Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

433. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

STAT 289810.

Washington, September 20, 1985, 0310Z

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy Toward the Western Sahara.

Ref:

• (A) Rabat 8280²
• (B) Algiers 4558³
• (C) Rabat 8576.⁴

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Department appreciates insights into current GOM and GOA approaches to Western Sahara (reftels). We are particularly encouraged by fact that:

— GOA still talking in terms of a referendum under UN auspices and has not ruled out consensus resolution;

— GOM also talking in terms of ceasefire/referendum and has reopened possibility of some OAU role in conjunction with UN (para 4, reftel C).

3. We are now considering our own approach on this issue at this year’s UNGA. Timing may require us to make decisions based on what we presently know, but we want nonetheless now to encourage the GOM to table a proposal explicitly outlining conditions which it would accept for settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. This would not have to make direct reference to the earlier GOA plan which was clearly unacceptable to the GOM. However, to be a step forward, it must be more than a statement of willingness to abide by an ill-defined referendum decree/form of autonomy would the GOM be willing to extend to the Sahraouis, for example?

4. In seeking a more detailed and comprehensive statement of GOM terms,⁵ for a Western Sahara settlement, Ambassador may use the following talking points:

— The United States is prepared to work closely with the GOM on the Western Sahara problem at the UN in the forthcoming session.

— We note with satisfaction that the GOM has made intensive efforts to contact other states who may have an influence on the outcome of UN debates on this issue.

— We hope that it will be possible to achieve a consensus resolution on the Western Sahara which both Morocco and Algeria will be able to support.

— In recent conversations GOA officials have kept open the prospect of working for a consensus resolution.

— We note that the NAM Ministerial incorporated Morocco’s call on the OAU Chairman and the UN Secretary General to seek new ways to secure a ceasefire and referendum.

— In order to avoid a sterile procedural consideration of this issue this year and perhaps a repetition of last year’s result, we think that it would be opportune for Morocco to seize the diplomatic high ground by putting forward a plan for a detailed comprehensive settlement.

— While there are features of Algeria’s earlier plan for a comprehensive settlement which are obviously unacceptable to Morocco, Algeria has made much diplomatic capital out of its claim to have proposed a comprehensive settlement.

— Morocco itself achieved a breakthrough and much support when King Hassan originally called for a ceasefire and referendum. To regain the initiative and to facilitate resumption of a direct dialogue between Morocco and Algeria on the Western Sahara, Morocco would be well served to come forward with a new comprehensive plan designed to gain as much as possible from the people of the Western Sahara.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850668–0886. Secret. Drafted by Roger Merrick (NEA/AFN); cleared by Zweifel and in draft by William Imbrie (P), Craig Karp (INR), Willett, David Lyon (AF), Sokolsky, and Mark Gatanas (PM/NESA); approved by Raphel. Sent for information to Algiers, Nouakchott, and USUN.
2. In telegram 8280 from Rabat, September 4, Nassif reported that on September 2, after he presented his credentials, Filali informed him that “Morocco hoped that the Western Sahara could be kept off the agenda” of the upcoming NAM meeting in Luanda. Filali continued: “Morocco will determine its strategy with respect to the Western Sahara in the upcoming UN General Assembly after it sees the results of Luanda” and he hoped that USUN “will be able to provide some support in New York this fall to the Moroccan position that there should be an early UN-sponsored referendum on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850629–0198)
3. In telegram 4558 from Algiers, September 3, the Embassy reported that during pre-General Assembly consultations with the Algerian Government, “GOA officials said that Polisario will not seek admission to Non-Aligned Movement at Luanda Summit. Instead, Algeria will urge affirmation of all UN resolutions relating to the Western Sahara.” The Embassy continued that de Cuellar told Abdelaziz “his report on the Western Sahara situation, and the possibility of a UN referendum, would conform with previously adopted UN resolutions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850622–0719)
4. In telegram 8576 from Rabat, September 11, the Embassy reported: “The September 2–7 Non-Aligned Ministerial meeting in Luanda was a case of damage limitation for Morocco. While language adopted on the Western Sahara contains elements unacceptable to Morocco and Zimbabwe was not Morocco’s first choice as next NAM Chairman, most GOM officials maintain that the results could have been much worse. The SDAR was not seated at Luanda and GOM fears of an Algerian chairmanship did not materialize.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850447–0556)
5. Not found.