Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

7380.

Rabat, August 24, 1984, 1352Z

For Secretary: NEA for Assistant Secretary Murphy. Also for S/AL. Department please pass to DCI and SecDef. From Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters. Subject: Ambassador Walters’ August 23 Meeting With King Hassan.

1. Secret/Nodis entire text.

2. Upon arrival in Casablanca at 1430 on 23 August 1984 I was met by Chargé Kirby and taken directly to the Casablanca palace where I saw King Hassan for one and one half hours.

3. King Hassan said that he knew the U.S. Government was concerned and he wished to review with me the genesis leading to his signature of the agreement with Qadhafi on August 13. He said that his primary responsibility was to the people of Morocco. They had become isolated as a result of the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian pact (which he had not been invited to join and which seemed to him to encircle Morocco).

4. The last time he had talked with Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, the latter had proposed a Maghreb confederation between at least initially, Algeria and Morocco. King Hassan said he had been enthusiastic. Whereupon Ibrahimi had asked him to put down on paper his ideas on how such a confederation could be organized. He had agreed to do so and had sent the papers to the Algerians more than two months ago. There had been no comments or reply from the Algerians since then.

5. King Hassan then strongly felt the need to take some balancing action of a similarly spectacular nature. Qadhafi had addressed to him, Mubarak, Bourguiba, Bendjedid and Haidalla similar letters saying that he wanted to do something for Arab and Maghrebian unity. Qadhafi said his conscience was bothering him for he seemed to be bothering other Arab leaders and he wondered what he could do. The King had then on 12 July sent Guedira to propose to Qadhafi a plan for union not repeat not merger in which the sovereignty of member nations was intact and which other Arab and African nations could join. To his surprise, Qadhafi had accepted and asked Hassan to come to Syrte to sign the agreement. Hassan had refused to go to Syrte because of past U.S.-Libyan clashes and Qadhafi had proposed that he come to Oujda—right on the Algerian/Moroccan border—to see the King.

6. King Hassan said that all of this had transpired in the greatest secrecy and none of his Ministers with the exception of Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Minister of Interior Driss Basri was informed until they were on the train and approaching Oujda. He then said that it was important to read the agreement carefully point by point and he proceeded to read it to me commenting on certain points. He pointed out that the presidency of the union would be exercised jointly by the leader of Libya and King of Morocco and in consequence Qadhafi could not take rash actions without his consent. He then said “I have no illusions about Qadhafi. Either I tame him or the union breaks up. And because of his past behavior. He will be blamed for the break-up.” There was perhaps only a ten percent chance that he would succeed in taming Qadhafi, but that was still ten percent more chance than had existed previously. The Libyan leader said he was sure his signature of this agreement would infuriate the Soviets and cause Hassan difficulty with the U.S. Hassan had replied that he was sure the U.S. was not just a fair-weather friend but a real friend.

7. Hassan said he and Qadhafi had agreed that the question of the union (not merger) of the two states should be subject to a referendum as soon as possible. In Morocco that referendum would take place on August 31.

8. The union would also have a joint court and if agreement on disputes could not be reached, both parties would accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. King Hassan pointed to Article 11, which reads, “In the unbounded reservation of their respective sovereignties each of the two states undertakes not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other state.”

9. When I asked about the mutual defense aspects of the treaty and what would happen if there were to be a Libyan attack on U.S. forces in the Gulf of Sytre and the U.S. struck back, Hassan said that in such a case he might write a letter of concern to President Reagan and that would be all.

10. King Hassan said that Qadhafi had insisted on including in the text an article on economic cooperation. Hassan had replied “My people think you are rich. I know you are broke.” Qadhafi had not demurred. Hassan also pointed out that he had invited Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia to join—something they had not done with him in their tri-partite treaty.

