Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

376. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

1694.

Nouakchott, April 15, 1981, 1615Z

Tunis for General Walters. Subj: Western Sahara: Thoughts for General Walters’ Meeting With President Bendjedid. Ref: (A) Algiers 1473;² (B) FBIS Abidjan R 141219Z Apr 81.³

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Embassy fully supports points made reftel, particularly those aimed at preventing escalation of conflict onto Mauritanian territory, a prime short-term policy goal, in our opinion.

3. Furthermore, Embassy proposes one more policy option: Since Morocco refuses to deal directly with the Polisario, and Algeria refuses to deal only with Morocco, and the Polisario want to deal only with Morocco, why not suggest that all parties to the war—Polisario, Morocco and Algeria—sit down together. Algeria is a co-belligerent, whether admitted or not, since it provides equipment and, more importantly, a sanctuary. If all three parties were to get together—and a format could be determined—they would, at least insofar as Moroccans and Polisario were concerned, be making an initial accommodation which, in our opinion, would be viewed favorably by African and international opinion.

4. Note that we leave Mauritania for the time being out of the negotiating equation: ref FBIS item contains statement by Mauritanian Foreign Minister Zamel concerning Mauritanian merger with Saharan state. Zamel is quoted as saying that “if objective reasons for the formation of a federation between Mauritania and the Saharan state exist, there is no reason why it should not be created.”⁴ This represents farthest statement along these lines we have seen by GIRM official. This could then be one of the factors to be negotiated by the three parties concerned. We believe that Mauritania would not object to the tripartite negotiations, since they would feel that their interests would be well-represented by both Polisario and Algeria.

5. These three-sided negotiations would also serve to preclude Libya, since it would not technically qualify as a belligerent and does not have a common border with the disputed area.

6. It would appear to us that if anyone is going to have to pay the price of peace, it is going to be Mauritania, or at least part of its territory; in this regard, GIRM Foreign Minister is now on the books as not being opposed to some sort of arrangement, which a conference of the other three parties could determine.

Schrager

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810179–0882. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis. Sent for information Priority to Paris.
2. In telegram 1473 from Algiers, April 13, the Embassy reported: “As the Western Sahara conflict drags into its fifth year, there is still little sign of movement toward negotiation. The U.S. is caught up in a situation not of its making, where we have limited leverage, but where we should do what we can to contain the conflict and move it toward a peaceful resolution.” The Embassy continued: “As long as the war goes on it bears the risks of escalation (as we see now in the Mauritanian affair) and presents the United States with difficult policy choices in balancing its relations with Morocco and Algeria, both of which are important to us for different reasons.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810176–0221)
3. Not found.
4. In telegram 98132 to multiple diplomatic posts, April 16, the Department indicated that it was “intrigued by” the Embassy’s “quote of GIRM Foreign Minister Zamel which appears to leave door open to formation of a federation between Mauritania and a future SDAR.” The Department continued: “we are curious whether basic idea could conceivably provide a new basis on which to seek a negotiated compromise peace settlement. Without implying U.S. support for the idea in discussions with foreign officials, posts are encouraged to provide any analysis or further information which is relevant.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810182–0897)