Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

396. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

688.

Algiers, February 14, 1982, 1435Z

SUBJECT

• Highlights of Veliotes’ Algiers Discussions February 13.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Herewith are highlights of Assistant Secretary Veliotes’ Feb 13 in-depth discussions with Foreign Minister Benyahia, Acting DefMin Col. Belloucif and MFA Secretary General Dembri.

3. The hour and twenty minute discussion with Foreign Minister Benyahia was the last, but most significant, of Assistant Secretary Veliotes’ meetings in Algiers, taking place in the evening immediately after Benyahia’s return from Nairobi. Veliotes was accompanied by Ambassador, AFN Director Flaten and DCM Lorenz.

4. Benyahia spoke heatedly and with great pessimism about what he considered the deteriorating situation in the Western Sahara. He believed it ridiculous to assume that Nairobi had succeeded. It had failed.² Morocco insists on a confirmatory referendum contrary to the OAU’s decisions, and wants to organize the referendum instead of the OAU or UN. The reason for Morocco’s unwillingness to accept a political settlement was clear: U.S. military aid had led Morocco to believe it could win the Sahara conflict and there was therefore no reason to search for a peaceful solution. Because of Morocco’s obstinacy the conflict was likely to continue for 5, 10 or 15 years. It would almost certainly escalate, each stage of escalation carrying with it an increasing threat of great power confrontation.

5. Benyahia strongly criticized the recent decisions taken at Marrakech regarding the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship.³ Algeria viewed these decisions with “enormous concern.” He termed the Joint Military Commission and the decisions on access rights “a quantitative and qualitative augmentation” of that relationship. Veliotes explained that the JMC and the access understandings could in no sense be so interpreted. The JMC was no more than a useful mechanism for managing our bilateral military aid relationships—one which worked well in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt. As for access rights, their sole object was to counter the threat of Soviet military intervention in the Gulf. This had nothing to do with northwest Africa.

6. Veliotes continued that while the recent agreements with Morocco were not a substantial augmentation, the U.S. was determined to maintain an equilibrium in the area and to continue support of its old friend, Morocco. He noted that equilibrium depends on both sides: The military balance had been significantly altered last fall by the introduction of SAM–6s, and the U.S. intended to restore that balance. Benyahia responded that the U.S. concept of equilibrium in the region was to allow Moroccan aircraft to roam at will throughout the Western Sahara.

7. Benyahia said that Algeria had no quarrel with America’s close relationship with Morocco. Indeed, Morocco was Algeria’s friend too. What Algeria did object to was a military aid relationship of such magnitude that it impeded a political settlement of the Sahara conflict.

8. One of Benyahia’s main points was that the U.S. had no real need of transit rights in Morocco in a situation involving threat to the Gulf since it already had such rights in the Azores, Spain and Italy. Veliotes explained at length the need for redundancy. Nevertheless, Benyahia clearly perceived the base rights as an opening wedge for massive U.S. assistance to Morocco in the Sahara conflict. Veliotes concluded this part of the discussion with the comment that he knew he was not going to persuade Benyahia now, but was confident that with the passage of time Algeria would acknowledge America’s constructive contribution to a Sahara settlement. (The discussion then turned to other issues, including Chad, the Middle East situation, Angola and Poland, which will be reported separately.)⁴

9. Accompanied by Ambassador, AFN Director Flaten and PolCouns Thompson, Veliotes had 90-minute, wide-ranging talk with the SYG of the MOD Belloucif (in reality, in day-to-day charge of the Defense Ministry since President Bendjedid holds the Defense portfolio.)

10. Algero-American Relations. Belloucif stressed Algeria wished to have good relations with the U.S. as well as all other countries. Algeria recognized the great U.S. contribution to international cooperation. He was critical of U.S.-Moroccan discussions re RDF transit arrangements as inconsistent with Morocco’s avowed non-alignment. Algeria did not want to see a military presence by the super powers in North Africa. Such military cooperation made it more difficult for Algeria to resist Soviet pressures for military facilities. If Algeria were to sign such an agreement with the USSR, Belloucif was sure King Hassan and the U.S. would not be pleased. He did not ask for a response since he knew this to be true.

11. Veliotes stressed the strategic nature of our access discussions and the practical advantages of the mixed military commission. He noted that the access discussions were not related to the Western Sahara. Belloucif listened closely but did not seem to be reassured.

12. Western Sahara. Belloucif reiterated Algeria’s position that the belligerents were Morocco and the Polisario. He did not hide Algeria’s support for the Polisario but also agreed with the Ambassador that this gave Algeria leverage vis-à-vis the Polisario. Belloucif cited the high rank and large number of recent U.S. officials visiting Morocco and said Algeria sometimes has the feeling it is considered as a hostile state. Veliotes denied this was the case. (For political aspects of the Western Sahara, see below.)

