Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

4597.

Algiers, December 22, 1981, 1650Z

SUBJECT

• Algeria’s Attitude Toward Morocco and the Polisario.

Ref:

• Algiers 4591.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. From my Dec 21 conversation with FM Benyahia (who apparently has been Algeria’s principal interlocutor with the Moroccans on the Western Sahara) the following impressions emerged:

(A) Algeria is actively searching for a political solution in accordance with the OAU decisions.

(B) Algeria is unwilling to negotiate publicly with Morocco on the Western Sahara since it is not a party to the conflict.

(C) Algeria is prepared to act a as a go-between (as it did during the hostage negotiations) and to discuss the Western Sahara privately with Morocco in the broader context of regional cooperation, something that would benefit all parties.

(D) The recent parade of high-level U.S. visitors to Morocco and our post-Guelta Zemmour military assistance has alarmed Algeria which fears the possibility of counter-move by Libya and, perhaps, the Soviets. This alarm is expressed obliquely by opposition to U.S. military involvement in the conflict.

3. Current Algerian national policy as enunciated and practiced is to concentrate on regional stability abroad and domestic development at home. Neither of these overriding objectives is served by a continuation of the Western Sahara conflict. Algeria thus supports the OAU referendum process and states it will accept the wishes of the Sahraoui people.

4. At the same time, Algeria insists that the referendum be “serious”. That is, the modalities of the referendum must ensure to the extent possible a genuine expression of the wishes of the Sahraouis. In the recent bilateral discussions that have taken place, Algeria apparently doubts King Hassan’s commitment to a serious referendum.³ The implication of Benyahia’s remarks was that Algeria was prepared to continue its private bilateral contacts with Morocco with a view to working out the modalities of the referendum which both Morocco and the Polisario could accept (presumably at the planned January meeting of the OAU Implementation Committee).

4. From here, the various positions seem to be:

(A) Algeria is prepared to work quietly for a serious (i.e. honest) referendum and will abide by its outcome.

(B) Morocco is unwilling to agree to terms of a referendum which might result in a majority vote for independence.

(C) The Polisario—unclear the Polisario gives lip service to the OAU decisions, but is known to have doubts about a referendum and insists on direct negotatiions.⁴ If Algeria and Morocco were to agree on modalities, it would be up to Algeria to try to sell such an arrangement to the Polisario. Should the Polisario balk, it would be difficult for Algeria to try to impose the arrangements given its traditional position on the Western Sahara and its general posture of support for liberation movements. Algeria will therefore be cautious in its discussions with Morocco.

5. Only one thing seems reasonably clear: As long as they are going on, Moroccan-Algerian exchanges offer the best prospect for eventual progress on this issue. This suggests that Washington discussions with the King should be designed to encourage continued bilateral discussions with the Algerians and eventual indirect talks with the Polisario at the OAU Committee meeting.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810609–0435. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat. The document is misnumbered in the original.
2. Telegram 4591 from Algeria, December 22, contains a record of Newlin’s December 21 meeting with Benyahia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810608–0738)
3. In telegram 4597 from Algiers, December 22, Newlin reported that Algeria “supports the OAU referendum process and states it will accept the wishes of the Sahraoui people. At the same time, Algeria insists that the referendum be ‘serious.’ That is, the modalities of the referendum must ensure to the extent possible a genuine expression of the wishes of the Sahraouis. In the recent bilateral discussions that have taken place, Algeria apparently doubts King Hassan’s commitment to a serious referendum.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810609–0435)
4. In telegram 4221 from Algiers, November 28, the Embassy reported: “The Polisario is carrying on an intensive and unprecedented diplomatic and propaganda campaign urging direct Morocco-Polisario negotiations and alleging U.S. military assistance to Morocco is an obstacle to OAU and UN peace efforts.” Continued U.S. military assistance to Morocco, the Polisario charged, “will inevitably lead to escalation of the Sahara conflict.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810566–0443)