Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

405. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

160.

Washington, January 3, 1983, 1705Z

SUBJECT

• US and the OAU.

Ref:

• Belgrade 10008.²

1) Secret—Entire text

2) The following paragraphs (3–5) contain background information requested reftel. Para 6 offers guidance for your conversations with Yugoslav and African interlocutors.

3) The OAU, Africa’s 19 year old political body, is currently experiencing a severe organizational crisis. It is divided over the issues of membership in the organization for the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR—the political wing of the Polisario) and the unsuccessful bid in August by Qadhafi to become OAU Chairman. While we were obviously not pleased at the prospect of Qadhafi’s chairmanship (which would have been his by tradition as host for the 1982 OAU Summit meeting had a quorum been present in Tripoli), we also believed that any overt action to sabotage that meeting would have been counterproductive. We did speak often, however, to the issue of the Western Sahara, noting our support of last year’s OAU peace plan involving a referendum. Seating the SDAR as a “member state” of the OAU—which occurred by virtue of the arbitrary decision of the Secretary General at a February Foreign Ministers meeting³—is clearly incompatible with such a plan. Our corridor lobbying on the Western Sahara at that meeting eventually contributed to the evaporation of a quorum, which subsequently led to a number of anti-U.S. comments by some members on our “meddling” in OAU affairs. In August there were enough OAU members who either agreed with our logic on the Western Sahara or who disliked Qadhafi sufficiently to prevent the two-thirds quorum required by the OAU Charter to hold a summit meeting. Perhaps because of the February events or “normal” suspicions about the unseen American hand, we were accused by several member states (mostly the radicals) of having sabotaged the Tripoli Summit.

4) Our policy has been characterized by carefully limited involvement with the OAU per se and support for the OAU’s earlier peace plan for the Western Sahara, which is focussed on a ceasefire followed by a referendum. This policy served a number of purposes up to now: (a) it kept the pot boiling on the issue which was the most effective yet indirect means of frustrating Qadhafi’s plan to become OAU Chairman, thus denying Qadhafi an institutional basis for inserting himself into African problems in which the OAU Chairman might conceivably be given a role; (b) it preserved our relationship with and interests in Morocco; (c) it allowed us to maintain a noninterference posture toward the OAU, which deflated potential criticism and kept us on good terms with a number of African states and leaders whose help is vital to us on important issues like the Namibia/Angola negotiations.⁴

5) Clearly shocked at the ongoing disunity in the organization, the vast majority of members—on both sides of the SDAR issue—appeared to favor holding a summit in November to reunite the OAU. They were also apparently willing to pay the price of holding the summit in Tripoli and having Qadhafi as chairman. A pre-summit ministerial meeting was eventually called for November 15 in Tripoli to make preparations for a November 23–26 summit. The major stumbling block to holding a summit seemed to have been removed since both the Polisario and Algeria agreed that the SDAR would not attend these meetings. “Tripoli II” was also a failure, as was its August predecessor, but the issue which blocked a quorum in November was which Chadian delegation to seat: that of the actual government of Hissène Habré or that of the Libyan-backed former President Oueddeye Goukouni. In the end virtually the same group of moderates aligned earlier against the SDAR seating refused to participate in the November meetings because Libyan-led radicals held out for not seating any Chadian delegation.

6) Our public position on the OAU can be summarized as follows:

A) The U.S. has always supported and continues to support the OAU as African’s principal political organization.

B) We believe it has made many positive contributions to peace and stability in Africa, and has the potential to make further contributions.

C) The U.S. actively supported the OAU peacekeeping effort in Chad.

D) We believe that the OAU Implementation Committee’s peace plan for the Western Sahara, founded on a ceasefire and a referendum, offers the best hope for resolving that conflict.

E) The U.S. continues to believe that Qadhafi, because of his well known adventurism throughout the world and his active destabilization efforts against his African neighbors,⁵ is an inappropriate spokesman for the continent. We also recognize, however, that the choices of a summit site and a chairman for the OAU are for the membership of that organization to decide.

F) We regret the current state of disunity within the OAU and hope that responsible efforts to restore the unity lost twice at Tripoli will be successful.

G) The U.S. did not lobby anyone in an effort to prevent a quorum at Tripoli. We believe that the failure to produce a quorum resulted directly from the contentious issues which split the OAU membership and from many members’ doubts about a Qadhafi chairmanship.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830002–0611. Secret. Drafted by Fairchild; cleared by Ann Korky (NEA/AFN) and George Humphrey (EUR/EEY); approved by John Davis (EUR/EE). Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lagos, Lusaka, and USUN.
2. In telegram 10008 from Belgrade, December 27, 1982, the Embassy reported that in private conversations with Yugoslav diplomats “a surprising number of African countries are advancing the Libyan contention that the USG is exploiting OAU internal differences in order to get at Qadhafi.” The Embassy therefore requested “background information for use with Yugoslavs and African diplomats” in reply to charges. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820668–0934)
3. See footnote 2, Document 396.
4. Documentation on the negotiations on Namibia and Angola is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXV, Southern Africa, 1981–1984, and Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.
5. In telegram 45276 to the OAU Collective and multiple recipients, February 17, the Department reported: “Following the Tripoli II failure, Qadhafi vowed to increase his assistance to the Polisario. The inventory of tanks and other conventional weaponry in Polisario hands has, in fact, increased over the past several months, and most of it probably comes from Libya.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830092–0370)