In the search for settlement of the Western Sahara dispute, 1988 could be
a window of opportunity.
If this window of opportunity is not opened, a new one may not appear for
some years. An analysis is attached.
Attachment
Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State3
WESTERN SAHARA: 1988 A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Defining a Settlement. While a cessation of
hostilities is the end-goal, both the process and terms of a
settlement remain to be determined. Polisario has sought Saharan
independence. Morocco wants international legitimation of its
control of the territory, and an end to the threat from Polisario
forces in Algeria. But Morocco and Algeria are now committed to a
referendum—proceeded or followed by negotiations—which would let
Sahraouis choose independence, Moroccan rule, or a still undefined
alternative.
The Setting. The UN Secretary General is set to visit the Maghreb in
early April, four months after a UN
technical team’s visit. Faced with ongoing Saudi pressure to strike
a deal, President Bendjedid
and King Hassan could again meet, as they did in May 1987 in the
presence of King Fahd. Tunisia is also trying to mediate. Morocco
prefers to delink bilateral ties from the Sahara issue and move
toward detente, but Algiers argues detente is impossible until the
Sahara issue is resolved.
Algeria. A Sahara settlement (especially one
on Algerian terms) fits neatly into Bendjedid’s plans for reelection. He is fighting
old-guard opposition to his agenda for military professionalization,
political pluralization, greater openness to foreign technology and
capital, distancing from the Soviets, and detente and economic
cooperation with Morocco. His political battle will peak at the
December convention of the ruling FLN party, where he will likely be reelected
President.
Bendjedid could purge his
opponents, but would prefer to show the FLN progress on a Sahara settlement, along with an
economic upturn, and reintegration of Libya into an
Algerian-inspired Greater Maghreb. The first would reduce
expenditures on Polisario and on the Sahraoui refugee population,
which Algiers would like to see return to the Sahara. It would also
open the prospect of cooperation with Morocco, which many Algerians
see as economically complementary.
Bendjedid’s Sahara strategy entails some risks. He knows Hassan
cannot accept much less than sovereignty, nor grant Polisario much
more than a political sop. Polisario reaction is also unpredictable;
faced
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with Algerian
concessions to Morocco, its hard-liners could try to defy Algerian
constraints on Polisario military activity, or assert itself in
Mauritania. Also important, though probably manageable, is the
reaction of states which, under Algerian diplomatic pressure and
often at the cost of a rupture with Morocco, have recognized
Polisario.
Morocco. Hassan’s interests have changed
little since 1975, but he too is interested in a settlement. A
Sahara deal would open up several prospects: lessen diplomatic
isolation from much of the Third World; satisfy Saudi desire for
Algerian/Moroccan rapprochement, and erase a hindrance to enhanced
ties with the US and the EC, possibly leading to greater
economic and military aid. It might also reduce military costs: the
overall effect of military outlays is arguable, but any
redistribution of funds to increasingly unruly urban areas would
respond to growing domestic ills.
Nevertheless, while Hassan stresses commitment to a Saharan
referendum, he recognizes that the status quo has served him well.
The war gives the Moroccan military a raison d’etre and deflects its
interests from politics. And the pluralization which he granted in
return for partisan backing of the war enhances his international
image.
Hassan built, and subsequently expanded, a protective berm and
adopted a defensive strategy after 1981 military reverses. The berm
assures control of useful areas of the territory, while a relatively
static defense avoids embarrassing defeats. It also employs large
numbers of young men whose return would exacerbate Morocco’s
employment problems and create a serious new pool of discontent. As
long as he seems to be successfully asserting Morocco’s claim, the
war is a source of internal political strength.
Hassan has recently given mixed signals on willingness to make
concessions. Modifying a long-term position, he told the BBC that
Polisario, not Algeria, was Morocco’s opponent in the Sahara. He
later waffled, saying negotiations with the Sahraoui Democratic Arab
Republic (the Polisario’s political arm) would be possible only if
Polisario won a referendum in the territory. He has now dropped
references to negotiations with Polisario, although secret talks
take place sporadically.
Polisario. Polisario is well-armed and capable
of adapting to Moroccan defensive advances. It cannot defeat
Morocco, but believes it can fight a successful war of attrition.
Moderates know a referendum will probably be held and have tried to
influence determination of those who will have voting rights.
