Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

65. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, January 18, 1986

SUBJECT

• Breaking the Moroccan/Libyan Accord (S)—ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S/NF) Recent events, including indication of Libyan involvement in the Rome/Vienna airport bombings,² appear to have further strained the delicate Moroccan-Libyan Union. Several Moroccan government officials (GOM) have vigorously criticized Qadhafi for his support for terrorist groups, as well as for his position on rapprochement with Algeria. King Hassan has commented privately that he believes Qahdafi’s support for terrorism will lead to his undoing.³ These incidents may have given us an opening for weaning Morocco away from its Libyan union.

(S/NF) US/Moroccan relations are valued highly for both strategic and political reasons. It is a country with which we have shared a “special relationship” for 199 years, even if strained recently by the Oujda Accord. The United States benefits directly from Morocco’s agreement [less than 1 line not declassified] and host to a major VOA relay station. In the longer term, it will serve US interests for Morocco to be strong enough to balance revolutionary Algeria in the Maghreb. A radical or pro-Soviet state at the western approaches to the Mediterranean would weaken our geo-strategic posture. These considerations argue strongly for some tolerance on our part toward the Union for now, but also for our taking appropriate action whenever possible to sever the Libyan tie.

(S/NF) Despite recent embarrassments by Qadhafi, King Hassan still sees value in the Union as a means to both preclude Libyan support to the Polisario and to divert Algerian forces to the Libyan border. There also are some modest economic benefits accruing to Morocco as a result of the Union, but these are not substantial. There are good indications that King Hassan would dissolve the Union openly if renewed Libyan support for the Polisario or other Libyan actions against Moroccan interests could be proven publicly.

(S/NF) King Hassan continues to have the highest regard for his US connection, and for what he believes is his close rapport with President Reagan. He also realizes that the distance between Rabat and Washington since the Oudja Accords has grown significantly, as evidenced by his inability to be guaranteed a meeting with the President when he planned to visit the US last year, and by our declining economic and security assistance program.

(S/NF) POSSIBLE INCENTIVES TO WEAN MOROCCO FROM LIBYA: We need to send a positive, unequivocal signal of US support for Morocco,⁴ one that assures the King it is possible to restore our “special’s relationship” to its former vigor, and that shows him he has a better alternative than the Accord. Such a message must be political primarily, but must include economic inducements as well.

(S/NF) Some specific steps we should consider:

— Given the King’s feelings of political isolation, send a Presidential invitation for King Hassan to visit early this year, a visit replete with the pomp and ceremony the King enjoys.⁵

— NSC proposed such a visit, but scheduling has been held up until dates for the next Reagan/Gorbachev meeting are resolved.

— If we delay until later in the year, we could miss the opportunity offered by the lastest Libyan debacle;

— Send a US emissary to Morocco. Given his close relationship with the King, we recommend UN Ambassador Dick Walters;⁶

— Selectively expand or redirect our intelligence exchanges to provide explicit proof to the GOM of Libyan support for terrorism and any other evidence of Libyan actions that adversely affect Moroccan interests;

— Readdress the idea of a referendum to resolve the western Sahara problem, offering US assistance in negotiations between Morocco and Algeria, and in the UN;

— While Gramm-Rudman⁷ poses obvious obstacles, consider providing additional concessionary or grant FMS for much desired and much needed equipment, e.g., an advanced US fighter aircraft, armored vehicles and ammunition (US assistance summary at TAB A);⁸

— As an “access” (but not “base rights”) country, Morocco should receive a higher level of priority in the security assistance allocation process than it currently does. This may be because the access agreement has received relatively little publicity, which the Moroccans prefer.

— Explore the possibility of doing more for Morocco as part of our transit access and joint exercise agreement by offering to “lease” Moroccan facilities based on existing levels of US usage for transits and exercises, an arrangement similar to the Oman “Operations and Maintenance Agreement”.⁹

— Morocco did not request such payments when we concluded the Access Agreement,¹⁰ primarily because they believed by giving us such privileges, they in turn would receive higher levels of concessionary FMS and grant aid.

— In view of impending Gramm-Rudman cuts to their overall O & M budgets, we expect the military services will oppose this idea strongly as, you may recall, they did the Oman O & M payments. If you support this idea, and if Morocco shows interest in receiving such remittances, you most likely will have to direct the Services to make these payments.

(S/NF) If you believe these ideas should be pursued further, we could include the subject as a topic for your next breakfast meeting with George Shultz and John Poindexter, or prepare a memorandum for you to send to them.

Richard L. Armitage¹¹
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Breakfast topic: ____________¹²

Prepare a memo: ____________¹³

Other: ____________

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1986. Secret; Noforn. Sent through Iklé. Drafted by Charles (ISA/NESA). A stamped notation at the top of the letter reads: “SECDEF HAS SEEN JAN 24 1985.” Taft also initialed the memorandum.
2. Reference is to the December 27, 1985, terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989. The United States believed that Qadhafi supported the suspected mastermind of the attack, Abu Nidal. See also footnote 2, Document 156.
3. No record of Hassan’s comment has been found.
4. Armitage wrote five vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to the phrase “We need to send a positive, unequivocal signal of US support for Morocco.”
5. Armitage made two vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote: “This is important point.” Weinberger wrote: “agree” underneath Armitage’s comment.
6. Weinberger wrote: “OK” in the right-hand margin next to this point.
7. Reference is to the Budget Deficit Reduction Act, December 12, 1985, authored by Senators Phil Gramm (R-Texas), Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire), and Ernest Hollings (D-South Carolina), which provided for automatic spending cuts in the federal budget if discretionary funding exceeded budget spending thresholds in a given fiscal year.
8. Attached but not printed is an undated information paper entitled “Morocco—Security Assistance Program.”
9. Not further identified.
10. See Document 207.
11. Armitage signed “VR/Rich” above this typed signature. Below it he wrote: “Mr. Secretary, A visit to the White House would do more than all the other items combined—Rich.”
12. Weinberger wrote: “OK” next to “Breakfast topic.”
13. Weinberger drew a line from “Prepare a memo” and wrote: “Brief talking points.”