Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

407. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

1972.

Addis Ababa, June 9, 1983, 0820Z

Paris for Assistant Secretary Crocker. Subj: OAU Summit: Success From the Jaws of Failure and Its Implications. Ref: Addis Ababa 1967.²

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Sekou Toure is the summit’s unsung hero (though it could have turned out differently) because he rallied opposition to the seating of the Polisario and carried the day. But the choice that Mengistu and other radicals made when they decided to break with Qadhafi over the SDAR seating issue has important implications.³ We may not necessarily have an easier time of it with Mengistu, but the chairmanship of the OAU should make him more cautious toward his neighbors. And he has shown that where he sees clear evidence of benefit to himself and to Ethiopia he is ready to cast off the more extreme version of radicalism. End summary.

3. The OAU Summit opening last evening can claim place among the finest examples of cliffhangers, a classic case study in the snatching of success from the jaws of failure.⁴ When the diplomatic corps, journalists and mid-level delegation members arrived at Africa Hall late in the afternoon of June 8, the universal expectation was still that the pro and anti Polisario blocs were headed for a showdown. Conjecture centered around whether the Guinean led moderate bloc, which was still at that moment meeting at the Ghion Hotel, would be able to hold on to enough members to prevent a quorum’s being reached.

4. How the Polisario was brought to the decision to withdraw from the summit, who played what role and what deals were struck, will probably become clearer when delegations return home next week and recount their experiences, and when we have the opportunity to talk with some of the African actors here. The result will be of more than strictly historical interest. It may tell us a lot about what we can expect from the various parties further down the road. What can be said now with reasonable certainty is that the shaping of the outcome began on the afternoon of June 7 but things did not actually come together until fairly late in the day of June 8, and that the Committee of Nine composed of Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Congo, Uganda, Cape Verde, Mauritania and Zambia played a major role. By its composition this group was well placed to talk reason to the Polisario. A different turn of events could have made Sekou Toure the villain of the summit and dashed hopes for a Conakry meeting. As it turned out, he is the summit’s unsung hero. By rallying the opposition to the Polisario he made the majority face up to the prospect of a split in the OAU if it continued to insist on the Polisario’s being seated, and he carried the day.

5. The stunning humiliation delivered to Qadhafi by the collective African leadership when faced with the choice between his insistence on seating of the Polisario and the possible break up of the OAU is a lesson that will be remembered for a long time in all quarters.⁵ There was probably at work here a kind of collective survival mechanism. Almost everyone realized that this was the OAU’s last chance and thus the course down which Qadhafi wanted to direct the organization meant likely, if not certain, disaster. But some interesting choices had to be made by the radicals, in particular Mengistu. At Mengistu’s dinner for delegation heads June 7, there were dour mutterings among members of the Egyptian delegation that Mengistu, faced with choice between the interests of the OAU and his friendship with Qadhafi, had chosen Qadhafi. This conclusion turned out to be premature. We do not know yet what role Mengistu played in the talks that led to the Polisario’s stepping aside—probably it was significant—but had he decided to give Qadhafi his support the outcome would very likely have been entirely different. Mengistu had good reason to do what he did. He had staked a lot of prestige, both domestically and internationally, on a successful summit, and a deadlock would have hurt him. His hesitation to split with Qadhafi is probably what caused the struggle that preceded the convening to become so protracted and so bitter. Mengistu did not want to part ways with his Libyan ally if any other solution were possible. It was probably only when other avenues were foreclosed that he was ready to make his choice.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Korn

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830327–0872. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Conakry, Djibouti, Khartoum, Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Rabat.
2. In telegram 1967 from Addis Ababa, June 8, the Embassy stated that the 19th “OAU Summit convened at a few minutes before eight p.m. Addis time with all delegate seats filled except Libya’s, and with no representation or seating arrangement for SDAR.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830326–0156)
3. In telegram 1926 from Addis Ababa, June 6, the Embassy reported: “The Ethiopians have clamped tight control over the Polisario and the Goukouni delegation. Polisario Foreign Minister Hakim told reporters on June 4 that he would hold a press conf at the Hilton morning June 5. The Ethiopians canceled the press conference but a Polisario rep told reporters that the SDAR Chief of State would make a declaration on arrival later same day; but when he arrived, the Polisario leader was given a bouquet of flowers and hustled off to his limousine.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830319–0242)
4. In telegram 1936 from Addis Ababa, June 7, the Embassy reported: “The OAU Summit has, as expected, run into trouble over the SDAR seating issue, but the trouble has been compounded by Qadhafi’s unexpected attendance which has stiffened the SDAR’s insistence on being seated. Moi has formed a Group of 21 to try to come up with a solution. A pall of pessimism has begun to form over the summit but few here are yet ready to write it off as failed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830321–0505)
5. In telegram 2038 from Addis Ababa, June 14, the Embassy commented: “But the success of the 19th Summit has heavily mortgaged the 20th which without serious progress toward settlement of the Western Sahara dispute (and for most, progress means a referendum) faces uncertain prospects at best.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830337–0825)