Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria and Morocco¹

363217.

Washington, December 11, 1984, 0053Z

For Ambassadors. Subject: Démarche to Governments of Algeria and Morocco.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Algerian-Moroccan relations have degenerated to a point where the possibility of conflict cannot be ruled out. Algerian FonMin Secretary General Kerroum told you November 23 that the GOA would not be the first to engage, and seeks to calm the situation.² The GOM likewise disclaims aggressive intent. Nonetheless, there is little prospect for meaningful dialogue, even though King Hassan recently told Ambassador Reed that he is in almost daily telephone contact with Bendjedid.

2. Among negative indicators are:

— A significant buildup of Algerian and Moroccan military forces along the shared border.

— Moroccan Ambassador Jorio’s statement that war fever is building in Morocco.³

— The Moroccans reportedly are on the verge of expanding the berm to within 35 km of the border—a move bound to appear provocative to the GOA.

— In mid-September, the GOA reportedly ordered a reduction in the number of non-official Algerians in Morocco; some apparently have left.

— Moroccans claim Polisario has obtained SAM–6 missiles and other sophisticated weaponry, operable only by Algerians or outsiders.

— GOM sources claim that the GOA has flown CAP for recent Polisario attacks against the berm. (We do not have independent confirmation.)

— Bendjedid is under domestic pressure to take more direct action to assist the Polisario.

— There has been one recent reported incident of cross-border firing, initiated by the Algerians.

3. For Rabat: You should seek the earliest opportunity to make the following points to the highest level of authority available:

— Various sources available to us indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations.

— We are particularly concerned over the increase in military forces in the border area.

— Although your government has assured us that Morocco has no aggressive intentions, misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger.

— We urge your government to exercise caution, and to take steps to dispel current tensions.

— Our Ambassador in Algiers is making a similar demarche to the Government of Algeria.

4. For Algiers: You should seek the earliest opportunity to make highest level demarche to your host government making the following points:

— Various sources available to us indicate that there has been a serious deterioration in Moroccan-Algerian relations.

— We are particularly concerned over the increase in military forces in the border area.

— Although FonMin Secretary General Kerroum and others in your government have assured us that Algeria has no aggressive intentions, misinterpretation or mischance may lead to a clash; escalation is a clear danger.

— We urge your government to exercise caution, and to take steps to dispel current tensions.

— Our Ambassador in Rabat is making a similar demarche to the Government of Morocco.

5. We are calling in Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors for similar presentation by Under Secretary Armacost.⁴

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840789–0766. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wukitsch; cleared by Schermerhorn (NEA/AFN), Zweifel, Sheldon Krebs (S/S–O), Johnson (P), and Covey; approved by Nassif. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis and Nouakchott.
2. No record of Kerroum’s November 23 comment has been found. In telegram 5699 from Algiers, December 8, the Embassy reported: “Kerroum told Ambassador Dec 8 Algeria seeks to reestablish dialogue with King Hassan on a political solution for the Western Sahara.” The Embassy continued: “Speaking officially on behalf of President Bendjedid, Kerroum said Algeria does not seek confrontation with Morocco, and it will not take the initiative to raise tensions.”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840786–0643)
3. In telegram 356507 to Algiers, December 5, the Department noted that in a December 3 meeting with Nassif, “Jorio stated his personal belief that there is a growing popular sentiment in Morocco for going to war with Algeria” even as Moroccans admitted “Algerian military superiority.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840779–0474)
4. In telegram 366367 to Algiers and Rabat, Dam reported: “Armacost made démarches to Algerian and Moroccan Ambassadors separately on December 11. Neither expressed surprise at our expressions of concern over increasing tensions between the two countries over the Western Sahara and both accepted as reasonable our fear that by mischance and unfortunate incident could develop.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840796–0666)