Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco¹

366367.

Washington, December 13, 1984, 0529Z

London for Raphel, Paris for Cheshes. Subject: Western Sahara: Démarches to the Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors. Ref: (A) State 363217² (B) State 351001.³

Military address handle as Specat Exclusive

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: Per ref A, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Armacost made démarches to Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors separately on December 11. Neither expressed surprise at our expressions of concern over increasing tensions between the two countries over the Western Sahara and both accepted as reasonable our fear that by mischance an unfortunate incident could develop. End summary.

3. Meeting first with Sahnoun, Under Secretary Armacost adverted to the November 23 conversation with Foreign Minister Secretary General Kerroum in which this same topic had been discussed (ref B). We accepted at face value the GOA’s assurances that it has no aggressive intentions towards Morocco. Nonetheless, we are worried that the mere presence of sizeable military forces in the border area could lead to clashes which might get out of hand. Accordingly, we hope the GOA will exercise caution and seek in every way to avoid military conflict.

4. The Under Secretary also noted the GOA intentions to send a special envoy to Rabat, inter alia to discuss the Western Sahara. He invited Sahnoun’s views on the prospects for these discussions.

5. In response, Sahnoun said that he had received information which essentially confirms that there have been border incidents and that the situation is tense. He reiterated that the GOA does not seek conflict with Morocco and is still hopeful that either a personal advisor to President Bendjedid or Foreign Minister Ibrahimi will be received in Rabat. He has no concrete information as to whether and when such a meeting might take place.

6. Under Secretary Armacost thanked Sahnoun for these reassurances and again stressed that our démarche stems from our concern for valued relations with both the Algerians and Moroccans. He noted that we would carry out a parallel démarche with the Moroccan Government. Ambassador Sahnoun thanked the Under Secretary for this friendly expression of views which he promised to relay to his government.

7. Armacost later told Ambassador Jorio that as a friend, we would be remiss in not expressing our concern over the deterioration in Algerian-Moroccan relations and the increase in tensions in the border area. While we take seriously his government’s professions of lack of aggressive intent, we believe that the possibilities for mischance are now greater. We hope that both governments will exercise caution, and we have given Ambassador Sahnoun the same message earlier. He asked Jorio if the contacts which we understood Morocco and Algeria had over the past eighteen months will continue.

8. Ambassador Jorio explained that the situation has become quote very difficult unquote after Morocco’s problem in Addis. The contacts would as far as the Moroccans are concerned remain alive but we must understand the history. At each stage, he said, the GOM has researched the problem and tried to respond. Each time the Moroccans have made the concession asked, the Algerians have considered it as a gain and then asked for something else. The GOM considers the conflict over the Sahara as a pretext for Algerian hegemonic ambitions, not the basic problem itself. Algerian ambitions have been a problem since 1963. The whole history is a series of concessions which have not given rise to reciprocal concessions on the Algerian part.

9. For Morocco, he said, the problem is now an internal one. The country as a whole does not understand the moderation and conciliation which the government has exercised. The government will continue to pursue negotiation quote as long as we can unquote but there are domestic concerns to be taken into account.

10. Under Secretary Armacost concluded by noting that our démarche is not in response to a particular party’s actions or concerns; rather, every buildup increases the potential for direct confrontation. We are speaking in an evenhanded manner to both sides.

Dam

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840796–0666. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Zweifel and Schermerhorn; cleared by Nassif, Cassius Johnson (S/S–O), and Covey; approved by Armacost. Sent for information Priority to the Secretary of Defense, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR. Sent for information to Tunis, Nouakchott, London, and Paris.
2. In telegram 363217 to Algiers and Rabat, December 11, the Department instructed both Embassies to make the points “to the highest level of authority available” that “various sources available to us indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations,” that “we are particularly concerned over the increase in military forces in the border area,” and the U.S. feared “misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840789–0766)
3. In telegram 351001 to Algiers, November 28, the Department reported that on November 23, Kerroum told Armacost that “the GOA is pleased with SDAR seating in OAU, but fully recognizes this does not solve Western Sahara issues. GOA continues to believe that solution should and can come only through negotiation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840759–0574)