Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

432. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Raphel) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead¹

Washington, August 16, 1985

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Positions on Libya, Western Sahara

ISSUE

How to respond to King Hassan’s request for a more detailed dialogue on Libya and the Western Sahara.

DISCUSSION

At the end of your August 12 meeting with King Hassan² and in your subsequent conversation with Foreign Minister Filali,³ the Moroccans made four specific proposals:

— Hassan stated a willingness to raise specific issues of concern to the USG in putting Qadhafi to the test. The King implied that he would be willing to terminate his relationship with Qadhafi if he failed to achieve modified Libyan policies.

— To continue the relevant dialogue, the King appealed for an early visit by National Security Adviser McFarlane and a detailed message from DCI Casey concerning Qadhafi’s involvement in terrorist acts.

— Both Hassan and FonMin Filali suggested that if the USG could persuade the Algerians to settle the Western Sahara dispute on terms acceptable to Morocco, this would remove the necessity for a continuing Moroccan-Libyan tie.

— Finally, the GOM requested vigorous USG support on the Western Sahara issue at this fall’s UNGA.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

3. Pressure Algeria to Resolve the Western Sahara Dispute.

Filali’s formulation (“if the US and others could persuade Algeria to agree to what Morocco would consider a reasonable settlement of the Western Sahara, the need for a Moroccan-Libyan arrangement probably would wither”) presents several problems. Clearly the GOA’s written proposal of February 1985⁴ was unacceptable to the Moroccans. Just as clearly, the Algerians advanced their diplomatic advantage, now claiming to have presented the only comprehensive proposal for a settlement.

The following points are of relevance:

— After several Department and inter-agency reviews,⁵ we remain convinced that there is no advantage for the USG to assume a direct role in solving the Western Sahara dispute. Our interests are served by maintaining our present policy which has a slight bias towards Morocco.

— Filali’s formulation gives us an opening again to urge the GOM to be explicit in detailing its version of an acceptable, negotiated settlement. We should encourage the GOM to table this as a counter to the Algerian plan, thereafter being prepared to consider if and how we or other third parties might help narrow differences between Moroccan and Algerian plans.

4. Work With Morocco at the UN.

We should be cautious about automatic support for GOM proposals at the UN. Realistically, in the Fourth Committee (decolonization) and at the UNGA, the Algerians will be able to muster a majority in support of their position. A defeat for Morocco would only add to its diplomatic isolation and diminish the prospects for some kind of UN role in a negotiated settlement.

In an August 10⁶ conversation with members of the House Armed Services Committee, Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi said the GOA would be willing to accept a UN-OAU jointly organized referendum in the Western Sahara. This sets the stage for a possible compromise under which the GOM would again accept an OAU role while the GOA would accept a much more direct UN responsibility. The modalities likely would have to remain vague at this stage. GOA demands for a referendum without the presence of either Polisario or Moroccan forces in the Western Sahara is impractical and the GOM insisting on narrow definition of eligible voters is another difficulty.

Concerned bureaus should work with USUN to devise a strategy aimed at facilitating a consensus resolution, even though this will be difficult to achieve.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the attached⁷ Platt-McFarlane memorandum recommending an early visit by McFarlane to Morocco. McFarlane should be accompanied by a [less than 1 line declassified] official who can give Hassan a detailed briefing. We would use this visit to respond to the King’s request for specific USG policy objectives vis a vis Qadhafi.⁸

2. On the Western Sahara dispute, that you reaffirm existing USG policy (i.e. no direct USG role in this regional dispute which should be settled through negotiations among parties directly concerned, the settlement ultimately to reflect the views of the area’s inhabitants) and that this be communicated to the GOM.⁹

3. That we encourage the GOM to table a proposal on settlement of the Western Sahara explicitly outlining conditions which it would find acceptable.¹⁰

4. That IO, USUN, AF and NEA should devise a strategy to facilitate a consensus resolution on the Western Sahara at this fall’s UNGA.¹¹

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, August 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zweifel on August 15; cleared by Sokolsky, Bishop, Ross, and John Willett (IO). Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the memorandum. Bova initialed the memorandum and wrote: “17 Aug.” An unknown hand wrote: “August 17, 1985” at the top of the memorandum. A stamped notation below the date line reads: “AUG 1985 J.C.W. has seen.”
2. See footnote 2, Document 247.
3. A record of the Whitehead-Filali discussion is in telegram 7565 from Rabat, August 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850575–0835)
4. See Document 427.
5. Not found.
6. The date is in error; the conversation took place on August 11. A record of the conversation between Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Charles Price’s (D-Illinois) delegation and Ibrahimi is in telegram 4206 from Algiers, August 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850572–0798)
7. Not attached.
8. Whitehead did not check the approve or disapprove option, and wrote: “Hold off on this until I can talk to the Secretary” in the right-hand margin.
9. Whitehead did not check the approve or disapprove option, and wrote: “Let’s wait on this until we get the answer to 3” in the right-hand margin.
10. Whitehead approved the recommendation.
11. Whitehead approved the recommendation.