Office of the Historian

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco1

110910.
Washington, April 10, 1986, 0314Z

For Ambassador From Under Secretary Armacost. Subject: Reply to King Hassan. Ref: Rabat 2912.2

1.
(S—Entire text)
2.
Basic message relayed to Ambassador Nassif by MinInt Basri (reftel) also sent via Director Casey.3 In latter case Hassan asked that President and Secretary Shultz be assured that “The message of solidarity sent today was the minimum that should be done. It was at the same time the maximum. King Hassan II.”
3.
You should respond orally to both messages (your choice as to interlocutor but no need to do so directly with the King) using following points:
—
I have been directed to convey USG views of King’s message to Qadhafi, as explained to me by MinInt Basri and also relayed to President and Secretary Shultz “by the hand of Mr. Casey.”
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USG cannot accept that Moroccan message of strong support for Qadhafi was “the minimum that should be done.”
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On the contrary, USG notes that some Arab governments did not take public positions; others took courageous course of entering reservations to Arab League resolution on this topic.4
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USG cannot understand nor accept Moroccan “total solidarity” with Libya which attacked U.S. military units operating in international waters. Such a Moroccan posture can only encourage Qadhafi to continue to pursue his various illegal activities. It is USG’s hope that GOM will reconsider its position.
Shultz
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel, Ussery, Teicher, Pearson, Tracy, and McKinley; approved by Armacost.↩
  2. In telegram 2912 from Rabat, March 25, Nassif reported: “Acting through Interior Minister Basri, King Hassan has given us advance notice and explanation of what he considers an ‘absolute minimum’ message of support he plans to send to Qadhafi in the context of ongoing Gulf of Sidra incidents. The message, which contains no reference to the U.S., has passages on ‘solidarity’ and Libyan ‘patriots’ and ‘victims.’ It appears to be the minimum which Hassan, as Chairman of the Arab League, Islamic Conference, and Jerusalem Committee considers necessary to avoid outright rupture with Qadhafi and attendant risk of Libyan reinvolvement in the Western Sahara. I pointed out to Basri probable adverse Washington reaction to such a message.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860230–0333) Documentation on the Gulf of Sidra incidents is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.↩
  3. Reference is to a March 26 memorandum from Rixse to Shultz and Poindexter. (Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Burns/Ross Subject Files, Morocco 1986)↩
  4. In telegram 3594 from Rabat, April 11, Nassif reported that he had met with Filali on April 10 and that Filali stated that “Morocco is ‘caught in the middle’ in the present confrontation between the U.S. and Libya. Morocco still has a union with Libya. Although there is little substance to the arrangement. The Libyans, for their part, were not pleased with the King’s message to Qadhafi and wanted more.” Nassif commented: “Despite these protestations, Filali clearly understood, and appeared to expect negative USG reaction to the message, which I believe he will convey to King Hassan.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Rabat 1986 Nodis)↩