Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State and the Embassies in Tunisia and Algeria¹

7071.

Rabat, August 14, 1984, 1749Z

Military for Polads. Subject: August 13 Hassan-Qadhafi Meeting: Conclusion of a Treaty Forming a Union Between Morocco and Libya. Ref: (A) Rabat 7035,² (B) Rabat 7069.³

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Further to ref (A), reports that Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, and perhaps King Fahd, would join the August 13 meeting in the Moroccan border town of Oujda between King Hassan and Colonel Qadhafi proved incorrect when neither appeared during the course of the day. The Hassan-Qadhafi meeting broke up late in the afternoon with Hassan departing for Fez, and Qadhafi going to Algiers and, on August 14, to Tunis for consultations with Algerians and Tunisians over the principal result of the Hassan-Qadhafi meeting: the conclusion of a treaty instituting a union of states between Morocco and Libya (ref B).

3. The conclusion of the treaty, which was announced almost 24 hours after Qadhafi’s departure from Oujda, is the single most important step Hassan has taken in his 13-month-old rapprochement with Libya. As we have reported, there have been increasing high-level contacts between Morocco and Libya in recent weeks, although there has been no indication that the subject of the discussions was a treaty of union. Indeed, this matter was handled in the greatest secrecy, with senior GOM Ministers, in response to our inquiries, regularly denying that there was anything special going on (French and Spanish Embassies tell us they were wholly unaware that union was in the works). Even in the aftermath of the announcement of the treaty’s conclusion, no details have been released specifying the practical effect of the treaty, which will not be implemented until ratified separately by Morocco and Libya according to the procedures of each country. Nevertheless even as a purely symbolic gesture, Hassan clearly intends through this decision to signal to his opponents in the region that Morocco continues to enjoy strong support; he also probably hopes that through agreement on this treaty, he will reinforce Qadhafi’s interest in continued rapprochement with Morocco, and continued political and diplomatic support for Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara dispute. From Qadhafi’s point of view the treaty will presumably serve his own need to decrease Libya’s isolation.

4. Foreign Minister Belkeziz, who is now in Fez with the King, telephoned Chargé afternoon of August 14 to say that he hopes to meet to discuss these developments as soon as possible after his return to Rabat late August 14 or early August 15. Apart from Belkeziz, as senior GOM and palace officials—all of whom accompanied the King to Oujda—filter back to Rabat in the days to come, we will attempt to learn additional details regarding the consequences of the treaty of union and the substance of the Hassan-Qadhafi talks. Based on recent form, we can predict with some confidence that the GOM will be at pains to try to reassure us that while the agreement with Qadhafi offers Morocco certain temporary material and political advantages, there is, in a profound sense, less to it than meets the eye.

5. Comment: Given the paucity of available facts and the recentness of this development, we shall not attempt major instant analysis in this telegram. On the other hand, some quick reflections are in order: (1) one of Hassan’s major motivations in entering this union, we think, is to bolster Morocco’s position in its jockeying with Algeria, broadly for predominance in the Maghreb, but particularly with respect to the Western Sahara; (2) Morocco sees some practical near-term economic value in specific cooperation agreements that either have already been concluded or are rumored to be upcoming under the union umbrella (e.g., civil air and other transport agreements); and (3) purely speculatively, and admittedly without any proof, we wonder whether the main bait for Hassan may have been a promised Libyan quick fix for Morocco’s difficult cash flow problems. Hassan, by all accounts, remains supremely confident of his ability to outmaneuver Qadhafi and even to moderate his maverick behavior. In our view, it would thus not be out of character for the King to attempt to solve economic problems by commitment to loose association with Qadhafi which recent Arab history suggests would be non-binding and short-lived.

6. After all foregoing has been said, we enter caveats: (1) from late ticker reports we note that Moroccan Royal Counselor Guedira has accompanied Qadhafi in his August 13–14 conversations in Algiers and Tunis; and (2) we recall Hassan’s comment to Ambassador Reed some weeks ago⁴ that Rabat and Algiers were quietly exploring the possibility of a Greater Maghreb grouping under which a Western Sahara solution might be arranged. Thus, it seems to us that Qadhafi and Guedira could arguably have gone to Algiers and Tunis either (a) to explain the Morocco-Libya Union and argue that it is not directed against anyone; or (b) to try to put the finishing touches on some broader arrangement. If their purpose is the latter, the analysis suggested in para. 5 in this cable would not necessarily hold in its entirety. In the absence of any real evidence one way or the other, and purely on the basis of instinct, we think their travels can best be explained by (a) rather than (b), however.

Kirby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840518–0422. Secret; Immediate. Sent Niact Immediate to Tunis and Algiers. Sent for information Immediate to Jidda and USLO Riyadh. Sent for information Priority to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Casablanca, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tel Aviv, Tangier, USUN, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USDOCOSOUTH, USCINCEUR, USCENTCOM, Dakar, Conakry, Abidjan, Lagos, Kinshasa, and Libreville.
2. In telegram 7035 from Rabat, August 13, the Embassy reported: “King Hassan arrived early August 13 in Oujda, near the Algerian border, where he was joined by Colonel Qadhafi. AFP reports here indicate that Algerian President Bendjedid, and perhaps King Fahd, are expected to join the summit today.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840514–0702)
3. Telegram 7069 from Rabat, August 14, contains the text of a joint Libyan-Moroccan communiqué announcing the union of the two nations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840517–0979)
4. See footnote 3, Document 36.