11. King Hassan said that secrecy had been indispensable and this was why he had not notified us, the French, or Egyptians until after the signature of the agreement. He repeated that the treaty was not a merger. Could be denounced at any time, and gave Qadhafi no hold over him. There had been no mention in the treaty of “imperialism or colonialism”. And that the preamble of the treaty indicated that it was a point of departure for other states to join. King Fahd had been informed and was enthusiastic at the idea of taming Qadhafi.

12. He then asked me how the U.S. felt about this agreement. I replied that I had conveyed to President Reagan and Secretary Shultz² his message that he would not change his relationship with us whatever happened, but I would be remiss in our personal friendship if I did not tell him how concerned we were about this matter. Qadhafi was viewed in the U.S. as an unscrupulous killer very much in line with the opinion the King had expressed to me the last time we met when Hassan said to me, “If you go to see him, do not take anything to drink or eat. He will give you something that will kill you a year later.” The King nodded wryly as I reminded him of this. Then he said “You have not been able to get rid of him or to silence him. Why not give my plans a chance?”

13. I said Qadhafi was a thug who killed, subverted and was actively plotting against King Hussein, King Fahd and President Nimeiri. We had been taken by surprise by this announcement of which we had no advance knowledge. Qadhafi was still in northern Chad and there was serious evidence that he was connected with the mining of the Red Sea and his terrorists were operating all over Western Europe.

14. King Hassan then said, “You have not been able to stop this kind of behavior. Why not give me a chance to see if I can tame him. If I can’t, the union will break down.”

15. I said that we were concerned that this move would play into hands of the Algerian hardliners to the detriment of Bendjedid.

16. King Hassan said he could reassure me on that score. The Algerians had been astounded at the Moroccan riposte to their tri-partite alliance.³ He had called President Bendjedid after the signature and the Algerian President had accepted Hassan’s proposal for a meeting between the two Chiefs of State and would send an envoy to Morocco to work out the details on August 29.

17. King Hassan also indicated that he had been in touch with President Mitterrand who would be coming to Morocco for a week’s vacation on the 29th of August. Mitterrand did not want to be in Morocco on the day of the referendum on the treaty. So he would fly to the Canary Islands for that day and then return to Morocco on the following day.

18. I then pointed to the difficulty of coordinating the policies of Morocco and Libya. Hassan replied, “I will do the coordinating.”

19. I mentioned the questions that this union would raise for us in the matter of aircraft. Hassan said Qadhafi had intended to buy 25 Airbuses but they had American engines and perhaps the Moroccans could lease them, get them maintained and return them to the Libyans. Hassan had told Qadhafi that the Americans were not children, would see through this scheme at once and it was out of the question. He understands the problem of maintenance for Libyan aircraft.

20. Article 12, according to the King, would not in any way affect his relationship with us. Qadhafi had said, “You have your friends and I have mine”.

21. Joint maneuvers:
I then told the King why we had postponed the joint maneuvers.⁴ He listened carefully and wished us well. He did not seem at all upset nor did he protest in any way the postponement.

22. Western Sahara:
I expressed our concerns to Hassan about his statements on “hot pursuit”. He replied that he knew any serious attack on Mauritania could well draw Algeria into the war. Algeria had overwhelming superiority over Morocco in all areas of military hardware and only in the quality of its men did Morocco have superiority. He certainly would not provoke a conflict with Algeria. In reply to my question as to whether President Bendjedid was really in charge, Hassan replied “More so now than at any time since he succeeded Boumédiènne”. He was looking forward to this next meeting with the Algerian President and hoped they could move forward together. Certainly he did not have the hardware to match vast quantities of Soviet equipment in the hands of the Algerians and more was arriving.

