Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

961.

Algiers, March 6, 1983, 1615Z

Dept please repeat to the following posts for info: Nairobi, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat. Subject: Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara. Ref: State 59329.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. We appreciated receiving repeat reftel which throws additional light on the Bendjedid-Hassan Feb. 26 summit during which the two sides reportedly had several hours of discussion.

3. Frankly, we wonder how King Hassan squares the position he reportedly outlined to Bendjedid with his formal acceptance of the OAU Implementation Committee’s resolution providing for a referendum of self-determination, with the options being independence or integration with Morocco.

4. It would appear that King Hassan’s statement that the flag and the stamps must be Moroccan together with his rejection of an independent Saharan state contravene both the letter and the spirit of the OAU decisions.

5. We have noted the King’s suggestion that the Polisario hold talks with the Moroccan-backed Saharan group—presumably within the context of a Moroccan state—and the reported Algerian promise to consider the proposal. Since Algeria maintains that the Western Sahara is not a bilateral Algerian-Moroccan problem, this may turn out to be the face-saving mechanism, if the Polisario is willing to accept the ground rules. In any case, Algeria can be expected publicly to support the principle of self- determination as it is contained in various OAU and UN resolutions.

6. Finally, we would agree with the comment of the Moroccan official who said it was much more difficult for Bendjedid to agree to the summit than for Hassan. It means that Bendjedid and company are putting Algerian interests in better relations with their Maghreb neighbors ahead of their support for Polisario aspirations. As to the question of “why now” we are tempted to see opposition to Qadhafi’s troublemaking in addition to Saudi and Tunisian peacemaking efforts.³

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Telegram 59329 to Algiers, March 4, repeated telegram 1746 from Rabat, March 3, which contains a record of Walters’s meeting with King Hassan, who reported on his meeting with Bendjedid. According to the Embassy, Hassan “told the Algerians that only two real problems divided them: the Western Sahara and the Saharoui people. With respect to the former, the flag and the stamps must be Moroccan, everything else is negotiable. As for the latter, Hassan is prepared to accept the results of a referendum. He expects to win easily; but will honor a loss. He could not accept a small Saharoui state; but suggested the two Saharoui factions meet to reconcile their positions, thereby preventing a loss of face for anyone in a referendum. Chadli promised to study the suggestion.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830002–0210)
3. In telegram 1122 from Algiers, March 14, the Embassy reported that Polisario official spokesman Ould Salek had four conversations with the Spanish Ambassador to Algeria. Salek reported that the “Polisario is extremely bitter over the Bendjedid-Hassan summit but vows to fight on to total victory.” The Spanish Government, the Embassy commented, was “also worried over possible Polisario attacks on Spanish fishing vessels off the Western Sahara coast and the possibility that the Polisario might resort to terrorism in Spain.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830140–0329)