no choice but to capitulate to Soviet demands.⁵ Qadhafi had expressed great dismay over such a prospect. (Bendjedid noted in passing that such a development would also be viewed by Algeria as a direct challenge to its interests given fact that Qadhafi would sooner or later leave the scene but Soviets, once based in Libya, would be difficult to extract.)

8. Qadhafi had said that he wanted to see if the U.S. would be prepared to lower the tensions and work to establish better relations. He asked specifically if Bendjedid would pass on his concerns and offer to the U.S. Ambassador. Bendjedid said he had agreed to act as a message-carrier only. He said he told Qadhafi he was sure the U.S. would want to know what they would get in return. Qadhafi had said that, aside from Soviet role and potential pressure, he knew that U.S. had certain other concerns (a clear reference to terrorism, Bendjedid noted) and that he was prepared to deal with these as well. Bendjedid said there were no more specifics.

9. Dropping his role as message-carrier, Bendjedid observed that Algeria wanted reduced regional tension—it did not want a Soviet base in Libya or the U.S. fleet engaged permanently off the North African coast and was therefore prepared to play any role the U.S. might find useful in relaying messages. He said he was always skeptical of what Qadhafi said—he had known him a long time—and would never guarantee the sincerity of Qadhafi’s commitments. But, Libya’s problems were acute enough to cause even Qadhafi to seek a better way to do business and therefore, Bendjedid said, there might be something useful which could be accomplished—based on deeds, not words. He thought the U.S. should give it a serious look, particularly given the lack of serious alternatives for dealing with Libya. On this issue, Bendjedid noted that although Qadhafi faced internal dissent and economic problems that might someday bring him down, the fact was that no external opposition leader appeared to have the necessary internal connections or abilities to get the job done. Bendjedid thought that when Qadhafi disappeared it would be from internal opposition, not from anything stimulated by exile groups. In the meantime, Bendjedid implied somewhat circuitously, the U.S. might best show some flexibility and not allow Qadhafi to exploit U.S. rhetoric and menacing acts to rally Libyan opinion. Bendjedid thought that Qadhafi commitments obtained Jan. 28 with regard to Tunisia and Ben Bella and, by implication, regional stability, would give Algeria some leverage to contain Libyan activities. I expressed great skepticism, which he accepted. I promised to be back in touch with him with our views.

10. Comment: From Algerian perspective, Qadhafi meeting looks like a substantial success. By stalling meeting date, Algerians were able to prevent element of surprise which Qadhafi has used to his advantage elsewhere. Remote desert location of meeting allowed Algerians to control media coverage and prevent any possibility of pro-Qadhafi demonstrations. On substance, Algerians obtained concessions (however hypothetical) on Tunisia, support for Ben Bella, and on the Western Sahara, in the latter case, thereby throwing something of a monkey wrench into the Morocco-Libya relationship. In return, they allowed Qadhafi his much-solicited meeting and agreed to transmit his message to the U.S. I doubt they expect us to snap up the Qadhafi offer and do not believe it makes much difference to U.S.-Algerian relations whether or not we respond negatively. The remaining question, as yet unanswered, is whether Qadhafi-Bendjedid meeting will lead to cooling of Algeria’s relationship with various Libyan exile leaders. For the time being, Algerians are likely to take wait-and-see attitude and, given Algerian skepticism over anything Qadhafi says, not discard any options for dealing with the Libya problem. I will have the further opportunity to explore this issue with the President’s Secretary General (Belkheir) on Saturday.⁶

Johnstone

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate, Nodis.
2. In telegram 497 from Algiers, January 29, the Embassy noted that “Algerian media gave GOA version of January 28 Bendjedid-Qadhafi meeting, indicating Algerians gained some ground in putting distance between Morocco and Libya on the Western Sahara. While Algeria reaffirmed its support for Libyans’ territorial integrity, the U.S. was not condemned.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860073–0223)
3. Reference is to the January 28 explosion of the U.S. space shuttle Challenger. Documentation on the incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XL, Global Issues I.
4. See footnote 2, Document 65.
5. Documentation on U.S. naval actions is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
6. February 1.