13. On Libya, Belloucif said Algeria tries to moderate Qadhafi’s actions and added that the thought the U.S. was making a mistake in building up Qadhafi by so much publicity. He stated Algeria had told Tunisian PM Mzali Qadhafi had been warned not to attack Tunisia. Moreover, Algeria was helping the GUNT and supporting the OAU effort in Chad, but the basic problem was lack of precision on the role of the PKF. Belloucif made it clear Algeria sought to keep Libya out of Chad and from interfering with its other Maghreb neighbors. Finally, Belloucif stressed that Algeria had paid too high a price for its own independence to allow Cuba, the USSR, East Germany or any outsiders into the Western Sahara.

14. Same U.S. participants plus DCM attended working lunch hosted by acting Foreign Minister Dembri. Director of West European and North American Affairs Benouniche and Deputy Director for North America Mekideche also was present.

15. Western Sahara. Dembri was quite forthcoming re results of Nairobi III. (But this was before Benyahia had returned with his much more pessimistic personal evaluation.) It was necessary, Dembri said, for President Moi to follow up quickly with the parties to get the OAU-UN presence in place, to agree on the modalities of the referendum, to arrange a ceasefire and, finally, to supervise the referendum. Dembri hinted that indirect Moroccan-Polisario contacts could take place via an OAU intermediary and cited the example of the Iran hostage negotiations. Benouniche noted that neither Morocco nor the Polisario had yet formally responded to the committee recommendations.

16. U.S.-Moroccan Military Cooperation. Veliotes gave Dembri essentially same explanations he had given Belloucif. Dembri said Algeria considered neither King Hassan nor the Moroccans to be enemies. Algeria was determined to remain friends with Morocco despite the Western Sahara. However, U.S.-Moroccan miliary cooperation risked polarization, super power intervention and radicalization of the Polisario. In response to Benouniche’s question Ambassador said we had irrefutable evidence that the Polisario had SA–6’s and SA–9’s in addition to other sophisticated military equipment.

17. Middle East. Veliotes gave an in-depth description of the status of the Middle East peace process and the dedication of the U.S. to progress on the question of Palestinian autonomy. The Algerians responded with their known position. Concerning the prospects for reconvening the Fez Arab League Summit, Dembri indicated Saudi Arabia, Algeria and SYG Klibi would meet in Tunis to see what could be done. Dembri spoke in rather positive terms of the Fahd plan as a possible basis for an Arab position.

18. Iran-Iraq. Dembri reviewed Iran-Iraq developments along the lines of his recent conversation with the Ambassador (Algiers 546).⁵ He said Iranian FM would arrive in Algiers Feb 14 for discussions. Dembri and Benouniche smiled when the Ambassador observed that it would be good to get back to something along the lines of the 1975 Algiers Accord.⁶ We shared with Dembri our assessment of the Iran-Iraq situation (State 31329).⁷

19. Comment. These conversations revealed both the positive and the negative elements in our current relations with Algeria. The Western Sahara continues to be the principal negative element, and Benyahia at least appeared very pessimistic that Nairobi III would lead to an early settlement. Clearly the Algerians are extremely upset over the announcement of our access discussions with Morocco and the establishment of the Joint Military Committee. Although they talk of the danger of superpower military involvement in the Maghreb, we expect the Algerians will continue to resist any pressures from the Soviets for similar arrangements here. Their presentation on this point was somewhat self-serving and ambivalent, but the strongest theme was a focus on Algerian nationalism and independence.

20. Assistant Secretary Veliotes arrived just after announcement of our expanded military cooperation with Morocco and Algeria’s presumed disappointment with Nairobi III.⁸ Despite their frank criticisms, the message that Algeria would like to have better relations with the U.S. was also communicated.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820082–0254. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to London, Jidda, Nairobi, Paris, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat and Tunis.
2. Reference is to the OAU Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Nairobi February 8–9, during which the OAU agreed for the first time to seat the SADR delegation, thereby granting de facto recognition to the Polisario’s political wing. Morocco and 16 other OAU members walked out in protest.
3. See Document 199.
4. Records of Veliotes’s discussions with Dembri and Bengelloun on these issues are in telegram 695 from Algiers and telegram 698 from Algiers, both February 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820082–0256 and D820082–0261, respectively)
5. In telegram 546 from Algiers, February 7, Newlin reported: “On instructions, I raised possibilities of negotiations concerning Iran-Iraq war with Algerians with forthcoming results.” Dembri “commented on what Algeria sees as favorable trends in both countries which may present opportunities for an intermediary role.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820067–1075) Documentation on the war is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XX, Iran; Iraq, April 1980–January 1985.
6. See footnote 4, Document 171.
7. Telegram 31329 to multiple recipients, February 5, repeated the text of telegram 29508 to multiple recipients, February 4, in which the Department offered an assessment of recent military activities between Iran and Iraq. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820064–0562)
8. See footnote 3 above.