Office of the Historian

388. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan1

Washington, October 30, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

2. My Meeting with King Hassan’s Special Emissary. In our meeting today, King Hassan’s special emissary, Reda Guedira,2 said that Morocco’s recent military defeat in the Western Sahara saw the introduction of SAM–6s and heavy armor for the first time in the war. The Moroccans are convinced that the SAM–6s were supplied by the Libyans with Soviet approval. Guedira asked us for help at the UN to get a resolution sponsored by the Organization of African Unity tabled supporting a ceasefire and referendum. I agreed. He also asked us to warn the Russians that the U.S. is not indifferent to the fate of the Western Sahara. I assured Guedira that I would make this point to Ambassador Dobrynin Saturday.3 Finally, he requested immediate U.S. assistance to counter the Polisario SAM-6 capability. I referred to my recent message to King Hassan4 and noted that a high-level DOD team will visit Morocco next week which will consider additional actions we might take. Finally, on your behalf I asked Guedira to assure King Hassan that we consider him an ally and irreplaceable world leader. Guedira appeared reassured by my remarks. He left a personal congratulatory message from King Hassan to you on your AWACS victory, which is being forwarded separately.5 (S)

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Secretary Haig’s Evening Report (10/29/1981–11/28/1981). Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 11:12 a.m. on October 31.↩
  2. A record of the Haig-Guedira discussion is in telegram 292159 to Rabat, November 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810519–0532)↩
  3. Haig and Dobrynin met on October 31. According to telegrams 291727 to Moscow, October 31, and 293442 to Moscow, November 4, they discussed Cuba, Afghanistan, arms control, Kampuchea, and Angola. The issue of Libya’s and the Soviet Union’s alleged role in arming the Polisario with SAM–6s was not raised. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number] and N810009–0015, respectively)↩
  4. See Document 387.↩
  5. The letter has not been found. Hassan referenced the Senate’s October 28 rejection of a resolution disapproving the administration’s decision to approval the sale of five Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Documentation on the sale is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.↩