Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

427. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

965.

Algiers, February 21, 1985, 1045Z

SUBJECT

• Algeria Proposes Compromise on the Western Sahara.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Algerian official outlines compromise solution on the Western Sahara which Algeria has proposed to King Hassan. In it, the King would exercise sovereignty over a Saharan entity linked to a wider Maghreb group. According to Algerians, negotiations with Morocco on the Western Sahara are “on dead center”. End summary.

3. At conclusion of Feb 20 meeting with MFA SecGen Kerroum on other matters, Ambassador and DCM asked where contacts stood with King Hassan on the Western Sahara. After reflecting, Kerroum replied, “on dead center”.

4. After many discussions with Morocco, Algeria he said had “assumed the heavy responsibility” of proposing a compromise solution which avoided the extremes of independence and annexation “without the permission of the Saharans.” It incorporated elements of the 1975 ICJ decision,² which recognized that there had been historic ties between certain tribes in the north Sahara and the Moroccan throne. Algeria, he said, was willing, if Morocco accepted the “national reality” of the Western Sahara (Kerroum used the analogy of Quebec within Canada) to support extension of this principle throughout the former Spanish Sahara.

5. At the same time, the Polisario had been seated in the OAU and this could not be reversed. The Western Sahara, he implied, should have a separate identity within a Maghreb grouping but with the King at its head. Kerroum cited the precedent of Byelorussia and the Ukraine in the UN, the King, not the Saharan, would represent the entire country in meetings with Chadli or Bourguiba, for example.

6. Kerroum said such a solution, if accepted by Hassan, would be difficult to sell to the Polisario and even to some in Algeria who believe closer cooperation with Morocco hold little economic benefit for Algeria. However, Algeria was thinking in terms of Maghreb stability. In the short run, Morocco would gain by a settlement but in the long run, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia would be the beneficiaries. Kerroum said the King’s reaction to Algerian proposals was leading to a question once again of whether Hassan has an interest in a peaceful solution.

7. Comment: Kerroum’s outline, if accurate, is hard to square with King Hassan’s statements to us that Algeria has been completely intransigent. (See Algiers 962.)³

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850118–0738. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat, Tunis, and Nouakchott.
2. See footnote 3, Document 426.
3. In telegram 962 from Algiers, February 21, the Embassy reported that in spite of Hassan’s criticisms, “Algeria has backed off its previous position of an OAU referendum on the alternatives of independence or incorporation into Morocco. Instead, Algeria increasingly speaks of avoiding these extremes and finding a compromise” and “speaks of a solution that will humiliate no one.” The Algerians, the Embassy continued, “are willing to envisage some kind of federation or autonomy with the King having ‘the flag and the postage stamps’ (i.e., certain attributes of sovereignty).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850118–0508)