Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

456. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2909.

Algiers, May 22, 1988, 1229Z

SUBJECT

• Algeria, Morocco, and the SADR: What You See Is What You Get.

Refs:

• (A) Rabat 4850;²
• (B) Algiers 2862;³
• (C) Algiers 2852.⁴

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. The restoration of Algerian-Moroccan relations has left unanswered the question of Algeria’s intentions toward the Sahrawis. Although the Algerians have continued to make public statements of support for the SADR,⁵ there is nothing to suggest that the Moroccans committed themselves to anything beyond the “legal and free referendum” mentioned in the joint communiqué. We note, for example, Basri’s statement (ref A) that agreement contained no more than the public language and that it would take a year to resolve the Saharan conflict. In other words, there is no settlement of the war included in the new bilateral agreement.

3. The Algerian press has balanced its enthusiasm for restoration with gentle reminders that Algeria still supports the SADR and still hopes to see direct talks between it and Morocco.⁶ The public reaction, however, is even more positive and uncomplicated. Algerians we have talked with have said, “it’s about time. We should have done it years ago.” Although no one expects that the restoration will bring an immediate improvement in availability of consumer goods (the first priority of all Algerians), those we spoke with hope that Algeria, free from the need to be hostile to Morocco, can devote itself to solving its stubborn internal economic and social problems. Of course, many Algerians are already asking about traveling to Morocco.

4. Why have the Algerians apparently abandoned a long-held position and accepted the Moroccan urgings that improving bilateral relations should proceed separately from the issue of the Western Sahara? There are two reasons, one domestic and one foreign. On the domestic front, the Algerians had already signaled their desire to settle regional disputes in order to concentrate on internal economic reforms. Bendjedid had inherited the Western Sahara problem from his predecessor. His willingness to put it aside and settle with Rabat is a sign of confidence at home, that his reform program is moving ahead, and that opposition to it is weak and disorganized.

5. On the foreign front, Algerian policy has always moved in multiple spheres: Third World, Nonaligned, African, Islamic, Maghrebian and Arab. This latest move represents the Arab and Maghrebian spheres taking priority over Africa and the Third World. With the coming Arab Summit and with the new situation in the occupied territories, Algeria must refurbish its Arab credentials. The Western Sahara never was an Arab cause. On the contrary, it divided Arab states and created ill will toward Algeria from both Morocco and her (rich) Arab friends. Algeria has staked considerable prestige on hosting an Arab summit with high-level attendance, and reconciliation with Rabat may bring not only King Hassan but other Arab Kings, Amirs and Presidents to Algiers in June.

6. After the March setback to Algeria’s “eastern” Grand Maghreb efforts, Algeria did not want another diplomatic defeat. Checked by the Libyans, Algeria can now proceed with its “grand Maghreb strategy” (in partnership) with Morocco, the only other regional state that can match Algeria’s weight and influence, inside the tent rather than out.

Brayshaw

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880440–0511. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, Casablanca, Cairo, Nouakchott, Riyadh, Kuwait City, Paris, London, Abu Dhabi, and USUN.
2. In telegram 4850 from Rabat, May 17, the Embassy reported: “The decision of King Hassan and President Bendjedid to restore diplomatic relations is a major step forward, for which the Saudis and we can take some credit.” See Document 88.
3. In telegram 2862 from Algiers, May 17, the Embassy reported: “GOA-controlled media have hailed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco as a positive step toward creation of greater Arab Maghreb unity and toward a peaceful solution of the Western Sahara conflict.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880424–0541)
4. In telegram 2852 from Algiers, May 16, the Embassy reported: “Algeria and Morocco have apparently agreed to restore diplomatic relations following Bendjedid’s meeting with Moroccan envoys.” The Embassy further noted: “The Algerians until now had insisted that progress toward settlement of the Western Sahara be a prerequisite for re-establishing relations. This latest step means either that the two sides have made progress or that the Algerians have dropped their condition. Nothing we have seen recently,” the Embassy continued, “would suggest that either side has compromised its basic positions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880421–0355)
5. In telegram 2989 from Algiers, May 26, the Embassy commented: “The Algerians appear to have put Polisario on the shelf for the sake of broader Maghreb goals and domestic political reasons.” The Embassy continued: “Thus they have moved from costly support of a liberation movement to support of regional economic integration and Arab solidarity, both of which promise economic benefits for Algeria that support for the Polisario could never provide.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880451–0826)
6. In telegram 2340 from Nouakchott, June 6, the Embassy reported: “According to Mauritanian military and other sources, the Polisario leadership in Tindouf is reacting gamely to the resumption of diplomatic ties between Algiers and Rabat, saying that it will not hinder their struggle. Significant numbers of Polisario rank and file, however, apparently believe that the restoration of diplomatic relations signifies that Algeria is abandoning the Polisario cause.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880480–0473)