Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

426. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

189.

Algiers, January 13, 1985, 1212Z

SUBJECT

• Algeria Says it Will Make Major Effort to Break Western Sahara Impasse.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary. Kerroum says Algeria is prepared to make a major effort to break the Western Sahara deadlock. Although the Jan. 8 visit of Guedira and Filali made no substantive progress, high-level contacts will continue. Algeria is prepared to make King Hassan an offer which takes full account of his preoccupations. At the same time, Algeria is deeply concerned that the King might not want a peaceful settlement for domestic reasons. Kerroum reiterated that no Algerian Government could accept Moroccan military annexation of the territory even if continuation of the present situation risks eventual destabilization in Morocco.² End summary.

3. After discussing another matter Jan. 12, Kerroum dismissed the notetaker and launched into a lengthy discussion of the Western Sahara. He said the Jan. 8 visit to Algeria of Guedira and Filali was in the nature of reestablishing contact and that no substantive progress was made. As agreed, the high-level secret contacts would continue.

4. Speaking with great intensity, Kerroum said Algeria was preparing to make a proposal which King Hassan would find extremely difficult to reject and one which took full account of his preoccupations. He again expressed Algerian opposition to the extremes of independence and annexation.

5. In response to probing, Kerroum said the GOA was looking at the “ambiguous” Oct. 1975 advisory opinion of the ICJ.³ He referred to a “Solomonic solution” within the context of a Grand Maghreb. Kerroum hinted that the proposal would involve an interim status looking toward the eventual construction of Maghreb unity.

6. Algeria would take the initiative in the interest of regional stability. Kerroum then expressed deep concern that the King might not want a peaceful solution of the conflict. Some were of the view that the war was the “cement” which held the monarchy together. Others contend the King wants to keep the army busy in the Sahara far from royal residences. One thing seems certain: continuation of the present conflict risks an eventual social upheaval in Morocco whose result would be abolition of the monarchy and destabilization.

7. Without directly asking, Kerroum hinted that U.S. support for Algeria’s initiative would be welcome. In response to a question on the Saudi position, Kerroum ruefully observed that Hassan’s influence on Fahd was greater than vice versa.

8. Indicating that his official remarks were concluded, Kerroum said he wanted to ask me, personally and unofficially, what I thought a possible solution could be. I replied that not being a citizen of the Maghreb, this was difficult. Clearly a face-saving solution that would be durable and meet the minimum requirements of those involved was the general prescription, but only those involved could have a realistic appreciation of what a solution might look like. When Kerroum persisted, I said personally the kinds of ideas we understood were discussed in the 1983 meeting between President Bendjedid and King Hassan seemed to offer hope.⁴

9. Kerroum said Algeria considered the King to be a very competent statesman. However, Algeria was concerned over his apparent miscalculations in his rapprochement with Qadhafi.

10. Comment: This was a rare glimpse behind the scenes. I have never seen Kerroum so intense and animated. Based on this conversation, I conclude Algeria is prepared to make a major effort to reach a compromise with the King on the Western Sahara. At the same time, Algeria is deeply concerned that the King may not want (or feel able) to accept a peaceful solution. As long as pressures exist for the two principal parties to negotiate, I thought it best to take evasive action when asked for my personal views on a solution. It is also clear Algeria will insist that the Polisario be brought into the negotiating process if sufficient prior general agreement can be reached between Algeria and Morocco.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001–0342. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 19274 to Algiers, January 19, the Department commented that during a January 18 meeting with Murphy, Sahnoun “expressed regret that Algerian-Moroccan progress on the Western Sahara issue had been thrown off track by the Libyan-Moroccan treaty. The GOA now reluctantly has concluded that King Hassan may believe that a military solution is possible (here Sahnoun cited the recent berm extension).” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850043–0371) For more on the August 1984 Morocco-Libya Union, see Documents 37–40.
3. Reference is to the International Court of Criminal Justice’s unanimous ruling that “Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain was not a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius),” and that “legal ties between this territory” existed with both Morocco and Mauritania. (“Summary of the Advisory Opinion,” October 16, 1975)
4. See footnote 2, Document 19.