Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

57. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, August 1, 1985

SUBJECT

• Managing U.S. Policy Toward Morocco and Algeria

You requested my thoughts on the U.S.-Moroccan-Algerian relationship.²

In the nature of things, our relationships with Morocco and Algeria are not symmetrical. While both are important countries, our relations with the two cannot really be equated. We derive strategic, military, and political benefits from Morocco that Algeria presently is either unwilling or unable to provide. Thus, Algeria could not substitute for a loss of our assets in Morocco.

In my view, it would be a mistake to risk the tangible benefits of our links with Morocco in the quest for intangible benefits from an improved tie with Algeria. Indeed, on two central cross-cutting issues on which Moroccan and Algerian interests conflict—the Western Sahara and arms sales—it is difficult to discern any other choice for us than to tilt toward Morocco.

General Considerations

King Hassan has his own agenda and will play the balance of power game in North Africa according to his perception of Morocco’s interests. The Union with Libya and Hassan’s less than enthusiastic support for the Hussein-Arafat initiative underscore his willingness to act in ways inimical to U.S. interests.³

Nonetheless, Morocco makes a significant contribution to our overall defense strategy and there is no other country in the region that can replace it. It offers the United States important support for our security strategy in Southwest Asia, the Mediterranean, and NATO; we have paid a relatively moderate price for our access agreement, use of Moroccan facilities, exercise program, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and VOA facilities.

Moreover, Morocco still attaches considerable importance to its relationship with the United States. It relies on us for military, economic, and diplomatic support and believes that the bilateral relationship is central to Morocco’s overall security position in the region. Morocco’s dependence on the United States continues to provide us with a measure of influence over Hassan’s policies—for example, implementing the Oujda Accord in a way that does less harm to our interests in Morocco than might have been feared.

Algeria, on the other hand, offers us modest benefits—a partial counterweight to Libya, denial of extensive Soviet access to its facilities, modest support for the peace process—but does not desire open or close strategic cooperation with us. While it will continue to provide limited access to its port facilities for U.S. forces, domestic constraints, the ideology of the leadership, its position within the nonaligned movement, and its relationship with Moscow will sharply limit its military cooperation with the United States.

Algeria is interested in expanding its relationship with us, especially in the areas of military procurement and economic and trade relations. But its limited need for our assistance will not give us significant leverage over Algerian policies. Indeed, there are a number of issues on which U.S. and Algerian interests will continue to diverge despite improved bilateral relations:

— continued terrorist training of Palestinian, radical Lebanese Shia, and other guerrilla groups;

— encouragement of Polisario demands on Mauritania to allow use of its territory for operations in the Western Sahara;

— support for the Sandinistas;

— support for Third World positions in the UN and other international forums.

We do not possess sufficient carrots or sticks to effect a change in Algerian positions on these issues. It is also unlikely that Algeria is prepared to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union significantly in return for greater military and economic assistance from us. Finally, we cannot give Algeria what it really desires: an end to U.S. support for Morocco.

The Western Sahara Problem

We should avoid a shift in U.S. policy on the Western Sahara in favor of the Polisario or Algeria; indeed, the creation of an independent Polisario state in the Western Sahara would be a potentially strategic blow to our interests. It would contribute to continuing instability in the region, provide a potential staging ground for Polisario attacks into Moroccan territory, and possible Soviet strategic access to facilities on the eastern coast of the Atlantic.

The risk of an escalation of the Western Sahara conflict has increased in the wake of Morocco’s extension of the berm; nonetheless, the war is unlikely to spread in ways that would threaten important U.S. interests in the region.

I suspect that a more active U.S. role in trying to resolve the Western Sahara conflict would inevitably be seen as partisan and thus antagonize one or another of the major parties. Each would probably misperceive the U.S. as siding with its adversary; we would bear the burden if failure occurs. Algeria would urge us to use our leverage over Hassan to get him to the negotiating table and to make substantive concessions. It is not in our interest to lean on a friend like Morocco to make compromises with a potential enemy like the Polisario. Hassan would expect us to support his position, which would only strain our relationship with Algeria. The conditions simply do not exist for successful U.S. mediation.

We should continue to emphasize our bilateral relationships with Morocco and Algeria and subordinate settlement of what is essentially a regional dispute to our larger strategic objectives in the region. The U.S. should not play a more active role in the negotiating process until the Moroccans and Algerians are closer to finding their own solution—and then only if both parties request direct U.S. participation. At present, neither Algeria nor Morocco is interested in a settlement except on terms unacceptable to the other. We should therefore maintain our present policy of encouraging Morocco and Algeria to resume their high-level dialogue in search of a negotiated settlement.

Arms Sales

Our first priority in our military programs in North Africa should be to help meet Morocco’s security needs. Algeria’s advantages in the quantity and quality of military equipment give it clear military superiority over Morocco. Moroccan forces are inadequate to defend the country from a large-scale Algerian offensive due to severe logistic shortfalls in maintenance, spare parts, fuel, and munitions. Morocco depends on U.S. assistance to maintain the operational effectiveness of its armed forces. And, unlike Algeria, Rabat does not have its own resources to finance its force requirements.

In contrast, Algeria is in the middle of a major force expansion and modernization program based upon the acquisition of large quantities of front-line Soviet equipment. Its requirement for U.S. military assistance is limited to the upgrading of Soviet-origin weapons and the acquisition of advanced technology to modernize existing equipment. Algeria’s interest in developing an extensive military supply relationship with us is limited at best. Algeria will not, however, take any steps in the shortrun to jeopardize its military supply relationship with the Soviets—a dependency which provides Moscow with a large degree of leverage over Algerian policies.

Our fundamental strategic interests in North Africa are to keep the Strait of Gibraltar under pro-Western control, to preserve a regional balance of power between Morocco and Algeria, and to ensure the continuation of a moderate, pro-Western regime in Morocco. These interests require, in my view, favored treatment for Morocco on issues where Moroccan and Algerian interests conflict, rather than a balanced or even-handed approach. This does not mean that we should forgo the threat of a U.S. “tilt” toward Algeria as a means of exerting leverage over Hassan. But this threat is more effective if it is not carried out.

Clearly, we must avoid placing ourselves in situations where both Morocco and Algeria expect us to solve their problems with the other. At this early stage in our evolving relationship with Algeria, the best way to proceed is to expand cooperation with Algeria in areas that do not pose a threat to Morocco and where we have a competitive advantage over the Soviet Union. The most promising areas for such U.S. assistance are technology transfer to modernize Algerian industry and agriculture, greater contacts in the scientific, cultural, and educational fields, the upgrade of Algeria’s Soviet-made equipment, and training programs for Algerian military personnel.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chron, August 1–31, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sokolsky; cleared by Ledsky. Copies were sent to Murphy and Holmes.
2. No record of Armacost’s request has been found.
3. See Document 37.