Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

334309.

Washington, October 31, 1985, 0537Z

SUBJECT

• Vice President’s Mtg With Moroccan Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary—The Vice President met with Moroccan Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani on October 25. The Prime Minister focused his remarks on the Moroccan initiative on the Western Sahara as well as King Hassan’s thoughts on how best to counter terrorism. End summary

3. Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani of Morocco met with Vice President Bush on October 25 at 1100 hours in the Vice President’s office. Also attending the meeting were Foreign Minister Filali, Ambassador Jorio as well as A. Raphel of NEA, D. Gregg of OVP and H. Teicher of NSC.

4. The Prime Minister opened the conversation by noting that his address to the U.N., given on behalf of the King, focused on the Saharan issue.² After 10 years of war, the GOM believes the issue should be put behind us. Therefore, King Hassan had called for a unilateral cease-fire which will be fully observed unless Moroccan forces are attacked.³ Also, the GOM has called for a referendum, to take place after January 1, 1986, to decide on self-determination for the Saharan people. The referendum would be under the aegis of the UN which could invite any other organization (e. g. the OAU), to assist.

5. Karim-Lamrani added that the referendum should be supported by all states interested in peace; the GOM hoped for full and active U. S. support. In response to a question from the Vice President, the Prime Minister said the GOM had ruled out negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario since it would prejudge the outcome of the referendum and, in any case, the organization is not representative of the Saharan people.

6. The Prime Minister added that although there had been no official Algerian reaction, the Algerian media had emphasized the demand that the GOM talk with the Polisario. The Algerians are treating the referendum idea as clearly overtaken by events, even though Algeria originally favored a referendum.⁴ Karim-Lamrani said the issue was really very simple. The Western Sahara, historically, geographically, and in every other way, is part of Morocco. Algeria wants to annex it. Everything else is just cosmetic. Karim-Lamrani went on to say that his only answer is for responsible countries to give the U.N. a wide mandate to organize a referendum with OAU support. The Prime Minister gave the Vice President a copy of Morocco’s draft resolution.

7. The Vice President responded that the U.S. welcomes any proposal to end the Saharan conflict, and promised that the USG would review the Moroccan proposal carefully. We have also always encouraged talks between Morocco and Algeria on this issue. Once we have discussed the proposal within the government, we would be back to the GOM with a considered and full response.

8. In response to the Vice President’s question about Diouf’s view of the proposal, Karim-Lamrani said that even though Morocco has withdrawn from the OAU, Diouf had indicated that if asked for help by the U.N. Secretary General, he would respond positively.⁵

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Shultz

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Meetings with Foreigners Files, OA/ID 19801, Folder 19801–068, Meetings with Foreigners—October 1985: Prime Minister Karim Lamrani of Morocco, October 25, 1985. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Tunis, Algiers, Nouakchott, Dakar, and USUN. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 2892 from USUN, October 24, the Mission reported: “In his October 23 address to the GA, Moroccan PM Karim-Lamrani stressed the historical ties of Morocco to the territory of the Western Sahara. Accusing ‘the enemies of Morocco’ (led by Algeria) of blocking peace and delaying resolution of the conflict, he confirmed Morocco’s commitment to the self-determination referendum proposed at the 1981 OAU Summit in Nairobi. He requested that this referendum take place in January 1986, under UN auspices. He also declared a Moroccan unilateral cease-fire, stressing, however, that Morocco would defend itself if necessary.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850759–0752)
3. Following an October 15 meeting with Hassan, Nassif reported on “Moroccan tactics for the upcoming U.N. sessions,” including Karim-Lamrani’s planned call for a ceasefire, in telegram 9845 from Rabat, October 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850738–0601)
4. During an October 2 meeting with Bush, Ibrahimi said that from Algeria’s perspective, “three elements were key to a solution of the Sahara issue—a referendum, negotiations, and the withdrawal of all forces before the referendum.” (Telegram 309868 to Algiers, October 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850717–0517) See Document 154.
5. During an October 24 meeting with Bush, Diouf indicated that “he was prepared to work with the U.N. Secretary General to bring a resolution to this difficult question. He said that if an acceptable resolution was introduced in the UN, he would do everything in his power to see that it was passed. Bush asked about the problem this conflict created for relations between Morocco and Algeria. Diouf responded that the problem was not between Morocco and Algeria, but rather between Algeria (sic) and the Polisario.” (Telegram 345750 to Dakar, November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850805–0875)