Some Polisario hard-liners advocate terrorism in Morocco, but it is
unlikely anyone in Polisario has responded to third-country offers
of aid, such as those from Iran. Such aid would be quickly blocked
by Algiers. Some Sahraouis think Bendjedid is moving toward compromise
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under Saudi and other
pressure. But Polisario will not soon risk a break with Algeria—its
primary source of financial, diplomatic, and logistic support—and
has little scope for independent operation in any case.
Libya. While Qadhafi may have given Polisario some aid in the
last eighteen months, he now sees support for Polisario as secondary
to the larger strategy of incrementally improved relations with his
Maghreb neighbors. Qadhafi
insists on union with Algeria, has renewed ties to Tunisia, and uses
links to Morocco to counter Algerian influence.
After promising Morocco financial aid (and, according to unconfirmed
Libyan assertions military aid as well), Qadhafi is pushing Hassan to reactivate union as
provided for by the 1984 Oujda Accord. Like Tunisia, he has offered
to mediate between Morocco and Polisario. It is unlikely Qadhafi will play any direct role
in the Sahara negotiations, but his rapprochement with Morocco might
sap Algeria’s confidence and enhance Morocco’s bargaining
leverage.
Saudi Interest. King Fahd’s 1987 talks with
Hassan and Bendjedid gave
major impetus to current Sahara negotiations. Fahd has not been as
directly engaged recently, but still clearly wishes a reduction in
Maghreb tension. Riyadh believes a mechanism must be found to
integrate the Sahara into Morocco, give Sahraouis special status,
and help Algeria save face.
Polisario thinks Saudi financial aid is now a major determinant in
Algeria’s Sahara policy. This is implausible; even in Morocco, where
the Saudi financial contribution is considerably more significant,
Saudi pressure is only one influence on Western Sahara policy.
The UN.
Algiers and Rabat agree in principle on a UN framework for a settlement, and know UN-brokered
negotiations and/or referendum could allow Rabat to soften demands
slightly, and allow Algiers to make concessions while saving face.
Determining Sahraoui population and voting rights is a problem, but
Perez de Cuellar, Rabat, and Algiers would accept a Spanish role in
interpreting census figures from the colonial period. Other thorny
questions include disposition of Morocco’s army and administration
during a referendum. Polisario wants both removed. Hassan will draw
troops back to barracks, but wants to retain Moroccan civil
authorities.
Perez de Cuellar will reportedly present Hassan written proposals for
significant Moroccan troop reductions (from the present 120,000 down
to 25,000, to be joined by a UN
supervisory force of 10–12,000), and a restricted role for the
Moroccan civil administration. Algeria (and Mauritania) would agree
that Polisario forces be confined to their bases and subject to
verification and control by the UN
force. The Moroccans have rejected similar recent suggestions by
OAU Chairman Kaunda.
Prospects. Algeria clearly considers 1988 a
year to make a deal and will try to press Rabat intensively while
preparing for concessions.
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Hassan has a narrow margin of maneuver, however, and may fear
backlash from the military, opportunistic politicians, and Moroccan
settlers in the Sahara. He could yet prove unwilling to make the
diplomatic gestures necessary to give Algeria an honorable way to
abandon the Saharan war.
The 1988 window of opportunity is created largely by Bendjedid’s internal political
ambitions. Although Bendjedid
could be bolstered by the December FLN Congress, his immediate incentive for a deal with
Morocco will dissipate, and settlement will become more difficult by
early 1989. The next readily apparent window will not open until
after 1992, when EC limits on
Maghreb imports sharpen Maghreb economic problems and intensify the
need for a unified Maghreb economic strategy.
US/Soviet Stakes. Resolution of the Sahara
conflict would be a clear plus for US interests, helping both Morocco and, Algeria
economically and removing a contentious issue which the US has felt itself obliged to straddle
diplomatically. It would reduce tensions and help assure North
African stability.
To the extent such a settlement, leads to movement toward expanded
regional cooperation and a Maghreb point of view on economics, the
Middle East, or Mediterranean security, US diplomacy in the Maghreb could become more complex.
Algerian and Libyan views may influence the thinking of pro-Western
Morocco and Tunisia, and be influenced in turn. Successful Maghreb
cooperation would further dilute Soviet influence in Algeria and
perhaps in Libya, giving the US an
overall net gain.