23. I asked whether he did not believe that the signature of this agreement with Libya would antagonize the moderate black Africans and hasten the Polisario’s admission to the OAU. We had been watching the strength of Morocco’s position on the ground and its deterioration politically among the OAU members. King Hassan said Mubarak had urged him to take some political action on the Sahara and he would soon hold a referendum on the future of the territory. I could not elicit the forms in which the question would be asked nor a date for such a referendum. Nor would he discuss what he would say if the SDAR was seated. He did note that it was almost impossible for anyone to attack Dakhla without crossing Mauritanian territory. I asked him whether he had a direct threat of a military nature from the Algerians and he said “No”. There had been no threat. Saharaouis will vote in the parliamentary elections and in the referendum on union with Libya.

24. The King said “My agreement with Libya is wide open to the Algerians, Tunisians and Mauritanians and even the Egyptians”. As an aside he said, “After I see you, I am receiving the Major General who is the head of the Egyptian Intelligence Service. He has told me that the Egyptians view this union as a real possibility to get Qadhafi back in the corral”. Hassan then said, In all such deals there is a locomotive and freight cars and I am a locomotive. If the union is unworkable, I will break it”.

25. It was clear that he did not want to be drawn out on what he would do politically about the Sahara. But seemed fully aware of what would happen at the next OAU meeting.

26. Then King Hassan said, “You Americans often do things I don’t like or do not fully understand without consulting me in advance and I don’t expect you to. We now have a 10 percent chance of being able to tame Qadhafi. That is not much, but it is 10 percent more than we used to have. Fahd and Mubarak understand what I am doing. The Tunisians have been odious.⁵ I will work on the black Africans and we will see what we shall see. Every nation has its problems. You have your Russians and your Chinese. Algeria is my Russia and Qadhafi is my China. You must show understanding and give me a chance to tame this madman. You must show that you are not just fair-weather friends but friends in difficult times also.”

27. Finally. The King said he was sending his Counselor Reda Guedira to Washington on September 4 to explain to those in the U.S. Government who might be concerned about his agreement with Qadhafi,⁶ and why Morocco had taken this step, and would be grateful if the appropriate appointments could be scheduled.

28. After my meeting with the King I met separately with Guedira⁷ and flagged the various points of our concern so he could be ready to answer them in Washington.

29. Comment: King Hassan looked serene and relaxed. The only tone of sharpness crept in when he said, “You must show that you are not just fair-weather friends.” He seemed pleased to be able to tell me that following this agreement he would be meeting with French President Mitterrand (who will spend a week in Morocco), Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid and that the Chief of Egyptian Intelligence was waiting to see him as I left. He said he looked forward to further discussions with me at the time of his daughter’s wedding on September 15. That will give him some time to reflect on our concerns and at that time I will press further on what he intends to do about the Sahara. He may have seen Bendjedid by that time and will certainly have seen Mitterrand. My plate was quite heavy this time.

Kirby

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–86–0048, 1984 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 1, Morocco. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A stamped and handwritten notation indicates that Weinberger and Taft saw the telegram.
2. Not found.
3. In telegram 3766 from Algiers, August 18, the Embassy reported: “Algerians are staying cool and taking the high road in the wake of the Hassan-Qadhafi agreement on union. Rather than denouncing the agreement (which Qadhafi and Guedira did not announce during their stop here), Algeria is pointing to the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian Treaty of Friendship which is open to other adherents as the true model for building the Grand Arab Maghreb.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840528–0402)
4. After it learned of the Moroccan-Libyan union, the Reagan administration postponed the joint maneuvers.
5. In telegram 6326 from Tunis, August 16, the Embassy reported: “Taken aback and obviously irritated by the Moroccan-Libyan decisions to form a union, the Tunisians are being pushed toward Algeria. Qadhafi is maintaining that the union was King Hassan’s idea, and has urged the Tunisians to consider joining. Tunisia is not about to do anything of the sort, but it is caught in the middle and will continue to attempt to keep all of its neighbors—especially Libya—off its back.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840523–0506)
6. See Document 228. A record of the Shultz-Guedira meeting is in telegram 267326 to Paris, September 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010–0334)
7. No record of the Walters-Guedira meeting has been found.